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Abstract
The chapter has 9 sections, covering the theory of two-sided markets and related em-
pirical work. Section 1 introduces the reader to the literature. Section 2 covers the case
of markets dominated by a single monopolistic firm. Section 3 discusses the theoretical
literature on competition for the market, focusing on pricing strategies that firms may
follow to prevent entry. Section 4 discusses pricing in markets in which multiple plat-
forms are active and serve both sides. Section 5 presents alternative models of platform
competition. Section 6 discusses richer matching protocols whereby platforms price-
discriminate by granting access only to a subset of the participating agents from the
other side and discusses the related literature on matching design. Section 7 discusses
identification in empirical work. Section 8 discusses estimation in empirical work. Fi-
nally, Section 9 concludes.
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1 Introduction
Consider a consumer that starts the day by searching for news on a tablet computer and
then ordering a car ride from a ride-sharing company over a mobile telephone. At each of
these points, an intermediary connects the consumer to various providers. The consumer’s
search terms for news are processed by a web search engine that mediates between content
consumers and content providers. Simultaneously with this search, a separate intermediary
system connects the consumer (and the consumer’s search behavior) to advertisers, leading
to advertisements. The ride-sharing service is an intermediary between the consumer and
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potential ride providers. Payment for the ride-sharing service is processed through a pay-
ment network, an intermediary that facilitates payments between buyers and sellers. These
interactions are enabled by an internet service provider that is an intermediary between
consumers and a complex market of telecommunication systems. In addition, the devices in
this story, the tablet and phone, can be regarded as intermediaries themselves, connecting
consumers to software applications via the devices’ operating systems. And most likely, at
least one of them was purchased through an online marketplace that connects consumers
to sellers.
Economics regards these intermediaries as platforms. Platforms are firms, or services of
firms, that connect market participants and allow them to interact or transact. Platforms
are prevalent in many markets: health insurance companies, for example, mediate between
consumers and care providers, stock exchanges mediate between buyers and sellers (or
liquidity providers and liquidity takers) and cable television companies mediate between
content providers and viewers. The rise of platforms, especially on the internet, has changed
the way vast parts of the economy are organized and has led to intense reexamination of
the nature of market power, competition policy, and regulation. Platform economics is
central to understanding a wide variety of recent policy debates, such as net neutrality,
financial market reforms, antitrust policy, as well as related topics such as privacy, consumer
protection, and media diversity.
A central aspect of platform economics is the role of network effects, which apply when
a product is valued based on the extent to which other market participants adopt or use
the same product. Of particular interest are indirect network effects, which emerge when
the adoption and use of a product leads to increased provision of complementary products
and services, with the value of adopting the original product increasing with the provision
of such complementary goods. For instance, as more consumers adopt a video game console
such as the Sony Playstation, more game-developers invest in developing games for that
platform, raising the value of the console to consumers. In this sense, indirect network
effects lead the platform firm to take into account the various interdependencies between
the two sides of the market, and the pertinent literature studying such interdependencies
is often termed the study of two-sided markets. Naturally, one can also consider multi-
sided markets consisting of more than two sides. For instance, in producing the Windows
operating system, Microsoft manages a three-sided market between hardware providers,
software providers, and consumers. One might even distinguish between different types of
hardware (CPUs, printers, screen devices, etc.) and types of software (productivity apps,
games, etc.), in which case Windows mediates a large many-sided market.
As a product with network effects diffuses into the market, it becomes more valuable
and drives further adoption. Indirect network effects thus lead to a feedback loop as more
participants on each side of the platform find it more valuable to adopt and use the platform
when they expect the other side to attract more users. This phenomenon leads to efficien-
cies as more market participants are able to interact with each other but also, in some
circumstances, market power, as network effects can protect platform owners from entry.
In markets with low marginal costs, as is the case for many digital markets, platforms with
strong network effects can grow to be enormous and eventually dominate the market.1.
1See also Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) for an extended analysis of digital markets
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The most obvious tool that a platform has to manage and expand its use is price. Pricing
decisions in the face of indirect network effects are complex because raising the price on one
side of the market affects demand not only on that side of the market but also on the other,
as each side responds to changes in the participation on the other side. Finding the correct
approach to pricing is key to the success of a platform. For policy-makers attempting to
evaluate the performance of a market, understanding the complex determinants of prices is
also crucial.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the literature on platform economics, focusing
on indirect network effects and pricing. We first provide a unified theoretical treatment of
a wide variety of approaches to these issues. We derive equilibrium and welfare-maximizing
prices and compare the factors that lead to deviations from optimality. Standard intuition
about how prices should respond to costs and competition often do not hold, and we lay
out the intuition required to understand these markets. We discuss different treatments of
how network effects may enter into consumer decision-making. For instance, whether agents
have heterogeneous valuations for the number of agents on the platform turns out to have
important implications. In addition, the platforms’ ability to price-discriminate is critical,
leading to the so-called divide-and-conquer strategies. Modeling platform firms may also
require new equilibrium concepts as the relevant models are rife with multiple equilibria
and one may wish to focus on the most relevant ones.
We contrast monopoly platforms with oligopoly platforms. Whether each agent multi-
homes across several platforms or single-homes on one platform plays an important role.
One may think that if agents are divided into two sides of the market, such as buyers and
sellers, and one set of agents multi-homes, then irrespective of whether this set comprises
buyers or sellers, all agents can interact with all agents on the other side and this guarantees
a level of efficiency. However, a robust result in the literature is that which side multi-homes
has important implications for pricing and the efficiency of the ensuing allocation. When
only one side multi-homes, platforms compete on the single-homing side but behave like
monopolists on the side that multi-homes, selling access to their single-homing agents. Total
network benefits increase, but prices on each side may increase or decrease as a result of
multi-homing.
We also take on some more challenging concepts to model, such as consumer information
and beliefs, and dynamics. Furthermore, in many contexts, a platform plays the central role
of a matchmaker. Matching markets, and more generally market design, play an important
role in platform economics. We provide an overview of the matching-design literature, once
again focusing on pricing. Although we show that prices respond to this wide variety of
modeling assumptions, we are able to draw out some consistent themes about pricing in
these markets.
Next, we turn to empirical work in this area. A starting point and a central issue in
this literature is estimating the magnitude of network effects. We view network effects as
a form of “social spillover” or “neighborhood effect”; the choice of an agent is influenced
by the choices of the agent’s peers. Identifying network effects is fraught with problems of
simultaneity and omitted variables. These problems are similar to those in the literature
on peer effects in social economics, such as identifying how the performance of one student
affects the performance of classmates, or how out-of-wedlock childbirth and criminal arrest
are influenced by the behavior and outcomes of peers. The social economics literature has
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made great strides in understanding the identification of these peer effects, exemplified by
the work of Manski (1993, 1995) on the reflection problem and the literature that followed.
We view the relationship between the social economics and network effects literatures as
under-explored. In this chapter, we provide a review of empirical approaches to estimate
network effects from the perspective of the literature on social economics. Doing so pro-
vides a valuable connection between the network effects literature and the wider economics
literature and provides new insights into the identification and estimation of network effects.
With the estimation of network effects in hand, we turn to a review of the estimation
of pricing in settings with network effects. We argue that empirical papers have mostly
taken one of two approaches. The first approach is to obtain data on many platforms, often
separated by geography, and to analyze how endogenous variables such as prices respond to
exogenous market characteristics. These papers often use reduced-form econometrics and
attempt to use theory to evaluate the effects that are expected to be found. The other
approach is to obtain data on a single platform and study the interaction between agents
on the platform, taking the platform pricing as exogenous. These papers are often quite
structural and utilize detailed models of agent behavior on the platform. These papers
then calculate various counterfactual outcomes associated with different price changes and
evaluate why firms choose the prices they do and what would happen if prices were to
change. These methods provide different insights into pricing by platforms, but we are able
to draw out some general lessons and connect them to the theoretical results in the first part
of the chapter. For instance, in the theoretical, part we discuss the seesaw effect, namely
the property that factors that depress price on one side of the market tend to raise price on
the other side; in the empirical part, we then discuss papers that support the existence of
the seesaw effect across a variety of industries using a variety of methods.
1.1 Terminology and background
The literature on network effects and two-sided markets has early antecedents in Rohlfs
(1974), Baxter (1983), and, on the empirical side, Rosse (1970). The modern incarnation
of the literature on network effects is typically associated with Arthur (1989), Katz and
Shapiro (1985), and Farrell and Saloner (1986). The first theoretical models of indirect
network effects are Church and Gandal (1992), as well as Chou and Shy (1990). An im-
portant overview of this earlier work is Farrell and Klemperer (2007). This earlier research
on network effects and particularly indirect network effects typically focuses on consumer
adoption decisions and does not treat pricing or other decisions by the platform as central.
The focus changed with the launch of the literature on two-sided markets, pioneered by
Caillaud and Jullien (2001), Rochet and Tirole (2002), and Parker and Van Alstyne (2005).
Important contributions to the development of the literature are Rochet and Tirole (2006)
and Armstrong (2006). Rysman (2009) provides an introduction, and a recent overview of
various issues related to platform economics is Belleflamme and Peitz (2021).
In this section, we define what we mean by a platform. Hereafter, we use the terms
“two-sided market” and “platform market” interchangeably. Several papers offer definitions
of two-sidedness, such as Rochet and Tirole (2006), Weyl (2010), and Hagiu and Wright
(2015a,b). We do not wish to adjudicate among these different definitions, but rather offer
some sense of what economists normally mean with these terms. We generally consider a
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two-sided market to be one in which at least two distinct sets of agents (or sides) interact
through an intermediary—the platform—and in which the behavior of each set of agents
directly impacts the utility, or the profit, of the other set of agents. The impact of one
set of agents on the other, and the resulting feedback to the first set of agents, is an
indirect network effect. To the extent that such an effect is not perfectly internalized by
the platform’s pricing, it represents a network externality.
For example, suppose buyers and sellers appear at an open marketplace where they may
engage in trade. The marketplace organizer is the intermediary, or platform, and the sellers
naturally care about how successful the intermediary is in attracting buyers, and vice versa,
so the firm is two-sided. In contrast, suppose the marketplace organizer decides to purchase
the sellers’ products wholesale and then retail the inventory to buyers. The sellers receive
the wholesale price whether buyers materialize or not, and so the sellers no longer have
an interest in the buyers’ behavior. In this case, we refer to the firm as “traditional,” or
one-sided.2
In reality, almost every real-world firm has some elements of two-sidedness to it, and it
makes little sense to classify firms with some binary distinction as being a platform or not.
Rather, one should see the platform nature of a firm as a continuous dimension.3 Platform
economics may be more important for understanding some phenomena than others, even
within a given firm or market. In an antitrust or in a regulatory setting, it may be necessary
to categorize firms as one- or two-sided. In this chapter, instead, we do not attempt to do
so, and instead favor the continuous nature of two-sidedness.
It is common in overview articles on platforms to list the largest firms in the world and
identify which are platforms and which are not, highlighting the growth and importance
of platform firms in the organization of modern business activity. However, we eschew
this because we do not view the distinction between platform and non-platform firms as
binary. For example, it is typical to identify Amazon as a platform firm and automobile
manufacturers as traditional one-sided firms. However, Amazon has always sold books in
a one-sided manner and, to the extent that it is expanding the sales of its own branded
products, it is moving further in that direction. A significant source of operating profits
at Amazon currently comes from its cloud-computing services, of which a substantial share
is provided directly by Amazon.4 In contrast, the Ford Motors distribution network can
be seen as a platform mediating the interactions between consumers and dealerships. Ford
cannot attract dealers to sell its products unless it has interested consumers, and consumers
cannot purchase Ford products unless dealers offer them. In addition to setting a wholesale
2This distinction is similar to the one in Hagiu and Wright (2015b), who locate the definition of a platform
market in the control the platform exerts over the transactions. The market is one-sided if the intermediary
controls all of the features of trade, particularly the price that the buyer pays to the seller.
3To push this point further, consider again the example of a marketplace organizer buying a seller’s
product wholesale and retailing the inventory to consumers. We argued above that such instances are
typically associated with traditional one-sided markets due to the fact that the seller does not care about
the success of the organizer. In practice, however, we often observe buy-back clauses whereby the marketplace
organizer can force the seller to buy inventory back if the organizer sells poorly. Even in the absence of such
formal clauses, if the seller has a long-term relationship with the organizer, the seller may have an interest in
the success of the organizer with consumers and this breaks down the strict one-sided nature of the example.
4In fact, Amazon also has an AWS (Amazon Web Services) Marketplace that connects cloud users to
third-party sellers through Amazon’s cloud services offerings. To the extent that the marketplace is driving
Amazon’s cloud services revenue and profits, Amazon is a platform for cloud services.
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price to dealers, Ford manages a system of promotions to consumers and dealers to achieve
successful outcomes. In practice, whether a firm is best viewed as a platform or a traditional
firm can depend on which questions one seeks to answer about the firm’s behavior.
Taking a broader perspective, whether a firm is two-sided (or multi-sided) is often en-
dogenous to the firm. Firms can integrate into one side of the market to reduce the platform
nature of the firm. For example, as pointed out above, Microsoft produces the Windows
operating system and thus relies on a three-sided market between consumers, hardware
manufacturers, and software developers. Adjacent to that, Microsoft produces both the
operating system and the hardware for the Xbox gaming system, leaving only a two-sided
market between consumers and software developers. Because of the endogenous nature
of two-sidedness, it may be best to talk about two-sided strategies rather than two-sided
markets to emphasize the role of a firm’s choice.5 The example above about Amazon ex-
panding its own brand of products is an example of a firm endogenously choosing to be less
two-sided in specific product markets, which ties together these ideas about two-sidedness
being endogenous and continuous. Similarly, internet search is thought of as a canonical
two-sided market that connects content consumers with content providers. However, to
the extent that Google integrates into content (i.e., videos, maps, shopping services, music,
etc.), it appears to be choosing a less two-sided approach.6
An idea related to the endogeneity of two-sidedness is that two-sidedness typically de-
scribes firms, not markets. There are many examples of platform firms competing against
one-sided firms in the same market. For instance, brokers that connect shippers with trucks
compete in the same market against shippers that own their own trucks and may not need
for-hire trucks. Media that is supported by advertising (and so is two-sided) competes
against media that does not rely on advertising. Examples of media that do not use ad-
vertising are Consumer Reports, Wirecutter.com, and Le Canard Enchainé. We refer the
reader to Hagiu and Wright (2015b) for an overview of the recent literature addressing the
endogeneity of two-sidedness.
Thus, from our perspective, calling this literature “two-sided markets” is not ideal.
Two-sidedness is not a binary outcome endowed by a market but is typically rather a choice
made by firms about what ways to be two-sided. Having clarified all of this, we follow in
this chapter the common practice of referring to many of the issues we study as pertaining
to two-sided and platform markets, as is clear from the chapter’s title. After all, this is
the way this literature is referred to, and, given our focus on pricing (which is the most
well-studied phenomenon in this literature), there is little lost by treating two-sidedness as
a market concept.
Our focus on pricing leads us to leave out large and important swaths of the litera-
5A famous definition of two-sidedness appears in Rochet and Tirole (2006), where a market is defined
as two-sided if the price structure of the transactions matters beyond the price level. As they point out,
this often hinges on whether the platform charges participation fees or not. However, we often think of a
firm’s price structure as endogenous and not as a natural way to define a market type. One could argue
that their definition is a useful way to determine whether a firm adopts a two-sided strategy or not, rather
than whether the market is two-sided or not.
6Some readers will recall that America Online provided internet search in the early days of the World
Wide Web and, for some consumers, essentially all of their internet content. To the extent that America
Online adopted a one-sided approach to internet search, it is an example of how markets are not inherently
two-sided or not.
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ture, that we briefly review here. First, whereas the concepts we describe can be applied
to all varieties of platform markets, we do not attempt to address the details of specific
industries, such as finance and advertising-supported media. For overviews of the litera-
ture on two-sided media, see Anderson and Jullien (2015) and Peitz and Reisinger (2015).
Rysman and Wright (2014) review the two-sided markets literature in the context of pay-
ment cards. Many industry-specific applications of this literature exist, such as voluntary
standard setting organizations (see Lerner and Tirole, 2006).
Further, whereas we discuss deviations of pricing from social optimality and the effects
of competition on outcomes, we do not review the competition policy literature here. See,
for example, Jullien and Sand-Zantman (2020) and Evans and Schmalensee (2015) for an
overview of this literature. The effects of platform economics on competition policy are
profound, with numerous commissions around the world addressing issues related to plat-
forms and laying out strategies for approaching digital platforms.7 Platform economics has
pointedly affected policy-making. For instance, in the United States, in the context of a
monopolization case, the Supreme Court has recently integrated two-sided markets into its
approach to market definition, and the Securities and Exchange Commission explicitly rec-
ognizes the role of platform economics in regulating securities exchanges.8 Indeed, platform
economics appears to be leading to new forms of regulation, such as the recently proposed
Digital Markets Act in the EU and the Digital Markets Unit in the United Kingdom.9
Platform economics has also important implications for privacy regulation, which we do
not review here.10
Finally, we stop short of covering platform design. A successful platform requires more
than just appropriate pricing.11 Platforms also invest in quality that affects one side or the
other, and choose the rules and nature of engagement between market participants, as well
as the information that each side gets to observe. Ratings systems are a familiar feature of
many digital platforms, and they bring up many design questions, as described in Tadelis
(2016). The question of whether to be two-sided or not, as in Hagiu and Wright (2015b)
is also largely an example of platform design. While these issues come up in the chapter,
particularly when we discuss matching markets, we focus on them only to the extent that
they interact with our questions about pricing. Along these lines, we restrict ourselves to
7Examples include (a) the report of the Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms from the Stigler Center
for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, (b) “Unlocking
Digital Competition” from the Digital Competition Expert Panel for the United Kingdom, and (c) “Com-
petition policy for the digital area” by Jacques Crèmer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer,
for the European Commission, all released in 2019.
8The SEC released its “Staff Guidance on SRO Rule Filings Relating to Fees” in May 2019 which
states “The platform theory of competition (“a total platform theory”) also provides a potential pathway
to demonstrating a competitive environment. Total platform theory generally asserts that when a business
offers facilities that bring together two or more distinct types of customers, it is the overall return of the
platform, rather than the return of any particular fees charged to a type of customer, that should be used
to assess the competitiveness of the platform’s market.” See also Ohio vs. American Express Co., 585 US
2018.
9See European Commission (2020), “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act)” and United Kingdom
(2020), “Government response to CMA digital advertising market study”.
10See Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman (2016) for an overview of some of the privacy literature.
11Teh (2021) and Choi and Jeon (2020) provide interesting analysis of the link between pricing instruments
and platform design.
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matching markets with payments, although there is a substantial literature on matching
without payments (see, e.g., Roth, 2018).
In peer-to-peer networks, such as WhatsApp and initially Facebook and LinkedIn, con-
tent creators and content consumers are one and the same. Their dynamics are governed by
a direct network effect rather than indirect network effects, and so their analysis falls out-
side of the scope of this chapter. Einav, Farronato, and Levin (2016) reviews peer-to-peer
markets. To the extent that these peer-to-peer networks also sell advertising that reaches
network users, these networks fall within our scope of analysis, although our focus is not
on media. In particular, we do not discuss situations in which spillovers run in only one di-
rection and we largely ignore negative spillovers. For instance, advertisers value newspaper
readers positively but readers may not value, or negatively value, advertisers. The articles
on media that we cite above cover the case of negative spillovers in detail.
It is also worth keeping in mind that terms such as “platforms,” “networks,” “net-
work effects,” and “network externalities,” are used in many other areas in economics and
across different literatures. For instance, in the strategic management literature, Cusumano,
Gawer, and Yoffie (2019) distinguish between innovation platforms and transaction plat-
forms. Innovation platforms are systems or general-purpose tools that facilitate new prod-
ucts. In this view, Java is a platform for creating internet applications and cloud computing
is a platform for delivering services or infrastructure over the internet. Transaction plat-
forms facilitate transactions. From our perspective, there is nothing particularly two-sided
or connective about what this literature calls innovation platforms and our concept of plat-
form and two-sidedness fits within their concept of transaction platforms. Similarly, there
is a large literature on social networks and network formation that models exactly which
agent is connected to which other agent (see, for example, Jackson, 2008). We discuss
how platforms use payments to influence specific matches and hence shape the network of
the interactions. Furthermore, some of the issues we review when discussing the empirical
literature on two-sided markets also appear relevant for the broader literature on network
formation. However, we do not discuss the connection between these two literatures at
length in this chapter.
2 Monopoly
In this section we review the literature that examines pricing in two-sided markets where
the interactions between the sides are mediated by a single platform. We first introduce the
setting and some useful notation and review the key results. We then discuss distortions
compared to welfare maximization. Finally we discuss various issues such as the chicken &
egg problem, zero prices, congestion, transaction fees or dynamic pricing.
2.1 Basic framework and notation
A single firm (hereafter the platform) matches agents from two different sides of the market,
denoted by i = 1, 2. Each side is populated by a unit-mass continuum of agents. Each agent
derives utility from the product offered by the platform (e.g., Amazon Retail or the iPhone)
but also by interacting with agents from the other side of the market who also join the
platform. Formally, each side-i agent has a type θi = (vi, γi) ∈ Θi ⊂ R2 and derives a gross
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payoff
ui (θi, qj) = vi + γiqj
from interacting with a mass of agents of size qj from side j 6= i. These gross payoffs
are net of any total payment Pi that the agents make to (or receive from) the platform.
Preferences are quasi-linear in payments so that the net payoff is equal to ui (θi, qj) − Pi.
Each agent who does not join the platform obtains a reservation payoff normalized to zero.
Each type θi is an independent draw from some distribution Fi and is the agent’s private
information. The component vi in the agent’s payoff is a proxy for the utility that the agent
derives from the platform’s product or service, whereas the component γi is a proxy for
the importance the individual assigns to interacting with agents from the other side of the
market.12 Hereafter, we refer to vi as the agent’s “stand-alone value” and to the term γi as
the agent’s “interaction benefit.” Following the pertinent literature, interactions with the
other side will also be referred to as “usage.”
Notice that the above formalization implies that different agents from the same side
may assign different value to interacting with agents from the opposite side, but each agent
values all agents from the other side equally.13. Consistently with the rest of the literature
surveyed in the first few sections of this chapter, we also assume that platforms do not
engage in price discrimination within sides. Any pair of agents from the same side who
joins the platform is granted access to all agents on-board from the opposite side and is
charged the same total payment by the platform. We relax these assumptions in Section 6
where we consider richer preference specifications and allow for discriminatory prices.
The total payment Pi to the platform may have two components, an access fee pi and
a transaction fee proportional to the number of interactions with agents from side j 6= i.
Assuming that the number of interactions is proportional to the mass of agents on side j
and letting ti denote the expected transaction fee per agent on side j, we have that the total
payment by each agent joining from side i is equal to Pi = pi+tiqj The above representation
assumes that agents do not exchange money directly with agents from the other side or do
so at a fixed price. It also assumes that the only relevant margin is the extensive one:
agents choose whether or not to join the platform but do not control the intensity of their
interactions with agents from the other side of the market. Finally, it assumes that every
agent who joins from one side expects the same number of interactions with the agents
participating from the opposite side. We discuss the implications of relaxing some of these
assumptions later in the chapter.
Fixing the measure of agents qj joining the platform from side j, we then have that the
total demand from side i when the side-i’s total payment is equal to Pi is given by
qi = Di (Pi; qj) ≡ Pr {(vi, γi) ∈ Θi : vi + γiqj ≥ Pi} . (1)
12Given our focus on pricing, in most of the chapter, we treat vi and γi as exogenous parameters, although
in certain markets they may be influenced by non-price decisions that we do not consider here. As most of
the literature, we also assume that network benefits are linear in the other side’s participation. Linearity is
relaxed in Section 4.1 and 6. Sections 2.5 and 6 endogenize network benefits through taxation and matching.
13This assumption only holds before the agents make their participation decisions, and reflects the lack
of information the agents have at the contracting stage about the identity of the participating agents from
the other side of the market. This assumption will be relaxed later in the chapter when considering price
discrimination
9
The measure of agents q1 and q2 from the two sides of the market is then the solution
to the two conditions qi = Di (Pi; qj), j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i. This formulation highlights that,
from side-i’s perspective, qj is a quality dimension that is determined endogenously through
prices. The platform incurs a cost ci for each side-i agent it brings on board and a cost σ
for each interaction between the two sides. The platform’s profits are thus given by
Π =
∑
i,j=1,2,j 6=i
(Pi − ci) qi − σq1q2.
Hereafter, we refer to the term
ηi (Pi; qj) ≡ −
Di (Pi; qj)
∂Di(Pi;qj)
∂Pi
=
Pi
εi (Pi; qj)
as the side-i inverse semi–price elasticity of the demand, where
εi (Pi; qj) ≡ −
∂Di (Pi; qj)
∂Pi
Pi
Di (Pi; qj)
is the standard elasticity of the side-i demand with respect to its own price.
Note that the sale of the platform’s stand-alone product is bundled with the interaction
with the opposite side.
The environment described above encompasses most of the models considered in the
literature. In particular, it admits the following specifications as special cases.
• Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003): Fi is a Dirac measure at some (v0i , γ
0
i ) ∈ R2 ,
i = 1, 2, meaning that agents’ preferences are homogeneous within sides;
• Rochet and Tirole (2003): for each i = 1, 2, ci = pi = 0; furthermore, Fi assigns
measure one to the set {(vi, γi) ∈ Θi : vi = 0}, meaning that all agents derive utility
only from interacting with other agents from the opposite side of the market (zero
stand-alone values);
• Armstrong (2006): σ ≡ 0 and ti = 0, i = 1, 2; furthermore, for each i = 1, 2 there
exists γ0i such that Fi assigns measure one to the set
{
(vi, γi) ∈ Θi : γi = γ0i
}
, meaning
that all agents assign the same value to interacting with agents from the opposite side
of the market (homogeneous interaction benefits).
• Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Weyl (2010): Fi is absolutely continuous over R2,
meaning that agents are heterogeneous in both their stand-alone values and their
interaction benefits.
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2.2 Profit-maximizing prices
Assuming a smooth demand and no coordination problems14, the profit-maximizing prices
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ), along with the demand/participation (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) they induce, solve
15
P ∗i −
[
ci + q
∗
j (σ − γ̃j(P ∗1 , P ∗2 ))
]
= ηi(P
∗
i ; q
∗
j ) (2)
for i, j = a, b, j 6= i, with q∗j = Dj(P ∗j ; q∗i ), and with
γ̃j(P1, P2) ≡ −
∂Dj(Pj ;qi)
∂qi
∂Dj(Pj ;qi)
∂Pj
= E [γj |vj + γjqi = Pj ] . (3)
The above formula is the two-sided analog of the familiar monopoly price formula in
one-sided markets. The right-hand side is the familiar effect by which a monopolist’s ability
to price above marginal cost is inversely related to the elasticity of the demand. The only
novelty relative to one-sided markets is that such elasticity is now computed by accounting
for the fact that it depends on the size of the side-j’s participation, q∗j . The term in square
parenthesis on the left-hand-side is the cost of bringing a marginal agent on board, ci, aug-
mented by the cost of matching the agent to all agents on board from the opposite side, σq∗j ,
and reduced by the product between the average interaction benefit γ̃j(P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 ) experienced
by the side-j marginal agents and the size of the side-j demand q∗j . To understand this
last term, note that when the platform brings on board an extra agent from side i, it can
then increase its side-j price by γ̃j(P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 ) while keeping constant the demand on side j at
q∗j . Holding the side j’s participation constant, the marginal effect on the side j’s profits is
thus equal to γ̃j(P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 )q
∗
j . When the average network effect γ̃j(P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 ) among the side-j
marginal agents is positive, this last effect thus contributes to a reduction in the marginal
cost of bringing new agents on board from side i.
2.2.1 Homogeneous interaction benefits (Armstrong, 2006)
Consider the case in which all agents from the same side have the same interaction benefit,
with the latter equal to γ1 on side 1 and γ2 on side 2. Further assume that the platform
incurs no cost in matching agents, with the only cost being the cost of getting agents on
board: σ = 0 and c1, c2 > 0. In this case, the profit-maximizing prices are given by
P ∗i = ci − γjq∗j + ηi
(
P ∗i ; q
∗
j
)
with ηi
(
P ∗i ; q
∗
j
)
= [1− F vi (P ∗i − γiq∗j )]/fvi (P ∗i − γiq∗j ) and q∗j = 1− F vj (P ∗j − γjq∗i ), i = 1, 2,
j 6= i, where F vi and fvi are the cumulative distribution function and the density of the
marginal distribution of Fi over the v-dimension, respectively.
The novel term relative to the formula for the optimal price in a one-sided market is the
term −γjq∗j . This term can be interpreted as an opportunity cost of excluding a marginal
14There may be multiple demand configurations compatible with the same prices. When this is the case,
we assume here that the monopolist can coordinate the market on the allocation most favorable to her.
15See Weyl (2010). This first-order condition corresponds to the optimal choice of price Pi holding the
quantity qj constant on the other side, which requires adjusting Pj accordingly.
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consumer on side i. Indeed suppose the platform increases the side-i participation by εi > 0 .
It can then maintain the participation on side j constant at q∗j by increasing its side-j price
by γjεi, thereby generating an additional revenue of γjq
∗
j εi.
2.2.2 Homegeneous stand-alone benefits (Rochet and Tirole, 2003)
Next, consider the case where agents are homogeneous in their stand-alone values, with
the latter normalized to zero, but have heterogeneous interaction benefits, on both sides.
Further assume that the platform incurs no cost to bring an agent on board, but incurs a
cost for each agent it matches: c1 = c2 = 0 and σ > 0. Finally assume that the platform
charges each side-i agent ti per transaction, i.e., per each match with the other side. The
total payment collected from each participating agent from side i is thus equal to Pi = tiqj ,
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Let F γi and f
γ
i denote the cumulative distribution function and the density
of the marginal distribution of Fi over the γ-dimension, respectively. Hence, in this case,
q∗i = 1− F
γ
i (P
∗
i /q
∗
j ), which implies that
ηi
(
P ∗i ; q
∗
j
)
=
[
1− F γi (P ∗i /q∗j )
]
q∗j
fγi (P
∗
i /q
∗
j )
.
The profit-maximizing payments can then be obtained from (2) which in this case yields
P ∗i − σq∗j +
P ∗j
q∗i
q∗j = ηi(P
∗
i ; q
∗
j ).
Letting t∗i = P
∗
i /q
∗
j , i = 1, 2, j 6= i, be the transaction fees associated with the profit-
maximizing total payments, we then have that the optimal transaction fees t∗1 and t
∗
2 are
given by the solution to
t∗1 + t
∗
2 − σ =
1− F γ1 (t∗1)
fγ1 (t
∗
1)
=
1− F γ2 (t∗2)
fγ2 (t
∗
2)
, (4)
which is the price formula identified by Rochet and Tirole (2003). Again, to interpret this
price formula, note that [1− F γi (t∗i )]/f
γ
i (t
∗
i ) is the inverse semi-transaction fee-elasticity of
the side-i demand (only agents with interaction benefit above t∗i participate). The term
σ − t∗j , instead, is the opportunity cost (per agent joining from side j) of getting on board
one extra agent from side i. The latter combines the cost to the platform of matching the
agent with any of the agents joining from side j along with the fact that any side-j agent
pays t∗j per each match with any of the side-i agents. The optimal transaction fees thus
reflect the general cross-subsidization pattern identified by the optimality conditions in (2).
2.3 Welfare-maximizing prices
Consider next the problem of a planner maximizing the sum of all agents’ utilities and the
platform’s profit. For any vector of prices P1 and P2, total welfare is given by
W ≡
∑
i=1,2
∫
{θi:vi+γiqj≥Pi}
(vi + γiqj − ci) dFi(θi)− σq1q2,
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with qi given by (1), i = 1, 2. One can then show that the welfare-maximizing prices
(P e1 , P
e
2 ), along with the efficient participation profile (q
e
1, q
e
2) they induce, solve
P ei = ci + q
e
j (σ − γ̄j(P e1 , P e2 )) (5)
for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, with qei = Di(P ei ; qej ), where the demand functions Di are given by the
same functions as in (1), and where
γ̄j(P
e
1 , P
e
2 ) ≡ E
[
γj |vj + γjqei ≥ P ej
]
(6)
is the average interaction benefit of the participating agents from side j.
The efficient price on each side is thus equal to the marginal cost ci + σq
e
j that the
platform incurs to get a marginal agent on board from side i and then match him to all
participating agents from side j, discounted by the network externality that the marginal
agent exerts on all the participating agents from the other side of the market. The key
difference with respect to profit maximization is that the externality accounts for the benefit
that all agents from side j derive from interacting with the marginal agent from side i,
whereas, in case of profit maximization, the only relevant externality accounted for by the
monopolist is the one exerted on the marginal agent from the opposite side of the market
(as in Spence, 1981, in a one-sided setting with endogenous quality).
2.4 Distortions
Using (2) and (5), one can express the difference between the profit-maximizing and the
efficient prices as follows (see Tan and Wright, 2018 and Gomes and Pavan, 2019):
P ∗i − P ei = ηi
(
P ∗i ; q
∗
j
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
markup
+ qej (γ̄j(P
e
1 , P
e
2 )− γ̃j(P e1 , P e2 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spence distortion
+ qej (γ̃j(P
e
1 , P
e
2 )− γ̃j(P ∗1 , P ∗2 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
displacement distortion
+
(
qej − q∗j
)
(γ̃j(P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 )− σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale distortion
. (7)
The first term in the right-hand side of (7) is the usual distortion originating in the
platform’s market power, according to which the firm reduces output to extract more sur-
plus from the infra-marginal agents. The only novelty relative to one-sided markets is the
dependence of the markup on the measure of the participating agents from the opposite
side, q∗j .
The second term in the right-hand side of (7) is a Spencian distortion. It originates in
the fact that a profit-maximizing monopolist internalizes only the effect of expanding the
side-i participation on the side-j marginal agents, whereas a welfare-maximizing platform
internalizes the effect that such an expansion has on all participating agents from side j.
The third term in the right-hand side of (7) is a distortion that accounts for the fact
that the marginal agents under the profit-maximizing prices are not the same as under the
welfare-maximizing ones and hence may have different interaction benefits.
Lastly, the the fourth term in the right-hand side of (7) is a distortion that originates
in the different size of the participation by side j under profit and welfare maximization:
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the average benefit γ̃j(P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 ) enjoyed by the side-j marginal agents when the platform
expands the participation on side i (net of the platform’s matching cost σ) applies to a
measure of agents equal to qej under welfare maximization, whereas it applies to a measure
of agents of size q∗j under profit maximization.
In general, signing the net effect of the interaction among the above four distortions is
difficult. One can identify markets in which the profit-maximizing prices are higher than
their efficient counterparts on one side but lower on the other, as well as markets in which
they are higher on both sides (see Tan and Wright, 2018 for examples).
To obtain further insights, Gomes and Pavan (2019) suggest to express prices on a per-
unit basis, i.e., by normalizing them by the size of the participating population on the
opposite side of the market. To see this, assume that the costs of getting more agents on
board on each side is equal to zero, that is, c1 = c2 = 0. Furthermore, and without loss of
optimality (both in the case of profit and in the case of welfare maximization), assume that
the participation fees are equal to zero (i.e., p∗i = p
e
i , i = 1, 2) so that the total payments
can be expressed entirely in terms of transaction fees, with t∗i ≡ P ∗i /q∗j and tei ≡ P ei /qej ,
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.16 We then have that
t∗i − tei =
1
qj
ηi
(
P ∗i ; q
∗
j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
markup
+ (γ̄j(P
e
1 , P
e
2 )− γ̃j(P e1 , P e2 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spence distortion
+ (γ̃j(P
e
1 , P
e
2 )− γ̃j(P ∗1 , P ∗2 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
displacement distortion
. (8)
Note that both the displacement and the Spence distortions are equal to zero in the
Armstrong (2006) model (due to the fact that the interaction benefits are homogeneous,
on both sides). In this case, the efficient transaction fees are unambiguously lower under
welfare maximization than under profit maximization, on both sides of the market: tei < t
∗
i ,
i = 1, 2.
When, instead, preferences are as in the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model, one can
show that the Spence distortion is always positive on both sides, whereas the displacement
distortion is negative on at least one side. While, in general, transaction fees can be either
smaller or larger under welfare maximization than under profit maximization on either
side of the market, the sum (across sides) of the transaction fees is always higher under
profit maximization than under welfare maximization: t∗1 + t
∗
2 > t
e
1 + t
e
2. The possibility
that prices are lower under profit maximization than under welfare maximization, though,
is a consequence of the impossibility for the platform to engage in second-degree price
discrimination. As we show in Section 6, when platforms discriminate among agents from
the same side of the market, prices are always higher under profit than under welfare
maximization (see also Gomes and Pavan, 2016).
16Clearly, the results below extend to arbitrary payments Pi by interpreting ti as the “per-unit” payment
(i.e., the payment per transaction).
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2.5 Miscellaneous: chicken & egg problem, non-negative prices, distor-
tionary taxation
2.5.1 Chicken & egg
The analysis so far assumes that either there exists a unique demand configuration compat-
ible with the proposed prices, or the monopoly can choose its preferred price-quantity pair
on the demand schedule. This last assumption may not be appropriate in many markets.
When the monopolist cannot pick its preferred allocation, a network may fail to launch
despite the long-run efficiency of the activity (Rohlfs, 1974). In a nutshell, if all consumers
have a negative stand-alone utility (joining is costly), then for any positive price, there is an
equilibrium market allocation where no consumer joins, despite the fact that some positive
participation would be efficient and profitable. In the case of platforms, this possibility
translates into the following chicken & egg problem (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003)17 Consider
a new platform with no users on board and suppose that the stand-alone utility is negative
for all users on both sides, that is, vi ≤ 0 for all consumers, i = 1, 2. To induce the side-i
agents to join, the platform must convince them that the side-j agents will join as well. In
the worst-case scenario (see the discussion of consumers’ pessimistic beliefs in Section 3),
given any pair of positive prices p1 and p2, no consumer joins from either side. To overcome
such pessimistic beliefs and successfully launch, the platform can subsidize one side, through
monetary payments or by offering additional services that raise the stand-alone values and
make them positive.
Notice that the ability to charge different prices on the two sides is key to overcoming
the chicken & egg problem, an important difference with respect to standard one-sided
markets with network effects. To illustrate this last point, suppose that sides are symmetric,
with demand equal to D (pi; qj) on each side i = 1, 2 and let v̄ be the smallest price
such that 0 = D (v̄; 0). Consider a firm selling at a uniform price a good with one-sided
network effects such that demand Q satisfies Q = 2D (p;Q/2) — the demand thus coincides
with the total symmetric demand of the platform at symmetric prices p. Because, for all
p ≥ v̄, the demand is equal to zero, under the worst-case scenario, the one-sided platform
cannot be active if its cost is above v̄. By contrast, the platform can set prices such that
p1 < v̄ and v̄ < p2 < v̄ + γD (p1; 0) which ensures positive sales on both sides (because
q1 ≥ D (p1; 0) > 0). The profit may then be positive if the margin on side 2 is large
enough. Notice that a similar strategy could be adopted by the one-sided platform if it
could price-discriminate.
2.5.2 Vertical integration
When subsidies are not possible, an alternative way to overcome the chicken & egg problem
and convince consumers on one side of the market to join is for the platform to integrate
vertically.18 Hagiu and Spulber (2013) argue that a platform mediating the interactions
between content suppliers and consumers may offer some integrated content to appear
17See Evans and Schmalensee (2010) for a dynamic version emphasizing the need to reach a critical mass
to succeed.
18Like any firm, platforms may have other efficiency motivations for vertical integration, such as eliminating
double marginalization, creating investment incentives, and promoting diversity and stability of supply (see,
for example, Perry, 1989, and Rey and Tirole, 2007).
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more attractive to consumers.19 Offering content in addition to matching services allows
the platform to raise the value that buyers derive from joining and secure their participation.
However, it comes at the cost of creating congestion on the seller side if integration reduces
the expected profit per consumer of non-integrated content suppliers.
Miao (2009) and De Cornière and Taylor (2014) study integration in complementary
services used as input for the interactions between the two sides and point to the risk of
foreclosure of competing services when the platform cannot appropriate all profits from
interactions.20
A recent empirical literature studies platform integration into the provision of comple-
mentary services, such as Google producing apps for Android (Wen and Zhu, 2019) and
Amazon selling products under its own brand name (Zhu and Liu, 2016). This literature
finds that the platform is attracted to product categories with relatively high sales and that
the threat of entry leads to reduced innovation and investment on the part of producers
of complementary products. These results suggest that platforms are not entirely driven
by the goal of ensuring the consumer experience, at least in these cases. In contrast, Lee
(2013) finds that producers of video game consoles sign exclusive deals with game develop-
ers in order to attract consumers and this practice particularly contributes to the success
of smaller console producers.
2.5.3 Non-negative prices
When, on one side of the market, the marginal cost is small (which is often the case for
digital platforms), the demand is very elastic, and/or the interaction benefits on the other
side of the market are large, the platform may find it optimal to set a negative price on the
side satisfying the aforementioned properties. Several contributions discuss why negative
prices may attract opportunistic demand from users that are of no value to the platform,
who join without any serious intent to interact with the other side. When this is the
case, the lowest price that a platform may set is often zero.21 Alternatively, a platform may
optimally set the price on one side to zero if it faces transaction costs in collecting monetary
payments from that side. Examples are free-to-the-air TV and street markets.22
Amelio and Jullien (2012) point out that, when the unconstrained monopoly price is
negative, constraining the price to be non-negative has a detrimental effect not only on the
platform but also on consumers. The reason is that the motivation for setting a negative
price on side i is to boost side-i participation so as to raise the value perceived by the side-j
users. As for any quality, as long as the pass-through of the interaction benefits into prices is
less than one, the net utility of the side-j consumers increases when the platform is allowed
to set a negative price on side i and so does the side-j participation. Consumers on side i
then benefit from a larger participation on side j and a larger subsidy. By contrast, when
a zero-price constraint is exogenously imposed, say because of high transaction costs, the
19See also Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl (2007).
20Illustrating the arguments in these papers requires richer models that go beyond what is assumed in
this chapter.
21Gans (2019) provides a formal justification of non-negative prices, based on a kinked demand curve at
a zero price due to free disposal of the platform’s good.
22We thank Martin Peitz for suggesting these examples to us.
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welfare effect on consumer surplus of a zero price on one side is ambiguous—as the optimal
price could be positive or negative without the constraint.
Consider the optimal subscription price on side 2 when the platform is constrained to
set a non-negative price on side 1 and the constraint binds. Profits in this case can be
written as
Π2 = (p2 − c2)D2 (p2; q1)− σq1D2 (p2; q1)− c1q1
with q1 = D1 (0;D2 (p2; q1)). To ensure uniqueness and positivity of q1, assume that ∆ ≡
∂D1
∂q2
∂D2
∂q1
< 1 and that D1 (0; 0) > 0. Assuming also positive profits, we have that the
first-order condition for the optimal price p02 is given by (Here we use superscripts “0” to
highlight the zero-lower-bound on the side-1 prices; We also use ∆0 as a shortcut for ∆
evaluated at p02 and q
0
1):
p02 −
[
c2 + σq
0
1 +
(
σq02 + c1
) ∂D1 (0; q02)
∂q2
]
=
(
1−∆0
)
η2
(
p02; q
0
1
)
. (9)
Comparing these conditions to their counterparts in the absence of the zero-lower-bound
(see Condition (2) above), we can highlight two differences (in addition to the change in
the quantity q1).
23 First, as the price p1 is not adjusted to compensate for the change in
q2 and maintain the side-1 demand constant, the relevant opportunity cost of getting more
agents on board from side 2 is larger: the extra benefit γ̃1q1 on side 1 is now replaced by a
cost
(
σq02 + c1
)
∂D1
∂q2
corresponding to the increase in q1. Second, the demand on side 2 is
more elastic at the constant price p1 than at the constant sales q1, which is reflected in the
term 1 − ∆. The global effect on the side-2 price of imposing a zero-lower bound on the
side-1 price is thus a priori ambiguous.
For an illustration, consider a market with linear interior demands Di (pi; qj) = ai−pi+
γiqj and zero interaction costs, σ = 0. In this case, the optimal prices with and without
the zero lower bound are related by p02 = p
∗
2 − γ2p∗1, q02 = q∗2 and q01 = q∗1 + p∗1.24 Hence all
prices increase and quantities decrease (weakly) when p∗1 < 0 whereas the reverse is true
when p∗1 > 0.
23Note that a similar condition holds for optimal prices in the absence of the zero-lower-bound. Such a
condition can be obtained by maximizing profits by means of p2, holding p
∗
1 constant:
p∗2 −
[
c2 + σq
∗
1 + (σq
∗
2 + c1 − p∗1)
∂D1 (p
∗
1; q
∗
2)
∂q2
]
= (1−∆∗) η2 (p∗2; q∗1) .
24From the previous footnote, the condition
p2 − [c2 + (c1 − p1) γ2] = (1− γ1γ2) q2
holds both in the presence of the zero-lower-bound and in its absence. Treating p1 as a parameter varying
between 0 and p∗1 and differentiating yields
∂p2
∂p1
= −γ2;
∂q2
∂p1
= 0;
∂q1
∂p1
= −1.
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Welfare with a zero-price on the side-1 price is maximal when
p2 −
[
c2 + σq1 + (σq2 + c1)
∂D1 (0; q2)
∂q2
]
= −
[
γ̄1 (0, p2) q1 + γ̄2 (0, p2) q2
∂D1 (0; q2)
∂q2
]
,
where γ̄j(0, p2) is the average interaction benefit experienced by the side-j agents, as defined
in (6). Because the right hand side is negative whereas it is positive in (9), this suggests
that the profit-maximizing price p02 is excessively high compared to its welfare-maximizing
level.
2.5.4 Distortionary taxation and two-part tariffs
The demand representation in (1) assumes that the value that each agent from each side
i = 1, 2 assigns to interacting with each agent from the other side does not depend on prices.
As a result, tariffs affect “participation” but not “usage” conditional on participation. When
this is the case, the structure of the tariffs is not important for the monopoly, so that the
first-order conditions in (2) apply to any two-part tariff Pi = pi + tiqj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
irrespective of how the latter is decomposed into a participation fee pi and a transaction fee
ti. Rochet and Tirole (2006) also show that their analysis of optimal transaction fees can
be adjusted to the case of two-part tariffs.25
However, in general, taxation of usage has a distortionary effect and in this case the
choice of transaction fees matters for efficiency. For instance, consider the following situa-
tions.
• The interaction benefit si for a side-i consumer is random and learned only after the
agent chooses to participate. In this case, a type θi participating trades only if the
realization of si is above ti.
• The interacting parties trade a variable quantity x at some price τ that are determined
ex-post (i.e., after joining the platform) through efficient Nash bargaining or a posted
price mechanism. In this case, the interaction surplus and volume traded depends on
the total per-unit tax t = t1 + t2.
26
Under these circumstances, the composition of the tariffs in terms of participation fees pi and
transaction fees ti matters for optimality. For instance, Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2013)
extend the credit-card model of Rochet and Tirole (2002) by considering two-part tariffs on
both sides with random interaction benefits. In their model, participating merchants do not
decide on the payment mode. As a consequence of the asymmetry between merchants and
consumers, they find that the transaction fees are inefficiently distorted (from a total-welfare
perspective) toward lower fees for consumers.27
25They show that their formula (4) applies to normalized transaction fees t̂i = (pi−ci)/qj+ti, by replacing
(1−F γi (ti))/f
γ
i (ti) with ηi(Pi; qj)/qj , where ηi(Pi; qj) is a generic expression for the side-i inverse-semi-price
elasticity.
26This is the total payment to the platform per unit of output transferred from side 2 to side 1, within
each match.
27In their credit card model, this means that the interchange fee (the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to
the consumer’s bank) is too large.
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Notice that, when interaction benefits are ex-ante homogeneous, the model can be
rewritten in reduced form by expressing interaction benefits as a function of transaction
fees, γi ≡ γi (t1, t2) , and introducing a measure of the expected fee paid by the side-i agent
per interaction with each side-j agent, βi (t1, t2). Then the gross utility of each consumer
joining from side i becomes vi+γi (t) qj , where t ≡ (t1, t2). The expected payment by each
side-i agent to the platform is pi+βi (t) qj . With this notation at hand, the demand on side
i (i.e., the measure of side-i agents who join the platform) can be written as
qi = 1− F vi (pi + (βi (t)− γi (t)) qj) .
The expected interaction cost to the platform σ (t) must also account for the effect of t
on the probability of trade. One may then invert the demand to write the platform’s total
profits, using pi + βi (t) qj = (F
v
i )
−1 (1− qi) + γi (t) qj , as∑
i,j=1,2,j 6=i
(
(F vi )
−1 (1− qi)− ci
)
qi + (γ1 (t) + γ2 (t)− σ (t)) q1q2.
The first part is the profit net of trade surplus and takes a standard form. The second
part is the total trade surplus generated by the platform. With this formulation we see
that if the platform is free to set any participation fees p = (p1, p2) and any transaction
fees t = (t1, t2) , then it chooses the transaction fees that maximize the total interaction
benefits between participants γ1 (t)+γ2 (t)−σ (t) . Participation fees can then be adjusted
to induce the desired participation levels q1 and q2.
The conclusion that transaction fees should aim at maximizing the surplus generated by
the activity of all agents on board is in line with similar conclusions on two-part tariffs in
other domains of IO (vertical wholesale contracts for instance). It hinges on the platform’s
ability to use participation fees pi to extract surplus and on consumers being risk neutral
(Jullien, 2012). If these conditions are not met, the transaction fees naturally affect rent
extraction and risk sharing between the platform and consumers.
Moreover, with heterogeneous agents, a platform must account for the screening effect
of different tariffs. In particular, if the trade benefits are ex-post heterogeneous and the
agents have private information, then the platform should optimally use the transaction fees
to implement a screening mechanism (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). In this context,
Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013) points to the interaction between ex-post screening and the
chicken & egg problem, arguing that solving the chicken & egg problem implies distortions
in the trade mechanism. In their model, the platform’s users learn the trade benefits
only after participating and, absent any chicken & egg issue, the platform would implement
efficient trade. However, to solve the chicken & egg problem, the platform needs to subsidize
participation of one side and charge only the other side. The platform then finds it profitable
to bias the trade mechanism against the subsidized side, so as to raise the other side’s surplus
and capture it through the participation fee. The paper then shows that competition may
exacerbate the trade distortion.
Hagiu (2006) argues that transaction fees matter when the platform cannot fully commit.
In his model of a video-game platform, there are two stages. In a first stage, transaction
fees are negotiated with independent game developers, who then invest in developing games.
In a second stage, the platform sells the game console while developers sell their games28.
28As sellers choose the prices of games, interaction benefits are endogenous in this model.
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Retail prices of the console and of the games are not contractible, and as the console and the
games are complements, prices tend to be too high (Cournot, 1838). It would be efficient
from an interaction surplus perspective–an interaction occurs when a consumer buys a
game–to set low transactions fees, so as to avoid double marginalization on games. But
then the platform would exploit its monopoly power by setting an excessively high price
for the console and restricting sales. Increasing the transaction fees permits the platform
to increase the expected revenue to the platform per gamer and this reduces its incentives
to restrict sales. For a given mass of games available, a higher transaction fee implies more
sales of consoles, which may attract more developers. Hence a high transaction fee works
as a commitment device that helps the platform convincing the developers of its willingness
to set low prices and high marketing efforts.
2.6 Dynamic pricing
Cabral (2019) offers a dynamic analysis of a monopoly platform with switching costs.29
The model assumes that, at random times, consumers outside the platform decide whether
to pay a subscription fee to join, and consumers inside the platform decide whether to
renew their subscription to the platform. The platform is thus treated as a durable good
with two-sided network externalities and random obsolescence. Consumers have fixed ho-
mogeneous interaction benefits, γi, heterogeneous and random stand-alone valuations (on
each side, vit is i.i.d. across agents and time t) and consumers are myopic
30–meaning that
when deciding to pay the subscription fee, they assess the value of joining/staying at the
platform based on current utility given prices and participation.31 Hence demand at time
t depends on subscription prices (p1t, p2t) and the volume of consumers with active sub-
scription (q1t, q2t). The platform price-discriminates between renewing insiders and joining
outsiders and follows a Markov strategy with state variable (q1t, q2t).
The paper finds that, for small discount factors, the price on side i is increasing in qjt
and, under some regularity conditions, decreasing in qit. At any time, the platform must
find a balance between exploiting current market power (with high prices) and building the
customer base (with low prices) so as to ”harvest” in the future with higher prices. When qjt
increases (and thus side-i interaction benefits increase), and the firm is impatient, the market
power effect dominates and the firm raises its side-i price. The effect of qit on pit is more
specific to the dynamic setting, as in a static framework there would be no reason to link
the price to the same-side participation, in the absence of within-side network externalities.
The dynamic effect of a consumer on the participation of the other side, along with the
complementarity between sides due to the two-sided network effects, induces a dynamic
indirect network externality between consumers on the same side. Another interesting point
is that, when consumers are homogeneous with non-random stand-alone valuations (vit ≡ 0),
29Peitz, Rady, and Trepper (2017) consider a continuous-time model of monopoly with no switching
costs but imperfect information about demand, where the intertemporal leakage follows from learning and
experimentation by the platform.
30See Cabral, Salant, and Woroch (1999) for an analysis of one-sided dynamic monopoly pricing with
forward-looking consumers.
31Each consumer thus also ignores the effect of her current decision on future participation levels. The
analysis also rules out within-period coordination issues by assuming that, in any period, only one consumer
is given the chance to move (as in Cabral, 2011, discussed in Section 4).
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the trade-off between exploitation and building customer base disappears. In this case, the
firm achieves monopoly profit with full participation by setting a price pit = γiqjt at any
date, which is the maximal price that any myopic consumer on side i is willing to pay to
join at date t.
Simulations show that, when stand-alone values take on negative values, dynamics may
have two absorbing states, one with no participation and one with full participation (this is
in line with insights from Evans and Schmalensee, 2010, that a platform may fail to launch
if it does not reach a critical mass). Results also suggest that heterogeneity in stand-
alone values may help a successful launch of the platform (reaching the large participation
absorbing state): as heterogeneity increases, more agents may be willing to join even if they
expect little interactions on the platform, which helps initiating the process of participation.
The paper shows also that, in a pure intermediation model where vit < 0 with probability
1, the initial subscription fees charged by a platform starting with zero participation are
negative. Here, myopia plays a role similar to expectations in Caillaud and Jullien (2001,
2003)’s analysis of the role of subsidies as a means to overcome consumers’ coordination
problems. In both cases, those consumers expecting or contemplating no participation on
the other side refuse to subscribe unless the fee is negative.32 The difference is that, in
a dynamic setting, the subsidy vanishes and prices become positive as the customer base
increases.
Peitz, Rady, and Trepper (2017)’s analysis of learning by experimentation also shows
that a platform may benefit from lowering its prices at an early stage of development,
relative to short-run profit maximization, but for a different reason. Lower prices speed
up the learning process by raising the informativeness of the market signal. This effect is
however countervailed by the fact that reducing the price on one side raises the marginal
benefit of increasing the price on the other side (a ”seesaw” effect that will be discussed in
Section 4.3). Hence, in their model, early monopoly prices are below myopic level on one
side but may be below or above the myopic level on the other side, depending on the nature
of the uncertainty.
3 Competition for the market
We now consider markets in which multiple firms (the platforms) compete to match agents
from various sides of the market. Specifically, suppose there are now two platforms k = A,B
and that each side-i agent has a type θi =
(
vAi , v
B
i , γi
)
, where vki is the agent’s stand-alone
valuation for firm k’s product. By joining platform k, the agent obtains a utility equal to
uki
(
θi, q
k
j
)
= vki + γiq
k
j (10)
where qkj is the measure of agents from side j joining platform k. Let pi =
(
pAi , p
B
i
)
denote
the side-i prices set by the two platforms and qi =
(
qAi , q
B
i
)
the measure of agents joining
32Note that, for an infant platform, consumers’ myopic beliefs are disadvantageous. Indeed a forward-
looking consumer expecting positive participation in the future may be willing to pay a positive price to join
in the current period, if she fears that a long time will elapse before she is given again the opportunity to
join. Indeed, in this case, not joining would result in foregone interaction benefits.
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each of the two platforms on side i. The side-i demand for platform A is equal to
DAi (pi; qj) = Pr
(
vAi + γiq
A
j − pAi ≥ max
{
vBi + γiq
B
j − pBi , 0
})
.
To simplify the formulas, in this section we ignore the interaction costs by assuming
that σk = 0, k = A,B, and then denote by cki the cost that firm k incurs to bring agents
on-board on side i = 1, 2.
A key driver of the nature of competition in such markets is the magnitude of the inter-
action benefits vis-a-vis the degree of horizontal differentiation between the two platforms’
products, as measured by the differential in the agents’ stand-alone values. When the inter-
action benefits are small relative to the degree of differentiation between the two platforms’
products, the two platforms can share the market. When, instead, the interaction benefits
are large, a single platform is likely to dominate the entire market. In this section, we focus
on the case of large interaction benefits. The case where interaction benefits are relatively
small is examined in the next section.
3.1 Divide-and-conquer strategies
To understand how competition works in markets with large interaction benefits, Caillaud
and Jullien (2001, 2003) consider a model in which an incumbent platform (firm A) and an
entrant (firm B) set prices to protect and conquer the market, respectively. Their model is
one in which platforms are pure matching intermediaries (agents derive no stand-alone value
from the platforms’ products) and where the agents’ interaction benefits are homogeneous
within sides and the same for both platforms (hence firm B is equally efficient as firm A).
That is, there exists γ1 and γ2 such that Fi is a Dirac measure assigning probability one to
(0, 0, γi), i = 1, 2.
The paper analyzes a simultaneous-pricing game and characterizes the full set of equi-
libria (a continuum) under a mild regularity assumption on demand (referred to as mono-
tonicity). In particular, the analysis does not assume any incumbency advantage. In this
section, we discuss only the case where all agents single-home (i.e., choose at most one of
the two platforms). The case where agents multi-home (i.e., use the two platforms) will be
addressed in Section 3.3.
Caillaud and Jullien (2001) show that an incumbent platform may monopolize the mar-
ket and make positive profits when facing an equally efficient competitor.33 Because the
equilibrium outcome yielding the highest profit to the incumbent firm coincides with the
equilibrium outcome of a Stackelberg game and because arguments are easier to expose in
this alternative game, hereafter we consider a Stackelberg game whereby firm A sets prices
before firm B does.
In this simple setup, when the price differential |pAi − pBi | between platforms is small
on each side i = 1, 2, both tipping34 on firm A (that is, all agents joining platform A) and
tipping on firm B (all agents joining platform B) can be sustained in equilibrium. The
multiplicity of equilibria in the network-formation game (that is, in the continuation game
among the agents, for given access prices set by the firms) translates into a multiplicity of
33This equilibrium is not unique; another equilibrium exists in which the competitor wins.
34In the chapter, we say that there is tipping when all consumers join the same platform.
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equilibria in the price-posting game. Whether or not the incumbent firm can have positive
profits in equilibrium then depends on the extent of the coordination failure between the
agents. If agents coordinate efficiently on joining the platform that can deliver them the
highest surplus,35 then a standard undercutting logic implies that no platform can enjoy
strictly positive profits in equilibrium. By contrast, if firm B faces “unfavorable beliefs,”
the incumbent firm may benefit from the consumers’ coordination failure and enjoy strictly
positive profits. The notion of “unfavorable beliefs” in Caillaud and Jullien (2003) captures
precisely the idea that consumers’ coordination failure disadvantages a firm.36
Unfavorable beliefs A firm faces unfavorable beliefs at prices (p1, p2) if, in the continu-
ation game that follows the selection of the prices (p1, p2), consumers coordinate on
the equilibrium allocation that minimizes the firm’s market share on both sides.37
When B faces unfavorable beliefs, we say that platform A is focal. Suppose that initially
each agent expects all other agents to join platform A. Then an equally efficient platform
B facing unfavorable beliefs would have no demand if it sets positive prices. This is because
any agent expects no match on platform B and such beliefs are self-enforcing. However, firm
B could still attract both sides by convincing one of the two sides to join with a subsidy and
charging a positive price on the other side. Such strategies are referred to in the literature
as divide-and-conquer strategies.
Divide-and-conquer strategies: Strategies that set prices below cost for some consumers
compensated with prices above cost on other consumers.
Divide-and-conquer strategies have been shown to be an effective instrument to steal con-
sumers in markets with increasing return to scale (Innes and Sexton, 1994). When the
entrant is expected to use such strategies, the incumbent cannot corner the market at a
positive price if the entrant is equally or more efficient. However it can protect itself,
preventing entry, by subsidizing one side.
Divide-and-conquer strategies in two-sided markets mirror introductory pricing in dy-
namic models of competition with interaction benefits, where a firm subsidizes early pur-
chases to induce a bandwagon effect and recover the subsidy on late-comers (Farrell and
Saloner, 1986, Katz and Shapiro, 1986, 1992). With introductory pricing, a firm subsidizes
demand in one period and recovers the loss in future periods. In two-sided markets, the
loss on one side is recovered on the other side within the same period. In some markets,
there is a natural ordering, with one side joining after the other (see for instance Hagiu,
2006, on video games). In other cases, instead, there is no natural order and either side can
be targeted with a subsidy. In this respect, divide-and-conquer strategies are more flexible
than sponsoring strategies in dynamic setting.
35That is, no agent joins platform k when all agents joining platform −k (from both sides) yields a Pareto
improvement vis-a-vis the situation where all agents (from both sides) join platform k.
36See also Hagiu (2006), Ha laburda and Yehezkel (2016) and the discussion in Halaburda, Jullien, and
Yehezkel (2020).
37Such an allocation exists because the network formation game between consumers is of a super-modular
nature. Unfavorable beliefs amounts to assuming that consumers coordinate on a “minimal” equilibrium of
the network-formation game, which always exists for supermodular games (Topkis, 1998). Unfortunately,
this existence result does not immediately extend to markets with more than 2 networks.
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When the entrant faces unfavorable beliefs, Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) show that
the incumbent can indeed obtain positive profits. This is achieved by setting a negative price
on one side and a positive price on the other side. These prices must satisfy two conditions.
First, the subsidy must be such that the cost for B of dividing the subsidized side is larger
than the surplus from network effects on the other side. Second, the positive price must be
low enough that dividing the non-subsidized side and competing with A’s subsidy on the
subsidized side is not profitable. Interestingly, firm A can find such prices and make profits
only if (i) both sides derive positive interaction benefits with the other side and (ii) there
is an asymmetry in interaction benefits between the two sides. Firm A’s optimal strategy
then subsidizes the side with less interaction benefits.
The above results rely on several modeling assumptions that were already discussed in
the monopoly case.
Negative prices: If subsidies are limited then an efficient firm facing unfavorable
beliefs may not be able to enter the market. To see this, suppose that firm A sets prices
0 ≤ pAi ≤ γi on both sides. Then firm B cannot sell when it faces unfavorable beliefs and
negative prices are not feasible. Indeed, for any pair of non-negative prices by firm B, the
network-formation game admits an equilibrium in which all consumers join only firm A. In
this case, an equilibrium exists where firm A obtains monopoly profits, unless firm B finds
a way to turn the agents’ coordination in its favor.
Transaction fees: The positive-profit result discussed above relies on the firms offering
simple prices that are not contingent on the participation of the other side. For instance,
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) show that if the two firms can use non-distortionary transac-
tion fees, then the equilibrium is efficient—i.e., all consumers buy from the same (most
efficient) firm—and the active platform obtains zero profit if both platforms generate the
same interaction benefits.
The analysis in Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) focuses on pure matching intermedi-
aries, where agents derive value only from the platforms’ matching services. Jullien (2011)
points to the importance of the relative magnitude of interaction benefits and stand-alone
values for the nature of platform competition. The paper contrasts the case of pure inter-
mediation with no stand-alone values and large interaction benefits to the case of platforms
offering services generating large stand-alone values and relatively small interaction benefits.
In the latter case, an incumbent firm cannot secure positive profits when facing a competitor
at least as efficient as the incumbent. To see that, suppose that agents’ stand-alone values
are homogeneous within sides and across platforms with vki = vi >> γi , i = 1, 2, k = A,B.
Suppose that firm A sets prices pA1 < 0 < p
A
2 . Then firm B can undercut firm A on side 1
with price pB1 = p
A
1 −γ1 and charge a premium on side 2 with price pB2 = pA2 +γ2, generating
a revenue pA1 +p
A
2 +γ2−γ1 larger than A’s revenue.38 The paper shows that, in the presence
of multi-sided network effects, a Stackelberg leader looses the market when faced with an
38By contrast, with a pure intermediation service, vi = 0, i = 1, 2, dividing side 1 would allow to charge
only γ2 on side 2 because consumers’ reservation value is zero on this side if side 1 joins B. Firm B’s revenue
would then be only pA1 + γ2 − γ1 which may be negative. This underlies the ability of firm A to generate
positive profit with a positive price p2 in this case.
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equally efficient or even slightly less efficient competitor. When, instead, the leader is more
efficient on some side, it may be able to win the market by choosing an adequate pattern
of subsidies and taxes to the various sides.
3.2 Congestion within sides
The canonical model assumes that there are no network externalities within sides. Such
externalities may originate from congestion effects or competition between agents on the
same side. Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009) show that intra-group negative externalities
expand the set of divide-and-conquer strategies, by allowing platforms to target a fraction
of agents from the congested side. This is because migration from A to B becomes less
attractive as congestion is reduced at A. To illustrate, consider again a focal platform A
and an entrant B. Assume that vki = 0, i = 1, 2, k = A,B, and let the interaction benefits
be homogeneous at γ1 on side 1. Suppose that agents from side 2 are exposed to congestion.
This can be captured by assuming that the side-2 interaction benefits depend on the measure
q2 of the side-2 participating agents, with the function γ̃2(q2) decreasing in q2. When all
agents join A, the side-1 consumers experience an utility equal to γ1−pA1 whereas the side-2
agents experience utility γ̃2(1)− pA2 . Faced with prices pA1 < 0 and pA2 > 0, platform B can
now attract all consumers from both sides with the following strategy: choose m2 ∈ [0, 1]
and set prices (slightly below) pB2 = p
A
2 − γ̃2(m2) and pB1 = pA1 + γ1(1− 2m2). First notice
that, at these prices, in any equilibrium demand configuration, at least 1 −m2 consumers
from side 2 join B, because the (negative) price pB2 makes B more attractive than A to the
side-2 agents if congestion on platform A exceeds m2, irrespective of the side-1 participation.
This in turn implies that all consumers on side 1 join B because pB1 is such that they strictly
prefer joining B than joining A when the former platform attracts strictly more than 1−m2
side-2 agents and the latter platform attracts strictly less than m2 side-2 agents. Finally,
given that all side-1 agents join B, it must also be the case that all side-2 agents join B
because no consumer on side 2 is willing to pay the positive price pA2 for no interaction
with the side-1 agents. Hence platform B has some flexibility in the choice of the subsidy
it offers to the side-2 agents. A higher subsidy on the congested side 2 allows platform B
to charge a higher price on the non-congested side 1.39
Negative within-side network externalities may also prevent tipping, as agents may prefer
to avoid negative externalities by joining a smaller platform.40 For instance, Karle, Peitz,
and Reisinger (2020) develop a model of e-commerce platforms where sellers can multi-
home but competition with other sellers reduces their profit, inducing negative externalities
between sellers on the same platform. When seller competition is intense, sellers have an
incentive to join different platforms to avoid head-to-head competition. In this case, market
fragmentation emerges even if platforms offer identical services and efficiency would require
all trade to take place on the same platform.
39The other divide-and-conquer strategy, subsidizing side 1, is unchanged if B wants to sell to all agents,
with γ̃2(1) being the relevant interaction benefit on side 2.
40See Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and Ellison, Fudenberg, and Möbius (2004) for an analysis of tipping
and market fragmentation in markets with indirect and direct network externalities but no prices charged
by the platforms.
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These effects can be important empirically. Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2006)
study the adoption of 56K modems in which the market was originally served by two es-
sentially identical but incompatible technologies. Despite the benefits to consumers from
having the market coordinate on a single technology, Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman
(2006) show that ISPs in the same local market adopted different technologies, presumably
in order to differentiate themselves. They argue that this led not only to market fragmen-
tation, but to overall adoption failure of 56K modems until a standard setting organization
intervened.
Halaburda, Piskorski, and Yıldırım (2018) argue that platforms may choose to restrict
agents’ choices in order to limit within-side negative externalities (they study restrictions on
each agent’s available choice set under inefficient multi-lateral bargaining in a one-to-one
matching process).41 The degree of restriction is then a competitive tool. With hetero-
geneous populations on both sides, offering different levels of restrictions allows platforms
to differentiate their services, which prevents tipping equilibria to emerge. (See also the
discussion of Ambrus and Argenziano, 2009, is Section 4.1).
3.3 Multi-homing
The analysis so far assumes that agents who join one platform do not join the other (single-
homing). The opposite situation where agents may opt to join more than one firm (multi-
homing) leads to slightly different results. For the discussion, assume that each agent cares
only about the mass of agents she can interact with on the other side and not about the
number of channels for interactions. The conclusion that firm A can corner the market and
make strictly positive profit still holds but the nature of the divide-and-conquer strategies
is different. When agents can multi-home at no cost, it is easier to convince a consumer
to try a new product—the divide part of the strategy. This is because a consumer who
decides to join firm B does not have to forgo interacting with those agents from the other
side who join only firm A. However, inducing a consumer to join firm B does not generate
the same competitive effects as in the case of single-homing. In particular, it does not
trigger the same strong bandwagon effect as in the case of single-homing. This is because
attracting users to firm B does not necessarily imply poaching them from firm A and hence
does not necessarily make firm A weaker. This makes the conquest of the side where prices
are positive less profitable. In the context of the simple example discussed above, when
pAj > 0, firm B attract both sides by asking a price slightly below zero on side i and then
setting a price sightly below pAj on side j. The maximal profit for firm B is thus equal
to pAj − c1 − c2. Firm A can however prevent firm B from profiting from such a strategy
by setting prices pA1 = p
A
2 = c1 + c2 and still make positive profits equal to c1 + c2.
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Thus incumbent firms still enjoy an incumbency advantage under multi-homing but their
profits are smaller than under single-homing. In particular, Caillaud and Jullien (2003)
show that the maximal incumbent’s profit is bounded from above by the total cost c1 + c2.
The incumbency advantage is thus small when costs are low.
41Casadesus-Masanell and Ha laburda (2014) also argue that a platform may limit supply if the goods
exchanged on the platform exhibit network effects.
42Note that the same prices also prevent firm B from attracting agents under single-homing.
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Multi-homing also alters the way complex tariffs, involving taxation of interactions,
can be used to conquer a market. The role of taxation of usage is analyzed by Caillaud
and Jullien (2003) who allows agents to multi-home and firms to charge fees for both
participation and usage. In the case of single-homing, an optimal strategy for an entrant
facing unfavorable beliefs is to subsidize participation and heavily tax interactions when
taxes are not distortionary. This strategy relies on the fact that, once one side is attracted,
agents from the other side must also join if they want to benefit from the network effects.
However, under multi-homing, even if a subsidized side is attracted, agents from the other
side can continue to enjoy interaction benefits by staying with the incumbent firm. Hence if
the entrant taxes interactions too heavily, all users may stay with the incumbent firm and
benefit from lower transaction fees. Moreover, multi-homing creates scope for a new type
of entry strategies. The entrant does not need to convince consumers to stop buying the
incumbent’s product. It needs only to convince them to stop interacting with the other side
using the incumbent’s platform and instead use its own platform. The aim is to induce all
agents to multi-home and then compete on transaction fees. As a result, when agents can
multi-home, divide-and-conquer strategies typically involve low transaction fees. By setting
low transaction fees, an incumbent firm can also raise its protection against entry. The paper
shows that, in the equilibrium maximizing the incumbent’s profits, the incumbent sets zero
transaction fees and relies solely on participation fees. Moreover, the incumbent makes
zero profits when faced with an equally efficient entrant, unless the volume of interactions
increases when all agents multi-home compared with the case where they single-home on
the same platform.43
3.4 Dynamic competition
Most of the existing literature on the dynamics of competition is related to the irreversibility
of the choice of a network by consumers, which may be due to the durability of equipment or
to switching costs (adoption cost, learning, data transfer). It has been known since Arthur
(1989) that in the presence of network externalities and irreversibility, firms with a large
installed base benefit from a competitive hedge that may prevent entry of more efficient
competitors. As discussed in Section 7.2.4, a number of empirical papers use installed base
as a variable to explain technology diffusion in markets with network effects. An implication
of the strategic value of an installed base is that firms supplying network goods gain from
quickly building clientele (see Farrell and Saloner, 1986, and Katz and Shapiro, 1986, 1992).
This allows them to induce a bandwagon effect that facilitates sales to future consumers. The
dynamics of competition is thus shaped by the intensity of network effects, with incentives
to preempt and intense competition at the earlier stages of competition.
Under imperfect competition, firms competing in the presence of network effects have
to find a balance between maximizing short-run profits and investing in building their
43Their model allows for an imperfect matching technology such that a pair of agents on each side using
two platforms obtains higher interaction benefits than if they use only one platform. In this case, entry with
all agents multi-homing is efficient if costs are low enough (this is referred to as global multi-homing). For
larger costs, instead, the possibility of global multi-homing makes entry less profitable by increasing the cost
of strategies that rely on one side single-homing.
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network.44 In this context, an important question for policy is whether there is increasing
dominance of the largest network eventually resulting in tipping. Almost all contributions
on the dynamics of competition focus on one-side network effects and uniform pricing by
firms.45 We highlight here some recent contributions that are particularly relevant for
two-sided markets.
In a computational duopoly model with product differentiation, network effects and dy-
namic stochastic demand, Cabral (2011) offers a new perspective on tipping by showing
that the market may exhibit long periods of dominance of one firm, alternating with tran-
sition periods of intense competition.46 The general idea is that a firm that has acquired a
large customer base will be tempted to exploit its position by setting a high price. Such a
strategy permits another firm to survive with a low price and few customers until a demand
shift allows it to challenge the large firm.47
With small network effects, product differentiation dominates the equilibrium dynamics
and the market converges to a situation where the two firms share the market. When
network effects are large, instead, the equilibrium features relatively long periods in which
a larger firm shares the market with a smaller firm, ending when a sufficiently large shift in
the market demand favors the small firm and a new cycle starts.
A key point in the analysis of Cabral (2011) is that the expected delay before the
small firm reaches a position where it becomes a credible challenger is long enough that
the incumbent does not find it worthy to eliminate its competitor. Things are different
when markets switch fast from one dominant firm to another. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
point out that a monopoly firm may inflate its sales by reducing prices to deter entry and
preserve its dominance. They build a model with overlapping generations of consumers with
switching costs and show that, in equilibrium, when firms are patient, an incumbent facing
the threat of entry in every period may sustain permanent low prices so as to maintain a
large installed base that dissuades entry. Indeed, an entrant’s profitability decreases if it has
to compete against a firm with a large installed base. The outcome is that of a contestable
market where monopoly is persistent but prices remain low. In this case, the price reflects
the shadow value of sales which includes entry deterrence.
Halaburda, Jullien, and Yehezkel (2020) and Biglaiser and Crémer (2020) argue that
dynamic leakage may not be related to switching costs but to consumer inertia.
Halaburda, Jullien, and Yehezkel (2020) relies on the concept of pessimistic beliefs
and a focal platform. The paper considers two competing platforms offering vertically-
differentiated goods with large network effects and no switching cost. In a dynamic context,
the paper assumes that “focality” is endogenous and history-dependent. More precisely, it
assumes that the firm that wins the market in one period gains an incumbency advantage
44The literature on dynamic competition with myopic consumers but forward-looking firms includes,
among others, Doganoglu (2003), Laussel, de Montmarin, and Van Long (2004), Mitchell and Skrzypacz
(2006), Driskill (2007), Markovich (2008), Markovich and Moenius (2009) and Laussel and Resende (2014).
45 See the review by Farrell and Klemperer (2007). A contribution with a dynamic model of two-sided
market is Zhu and Iansiti (2012)
46See also Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009).
47As all other contributions described in this section, this result is shown in the context of a market with
one-sided network effects and uniform price instead of a two-sided market. But the insights are clearly
relevant also for the dynamics of two-sided markets.
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(see also Biglaiser and Crémer, 2020) by becoming focal in the next period. The prospect of
winning focality affects incentives in a somewhat similar way as the prospect of building an
installed base in the case of switching costs (Farrell and Saloner, 1986, Katz and Shapiro,
1986, 1992): firms are willing to subsidize sales in early periods to benefit from the incum-
bency advantage in later periods. The paper shows that, with a finite but long horizon,
the more efficient platform wins the market in the first and all subsequent periods. The
reason is that the value attached by a firm to gaining focality is larger for the higher-quality
firm48 and the value differential increases with the horizon, exceeding, for large horizons,
any incumbency advantage that may initially favor the lower-quality firm.
Hence, dynamic considerations weaken concerns that an incumbency advantage creates
barriers to entry, because prospective future benefits of a superior-quality entrant are larger
than the prospective benefits of the lower-quality incumbent.49
This conclusion must be qualified when the horizon is infinite. For large discount factors,
both efficient and inefficient equilibria exist. In the case of inefficient equilibria, one firm
is always aggressive and successful in gaining or preserving focality whereas the other does
not attempt to gain focality, for it expects tough competition in case of success. Due to
the advantage attached to incumbency, aggressiveness or softness in competition are self-
enforcing. To see this point, suppose that the least efficient firm A is expected to win the
market in the future, irrespective of which firm will be the incumbent. Then the other firm
B has no reason to price below cost, since it expects no future sales. To the contrary, firm A
is always willing to make a sacrifice by pricing below cost to become focal. Indeed, although
firm A expects to win in the future irrespective of its focality position in the next period,
it strictly prefers to be focal in the next period, because this permits it to set a higher
price. Firm A may then win the current period both when it is already focal and when it is
not. With a large discount factor and infinite horizon, this effect is strong enough that an
equilibrium exists in which A always wins. In other words, when firms are patient, a firm’s
”reputation” for being aggressive in defending and restoring its incumbency position after
a downturn may dissuade other firms from challenging it.
Biglaiser and Crémer (2020) analyze the effect of demand heterogeneity on market frag-
mentation in a dynamic model with no switching costs but an incumbency advantage.
Their modeling of the incumbency advantage is based on a fictitious network formation
game. Their pseudo-dynamics start from the allocation of consumers of the last period
and assumes that consumers change their demand sequentially to a strictly preferred (my-
opic) choice, where the first to move are those with the highest benefit to do so. In the
case of homogeneous network effects, the dynamics are the same as in Halaburda, Jullien,
and Yehezkel (2020). Their concept applies to multiple platforms, which they exploit to
study market fragmentation. In a model of price competition between firms offering ho-
mogeneous (one-sided) network goods to an heterogeneous population, they show that, for
small discount factors and large heterogeneity of interaction benefits, an inefficient equilib-
48To see that, suppose platforms A and B offer homogeneous products to a unit-mass population, with
stand-alone values vA and vB and network effect γ per user such that γ > vB−vA > 0. Then, in a one-period
game, A sells to all consumers if it is focal, with profit γ + vA − vB < γ, whereas B sells to all consumers if
it is focal, with profit γ + vB − vA > γ.
49However, this argument requires the entrant to be forward looking and able to sustain large losses in
current competition with the incumbent.
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rium with two active networks exists (where tipping would be efficient). This conclusion
follows from the same logic that prevents full tipping in models with switching costs such
as Cabral (2011), except that, as in Halaburda, Jullien, and Yehezkel (2020), an installed
base doesn’t raise value but affects the consumer coordination process. An incumbent with
a large legacy network, and thus a large incumbency advantage, prefers to “harvest” its
position by charging a high price and keep only consumers with high interaction benefits,
which allows a second firm to attract unsatisfied customers with low interaction benefits.
Obviously such an equilibrium is sustainable only if the second network is small.
4 Competition on the market
Four forces that can prevent tipping in two-sided markets are: platform differentiation,
multi-homing, compatibility50, and, as discussed in Section 3.2, congestion.51 Many plat-
forms offer differentiated products and services in addition to their intermediation services.
For example, smartphones provide communication services, integrated apps, and photo and
video recording, in addition to permitting users to download the apps that have been devel-
oped for their operating system and which are available “on-demand” (the other side of the
market). By differentiating their stand-alone offerings, platforms alleviate the competition
with other platforms. If the stand-alone service provided by a smaller platform is valuable
enough, then the platform may be able to survive even if it attracts only a few consumers.
In this section, we discuss some of the key results in the literature on competition between
platforms, when the market has stabilized with more than one firm serving both sides of
the market.
4.1 Single-homing
We first consider the case where all users single-home on both sides. Single-homing may
be due to physical constraints or be the result of contractual restrictions set by the plat-
forms. (Armstrong and Wright 2007). In this section, we treat single-homing as a technical
constraint.
4.1.1 Homogeneous interaction benefits
Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) study platform competition under high
degrees of product differentiation. In particular, Armstrong (2006) considers a duopoly
in which platforms sell a horizontally-differentiated consumption good delivering different
stand-alone values to consumers in addition to two-sided interaction benefits (through access
to the other side). The analysis assumes that (i) consumers on both sides single-home, (ii)
the market is covered (meaning that each agent from each side i = 1, 2 who does not join
50We use the term compatibility for technologies that allow users of one platform to interact with users
of other platforms. Examples include email and the connectivity of telecommunication networks.
51Another force against tipping may be dynamic pricing. Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006) study a dynamic
duopoly model of direct network effects (not a two-sided market) and identify settings in which a firm with
a large lead raises its price to harvest its installed base instead of lowering its price and further reduce its
rival’s market share.
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platform k joins platform −k) and (iii) interaction benefits are homogeneous within each
side.
Preferences take the additive form in (10) with γi identical for any pair of agents from
the same side. Interaction costs are zero (i.e., σi = 0, i = 1, 2) and prices take the form of
access fees so that P ki = p
k
i , i = 1, 2, k = A,B.
Platform differentiation on each side i = 1, 2 is captured by the dispersion of the stand-
alone value differential vBi − vAi . When there is little differentiation, coordination failures
may arise, and multiple allocations of consumers over the two platforms can be sustained
in equilibrium. In this case, insights similar to those from the analysis of competition for
the market apply. When, instead, the dispersion of stand-alone values is sufficiently large,
a unique “stable” equilibrium allocation exists for any price vector.52 In this case, the
demand for firm A is defined by
DAi (pi; qj) = 1−DBi (pi; qj) = Φi
(
pBi − pAi − γi
(
qBj − qAj
))
, (11)
where Φi is the side-i cumulative distribution function of the differential in stand-alone
values vBi − vAi , assumed to be smooth on a compact support, pi = (pAi , pBi ) is the vector
of side-i prices, and qj = (q
A
j , q
B
j ) is the vector of side-j quantities (equivalently, of side-j
participations).
Specifically, Armstrong (2006) assumes that stand-alone values take the Hotelling form
vAi = v − τixi and vBi = v − τi (1− xi) where v is large enough to guarantee that the entire
market is served in equilibrium, and where xi is drawn from a uniform distribution over
[0, 1]. In this case, the condition for uniqueness of the allocation of agents over the two
platforms for all price vectors reduces to γ1γ2 < τ1τ2.
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Under this condition, given any collection of prices p1 = (p
A
1 , p
B
1 ) and p2 = (p
A
2 , p
B
2 ),
each platform’s profits are equal to
Πk =
∑
i=1,2
(
pki − cki
)
qki
where
qki = D
k
i (pi; qj) .
It is known from the earlier literature on one-sided markets that network effects can raise
the elasticity of the demand by magnifying the demand response to a change in prices, as
consumers that would not react to a price increase alone may react to the induced reduction
of interaction benefits. The same logic applies to the elasticity of the residual demand of
each platform in a two-sided market. Moreover, a higher elastic demand on one side means
that increasing price on this side induces a higher loss of sales on both sides of the market.
52The assumption of large differentiation bears some similarity with the role of heterogeneous beliefs in
global games (see Jullien and Pavan, 2019 for a discussion).
53To see this, consider an arbitrary allocation of consumers over the two platforms covering the entire
market
(
qki
)
i=1,2,k=A,B
and assume that a small mass ε of side-i consumers moves from platform A to
B. Then, the value of platform B relative to that of platform A for the side-j agents increases by 2γjε.
This induces Φ′j2γjε side-j agents to switch from A to B. By the same reasoning, this change in the side-j
participation in turn induces an additional mass of agents from side i of measure Φ′i2γi
(
Φ′j2γj
)
ε to migrate
from A to B. The adjustment process converges if 4Φ′iΦ
′
jγiγj < 1. In the Hotelling model, this condition
reduces to γ1γ2 < τ1τ2.
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The equilibrium pricing formulas thus reflect the enhanced price elasticity as discussed in
the monopoly case, but accounting for the presence of a competing firm. To derive intuition,
consider a small price change by firm k consisting in a reduction of its side-i price along with
an increase in the firm’s side-j price that maintains the platform’s side-j demand constant
at qkj . When the platform adds ε new consumers on side i, it can increase its side-j price
pkj by 2γjε. This is because, in a covered market, the ε consumers that join the platform
come from the competing firm. Attracting such consumers thus also means reducing the
attractiveness of the other platform. That is, stealing a consumer from the competitor on
side i not only raises the platform’s value for those agents on the other side of the market
who join the same platform but also reduces the value of joining the competing firm. By
attracting ε more consumers from side i the platform can thus increases its side-j revenues
by 2γjεq
k
j without expanding the side-j participation and hence without incurring any
extra cost. Holding constant the participation on side j at qkj , this means that the total
opportunity cost of attracting ε more consumers on side i is equal to
(
cki − 2γjqkj
)
ε. Once
such opportunity costs are incorporated into the analysis, the optimality condition for for
equilibrium prices can be derived as in standard oligopoly games.
Under the above specification, equilibrium prices of an interior equilibrium take the form
pki −
[
cki − 2γjqkj
]
= µki (pi; qj) (12)
where
µki (pi; qj) = −
Dki (pi; ,qj)
∂Dki (pi;qj)
∂pi
(13)
is the inverse semi-elasticity of firm k’s demand on side i, holding the participation of side
j fixed at the level specified by qj = (q
A
j , q
B
j ) and fixing the other firm’s prices at the level
specified in pi = (p
A
i , p
B
i ).
54 In the case of the symmetric Hotelling model of Armstrong
(2006), the equilibrium quantities on the other side are equal to qAj = q
B
j = 1/2 and the
inverse-semi-elasticity of each firm’s residual demand at the symmetric allocation is equal
to µki (pi; qj) = τi. The equilibrium prices on each side are thus equal to
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pAi = p
B
i = ci + τi − γj .
Extending these pricing formula to general oligopoly games turns out to be complex for
two reasons. First, computing the opportunity cost is complicated if the intensity of the
interaction benefits γj is heterogenous across agents and/or if there are more than 2 firms.
Second, computing the price elasticity of the residual demands at constant opportunity cost
may also be challenging, for neutralizing the effects of a change in the side-i demand on all
the remaining sides is more involved. However, the idea of deriving the equilibrium prices
on each side by holding quantities constant on the other sides has proved useful in richer
54More precisely µAi (pi; qj) =
Φi(pBi −p
A
i −γi(q
B
j −q
A
j ))
Φ′i(pBi −pAi −γi(qBj −qAj ))
and µBi (pi; qj) =
1−Φi(pBi −p
A
i −γi(q
B
j −q
A
j ))
Φ′i(pBi −pAi −γi(qBj −qAj ))
.
55Existence of the equilibrium requires that τ1τ2 > γ1γ2 +
1
2
(γ1 − γ2)2 which is stronger than the previous
condition for demand stability. Weyl and White (2016) show that, in the symmetric case with γi = γ and
τi = τ, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium if γ < τ while only tipping equilibria exist if γ > τ.
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settings too. The key assumption in the derivation of the equilibrium prices is that the
market is fully covered.
For instance, when the demand on each side takes the general form qki = D
k
i
(
pki , p
−k
i ; q
k
j , q
−k
j
)
,
changing price on side i while adjusting the price on side j so as to maintain the side-j par-
ticipation constant and using the full-market-coverage condition q−kj = 1 − qki yields the
following pricing formula on each side of the market and for each platform
pki − cki − qkj

∂Dkj
∂qki
− ∂D
k
j
∂q−ki
∂Dkj
∂pkj
 = µki (pi; qj) . (14)
The above formula applies to arbitrary (asymmetric) duopoly markets.
In a recent paper, Tan and Zhou (2020) generalize the pricing formula derived by Arm-
strong (2006) to the case where there are more than two sides and more than two platforms,
assuming a symmetric discrete choice model. The paper shows that, with two sides, no inter-
action costs (i.e., σk = 0, all k) and K firms covering the market, the first-order conditions
for a symmetric equilibrium (pki , q
k
i ) = (pi, 1/K) all k is equal to
pi −
[
ci −
γj
K − 1
]
= µki ,
where µki is again the inverse semi-price elasticity of the side-i demand of firm k, holding
constant the participation of side j and the other firms’ prices. The interpretation is similar
to the one discussed above. Attracting a small mass ε of consumers on side i allows firm k
to raise its side-j price by γj
(
ε+ εK−1
)
. The first term in parenthesis is the direct benefit
of increasing the attractiveness of platform k for the side-j agents. The second term is the
extra benefit of weakening the attractiveness of firm k’s competitors, again in the eyes of
the side-j agents. In a symmetric equilibrium, the ε new agents the platform brings on
board on side i come from a uniform reduction (by ε/(K− 1)) in the side-i participation to
each of the other K − 1 firms. As in Armstrong (2006), the above conditions are valid only
in markets with a sufficiently high degree of horizontal differentiation. With more than 2
sides of mass 1 each, the same reasoning shows that γj should be replaced by
∑
j 6=i
γij , where
γij is the intensity of the interaction benefits from side i to side j (that is, the extent to
which side j benefits from a marginal variation in the side-i participation).56
The above pricing formulas can also be adjusted to accommodate for interaction costs.
For example, in a symmetric market with K firms and two sides, it suffices to replace the
side-i cost ci in the above pricing formulas with ci + σ/K , where the term σ/K is the
cost of matching any new agent brought on board on side i to all the agents the platform
attracts on the other side of the market (in a symmetric equilibrium, the measure of such
agents is equal to 1/K).
56Tan and Zhou (2020) also derive first-order equilibrium conditions for the case where the market is not
fully covered. In this case, reducing a price on one side expands the total demand and the simple additivity
of the formulation above is lost.
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While Tan and Zhou (2020) uncover important new insights, the literature still lacks a
tractable model of platform competition in asymmetric and/or partially-covered markets.57
As anticipated above, the difficulty is the complexity of identifying the price adjustments
necessary to maintain participation on other sides constant when the participation of one
side changes, as well as the complexity of identifying the elasticity of the relevant residual
demands when maintaining the prices of the competing firms fixed. Section 9 discusses
several papers that structurally estimate models of competing platforms with asymmetric
and partial market coverage. As these papers are naturally computational in nature, they
can utilize models that are intractable from a theoretical perspective.
4.1.2 Dispersed information
The possibility for multiple platforms to share the market hinges on the presence of het-
erogeneous stand-alone values, as interaction benefits alone tend to generate tipping, as
explained above. However, in most markets of interest, it is difficult for an agent to predict
whether many agents prefer one platform to another and hence how the platforms’ prices
will lead to different participation to each platform. This raises the question of how plat-
forms should price access to each side when agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about the
distribution of preferences and hence about the ability of each platform to attract partici-
pation. This issue has been studied recently by Jullien and Pavan (2019) in a model that
can be thought of as the extension of Armstrong (2006) to a market with dispersed infor-
mation. The analysis accommodates for the possibility that each agent is uncertain about
the distribution of preferences on each side of the market and uses his own appreciation for
each platform’s product to form beliefs about other agents’ participation to each platform.
Formally, consider a two-sided market populated by two platforms and assume that
interaction benefits are homogeneous within each side and given by γ1 and γ2, respectively.
58 The distributions from which the agents’ stand-alone values vAi and v
B
i for the two
platforms are drawn is unknown both to the platforms and to the individual agents. Under
suitable assumptions, the market is fully covered and each agent from each side i = 1, 2
uses the differential vi ≡ vBi − vAi in his stand-alone values for the two platforms to form
beliefs over the distributions of preferences on each side.
Assume that the relevant “aggregate state” which is unknown to both the agents and
the platforms is the pair of marginal distributions Fv ≡ (Fv1 ,Fv2 ) from which the agents’
stand-alone differentials vi are drawn. Given Fv, each side-i agent’s stand-alone differential
vi is drawn from Fvi independently across agents. Further assume that each agent’s stand-
alone differential vi is the only information the agent has about Fv. For simplicity, the
platforms are assumed to possess no private information.
Given the firms’ prices
(
pk1, p
k
2
)
k=A,B
each agent from each side i then uses his type
vi to form beliefs about the participation to each platform on each side. Assuming that,
57Some progress in this direction was recently made by Belleflamme, Peitz, and Toulemonde (2020) who
extend Armstrong duopoly model by allowing for different network externalities on each platform. Among
other things, the paper shows that the platform with the largest market shares need not be the most
profitable one.
58Consistently with the rest of the pertinent literature, Jullien and Pavan (2019) assume that the intensity
of the network benefits γ1 and γ2 are symmetric across platforms. See Belleflamme, Peitz, and Toulemonde
(2020) for a discussion of potential implications of dropping such an assumption.
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as in Armstrong (2006), interaction benefits are not too large, we then have that, given
any vector of prices, each side-i consumer chooses firm A if his stand-alone differential vi
is below a threshold v̂i, and firm B otherwise (with type v̂i being indifferent over which
platform to join). When this is the case, the side-j participation to firm A expected by a
side-i agent with type vi is given by Pr (vj ≤ v̂j | vi). Importantly, such participation need
not coincide with the participation to platform A expected by the platforms, which is given
by qj = Pr (vj ≤ v̂j). This happens even if the platforms and all the agents share a common
prior over the distribution from which the “aggregate state” Fv is drawn.59
Let q̂Aji = Pr (vj ≤ v̂j | v̂i) denote the side-j participation to firm A expected by the
“marginal” agent on side i— i.e., by the side-i agent with type v̂i implicitly defined by
v̂i = p
B
i − pAi − γi [Pr ( vj ≥ v̂j | v̂i)− Pr (vj ≤ v̂j | v̂i)] (15)
who is just indifferent between joining platform A and joining platform B.
Continue to assume that interaction costs are zero and that prices on each side take the
form of participation fees so that P ki = p
k
i , i = 1, 2, k = A,B. Jullien and Pavan (2019)
then show that platform A’s equilibrium prices satisfy the following optimality conditions
(similar conditions apply to platform B)
pAi −
[
cAi − 2γj
∂q̂Aij
∂qAi
qAj
]
= µ̂Ai (pi; qj) , (16)
where µ̂Ai (pi; qj) is the inverse-semi-price elasticity of the platform’s side-i expected demand
qAi , holding the opponent’s prices and the side-j threshold v̂j constant, and where ∂q̂
A
ij/∂q
A
i
is the change in the side-i demand expected by the side-j marginal agent, when the platform
increases the participation it expects from side i.
Private information affects pricing in two important ways. First, the opportunity cost of
expanding the side-i participation (the term in square brackets in (16)) must now account
for the fact that when the platform expects a change in the side-i price to bring on board ε
more agents from side i, the marginal agent on side j expects the side-i demand to change
by ε · ∂q̂Aij/∂qAi . The difference in the side-i participation expected by the platform and by
the side-j marginal agent reflects the difference in their beliefs over the “aggregate state”
(i.e., over the cross sectional distribution of stand-alone differentials).60
Second, the inverse-semi-price elasticity must now account for the fact that, when the
platform expands the side-i participation, it also changes the beliefs of the side-i marginal
agent over the side-j participation. This change in beliefs occurs even if, from the platform’s
perspective, the side-j demand remains constant (that is, even if v̂j does not change). In
59The analysis in Jullien and Pavan (2019) does not assume that the agents’ and the platforms’ beliefs be
derived from a common prior. We assume a common prior here just to facilitate the exposition.
60The platform and the side-j marginal agent agree that a decrease in the side-i price pAi by δ, when
paired with a variation in the side-j price pAj that leaves the identity of the side-j marginal agent v̂j (and
hence the side-j demand expected by the platform) unchanged triggers a change in the identity of the side-i
marginal agent by (∂v̂i/∂p
A
i )δ, with ∂v̂i/∂p
A
i obtained from (15). However, they disagree over the effect that
such a change in the identity of the side-i marginal agent has on the side-i demand. In particular, while the
platform expects the side-i demand to change at a rate dPr (vi ≤ v̂i) /dv̂i, the side-j marginal agent expects
it to change at a rate ∂ Pr (vi ≤ v̂i | v̂j) /∂v̂i. The term ∂q̂Aij/∂qAi captures this discrepancy.
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turn, such changes in the beliefs of the side-i marginal agent over the side-j’s participation
affect the slope of the platform’s side-i inverse residual demand which is now given by
∂pAi
∂qAi
=
∂pAi
∂qAi
∣∣∣∣
q̂Aji=cst
+ 2γi
∂q̂Aji
∂qAi
.
The sign of the second term depends on whether preferences are “aligned” or “misaligned”
between the two sides (that is, on the affiliation between the stand-alone differentials be-
tween the two sides).61 When preferences are aligned, agents with a higher appreciation
for a platform’s product also expect a higher appreciation by agents from the opposite side,
whereas the opposite is true when preferences are misaligned.
When preferences are aligned, the new term is negative, thus contributing to a steeper
inverse residual demand, whereas the opposite is true when preferences are misaligned.
This effect has no counterpart under complete information. To understand this new effect,
notice that increasing the side-i demand implies increasing v̂i which in turn means attracting
marginal consumers with a lower appreciation for platform A’s product vis-a-vis platform
B’s product. When consumers form beliefs over the distribution of preferences on the other
side of the market using their own appreciation for the platforms’ products, and preferences
are aligned between sides, the new marginal agent from side i is thus less optimistic about
the side-j participation to platform A than the old marginal agent (the one with a lower
v̂i). Other things equal, this new effect tends to reduce the elasticity of the residual demand
and thus contribute to higher prices when preferences are aligned, and to increase the
elasticity of the residual demands and hence reduce the equilibrium prices when preferences
are misaligned.
This finding reflects the fact that, when preferences are aligned, the new marginal agent
is less optimistic than the infra-marginal agents about the participation of the other side.
Therefore, the platform must cut the price more to trigger the same expansion in the side-i
demand compared to the case where preferences are independent across sides (note that
preferences are always independent when the cross-sectional distribution of stand-alone
differentials on each side is common knowledge).
The above observations have various implications for the structure of the equilibrium
prices. For example, the equilibrium price on each side depends directly on the magnitude of
the interaction benefits on both sides whereas, with complete information, it depends only
on the intensity of the interaction benefits on the opposite side, as shown in Armstrong
(2006). More importantly, platforms may alter the intensity of competition by engaging
in marketing activities and various other information-management policies geared at influ-
encing the ability of each side to predict the other side’s participation (through forums,
showrooms, the dissemination of information about early adoption decisions and the like).
Jullien and Pavan (2019) study the effects of the aforementioned policies on equilibrium
prices, profits, and consumer surplus restricting attention primarily to symmetric markets
that are fully covered. Extending the analysis to richer configurations remains an interesting
line for future research.
61Formally, preferences are aligned if, for all v̂j , Pr (vj ≤ v̂j | vi) is decreasing in vi. They are misaligned
if Pr (vj ≤ v̂j | vi) is increasing in vi.
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4.1.3 Heterogeneous interaction benefits
Consider now a two-sided market in which preferences are as in (10), but where the interac-
tion benefits are heterogenous across agents (that is, Fi is not restricted to assign probability
one to types θi = (v
A
i , v
B
i , γi) that share the same γi).
To make things simple assume that types can be parametrized by a uni-dimensional
variable ωi ∈ Ωi ⊂ R, drawn from a distribution Fi, i = 1, 2. That is, there exists a function
gi : Ωi → Θi such that when ωi is drawn from Ωi according to Fi, independently across
agents, then the cross-sectional distribution of gi(ωi) coincides with the type distribution
Fi on Θi. For any ωi then let γi (ωj) be the intensity of the interaction benefit for each
side-i agent whose type θi is parametrized by ωi (in short, for any ωi-agent). Assuming for
conciseness that the differential in stand-alone values vi(ωi) ≡ vBi (ωi)− vAi (ωi) is increasing
in ωi, under appropriate conditions, we then have that, for each price vector, there exist
thresholds ω̂1 and ω̂2 such that each side-i agents joins firm A if ωi < ω̂i whereas he
joins firm B if ωi > ω̂i, i = 1, 2.
62 Paralleling the analysis above, we then have that the
price adjustment required to maintain the participation of side j constant when expanding
the side-i participation can be identified by preserving the utility differential of the side-j
marginal agent (the one whose type is indexed by ω̂j). The equilibrium prices then solve
the first-order conditions
pAi −
[
cAi − 2γj (ω̂j) qAj
]
= µAi (pi; qj) ,
where the term µAi (pi; qj) continues to denote the inverse-semi-price elasticity of platform
A’s side-i demand with respect to the price pAi , for given prices by form B and given
participation qj on side j. As in the monopoly case, a Spence distortion then arises due
to the fact that the firm accounts only for the effect of a variation in the side-i demand on
the interaction benefit γj (ω̂j) of the side-j’s marginal agent, instead of all side-j agents on
board (see Weyl, 2010). This distortion is in addition to the one originating in the firm’s
market power, as reflected in the inverse-semi-price elasticity term µAi .
When the heterogeneity of the interaction benefits γi is large, asymmetric equilibria
may arise. An alternative to product differentiation is for platforms to differentiate their
business models. Introducing different price skewness to court different market segments
on each side of the market is one way to alleviate competition. An illustration is provided
in Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) who investigate the conditions for the existence of asym-
metric networks, as for example, in the market for online job search in the US or in the
credit-card industry. They assume that, on each side, there are two types of consumers, the
first with large interaction benefits γi, the second with small interaction benefits. Assuming
that the measure of the second type is large relative to that of the first type, Ambrus and
Argenziano (2009) then show that each platform’s optimal strategy is to set a low price on
one side (say side 1), in order to attract the large mass of consumers with low interaction
benefits and set a high price on the other side (side 2) targeted to those agents with large
interaction benefits. When platform A sets low prices on side 1 and high prices on side 2,
the best response for platform B is to do the opposite (set a low price on side 2 and a high
price on side 1). This is because many agents are not served by platform A on side 2 and
62This is the case for instance if γi(ωi) are small, for all ωi, i = 1, 2, and if the distribution of vi(ωi) is
sufficiently diffused.
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hence are easily attractable by firm B by setting a low price. Conversely, on side 1 those
agents with low interaction benefits are already attracted by platform A in which case it is
more profitable for platform B to target those side-1 agents with high interaction benefits
who value being connected to many agents from the other side.
In the case of online job search, the result implies that a natural equilibrium config-
uration is one where two platforms asymmetrically split the market, with one platform
attracting many job posters and few job seekers and the other platforms attracting many
job seekers and few job posters.63
4.2 Multi-homing
The previous contributions share the important assumption that each agent joins at most
one platform. How robust are the ideas developed above to the possibility of multi-homing?
As long as there are two active firms, and some agents choose to join only one platform, the
agents on the other side will have incentives to subscribe to both platforms. Multi-homing
allows agents to benefit from larger interaction benefits but also enjoy the differentiated
products supplied by both firms.64
Note that, for given horizontal differentiation in the stand-alone values, the incentives
for each side-i agent to multi-home are inversely related to the measure of side-j agents who
multi-home. Let m1 and m2 denote the measure of agents who multi-home on side 1 and 2,
respectively. The incremental value of multi-homing relative to single-homing depends on
the additional stand-alone value that each agent obtains by joining a second platform and
the incremental interaction benefit that the agent obtains by reaching those agents from the
opposite side that single-home. Specifically, consider a side-i agent of type θi =
(
vAi , v
B
i , γi
)
buying from firm A. The agent prefers to multi-home if
vBi − κi + γi
(
qBj −mj
)
≥ pBi
where κi can be interpreted as the cost of multi-homing, which can be either a direct adop-
tion cost or the utility loss from purchasing a product that is not fundamentally different
from that provided by firm A. In other words, vBi − κi is the incremental value from con-
suming the good provided by platform B when consuming already the good provided by
firm A. The term γi(q
B
j −mj), instead, is the interaction benefit of reaching those side-j
agents who are present on firm B and who do not multi-home. Everything else equal, it
is easy to see that the mass of consumers willing to multi-home on side i decreases with
the mass mj of side-j consumers who multi-home. In particular, when interaction benefits
are an important driver of the demand on each side (relative to stand-alone values), if all
consumers multi-home on side-j, few consumers multi-home on side i. This led researchers
to investigate asymmetric models with multi-homing on one side only.
63In a media context, Calvano and Polo (2020) study how platforms may achieve product differentiation
by choosing different business models, arguing that when consumers multi-home, an ad-financed business
model becomes less attractive if the other platform adopts it.
64There is a link between single-homing/multi-homing and substitutability/complementarity. But since
the features of a platform depend on the number/type of agents joining the platform, the notion of substi-
tutability/complementarity is endogenous in a two-sided context. If one side multi-homes, the other sides
views the competing platforms are providing imperfectly substitutable goods. But if there is single-homing
on the first side, the competing platforms are seen as providing complementary goods by the agents on the
other side of the market.
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4.2.1 Competitive bottleneck
As an example of a model where agents multi-home on one side only, consider again the
setting in Armstrong (2006) but assume now that the side-2 agents multi-home whereas the
side-1 agents continue to single-home (this is the structure considered in Armstrong and
Wright, 200765).
The multi-homing behavior of the side-2 agents dramatically changes the competition
between the two platforms. The side-2 agents de facto choose whether or not to join each
platform as if it were a monopoly: given that choosing a platform does not preclude joining
the other, there is no direct competition between the two platforms to attract the side-2
agents.
The lack of competition on side 2 de facto changes the bargaining power between the
agents and the platform. Indeed, because the side-1 agents single-home, they are a scarce
resource for which the platforms are ready to fight. If any of the side-2 agents wants to be
connected to a specific agent from the other side, he has to join the platform this specific
agent has joined. This situation is often referred to as a competitive bottleneck. Because of
the lack of competition on side 2, platforms raise their side-2 price, inducing too few side-2
agents to join. The effects of multi-homing on the equilibrium side-1 prices are ambiguous.
On the one hand, because side 2 multi-homes, the value of stealing a side-1 agent as a way to
weaken the competitor is not present anymore. On the other hand, the value of attracting
a side-1 agent may be larger under multi-homing because each platform may attract more
agents on side 2 under multi-homing and hence may match the additional side-1 agent it
attracts to a larger set of side-2 agents.
To illustrate the above effects assume that consumers on side 2 multi-home at no cost
(κ2 = 0), that all side-1 consumers single-home (m1 = 0) and that interaction benefits are
homogeneous within each side and equal to γ1 and γ2 for side 1 and side 2, respectively.
Then for each consumer on side 2, the decision of whether or not to join platform k doesn’t
depend on the other platform’s price or sales. The side-2 demand for each platform k = A,B
is given by
qk2 = Pr
(
vk2 + γ2q
k
1 − pk2 ≥ 0
)
≥ Dk2 (p2; q1) ,
where Dk2 (p2; q1) is firm k’s demand on side 2 under single-homing.
Many applications of the competitive bottleneck model assume that firms set quantities
on the multi-homing side instead of prices. In this case, each firm k chooses a price pk1 for
the single-homers and the quantity qk2 of multi-homers, with the quantity q
k
1 and the price
pk2 obtained as residuals by market-clearing conditions.
66 In this case, most of the intuitions
developed in the previous sections extend but multi-homing has two novel implications for
the determination of the opportunity costs. First, as anticipated above, the value of stealing
a side-1 user as a way to weaken the competitor on the other side of the market vanishes,
as the two platforms no longer compete on the multi-homing side. Hence, in computing
the opportunity cost of getting a marginal side-1 consumer on board, each firm internalizes
only the value of increasing the attractiveness of its network for its side-2 agents. As a
65In this paper the side multi-homing is endogenously derived
66This is for instance the case for most models of advertising. See Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong
(2006), and Crampes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien (2009).
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consequence of this effect, the optimal prices on the single-homing side are now determined
by the first-order condition67
pk1 −
[
ck1 − γ2qk2
]
= µk1 (p1; q2)
where µk1 (p1; q2) continues to denote the inverse-semi-price elasticity of the residual demand
on the single-homing side.
Second, on the multi-homing side, attracting a marginal consumer does not imply steal-
ing him from the competitor, if the marginal consumer multi-homes. This is because the
attracted consumer continues to buy from the competing firm. Attracting dqk2 new side-2
consumers while adjusting the side-1 price pk1 by γ1dq
k
2 would leave q1 unchanged. The
first-order optimality condition on the multi-homing side then becomes
pk2 −
[
ck2 − γ1qk1
]
= ηk2
(
pk2; q
k
1
)
(17)
where ηk2
(
pk2; q
k
1
)
is the inverse-semi-price elasticity of the monopoly demand.
Hence each firm de facto acts as a two-sided monopolist on the multi-homing side, with
the opportunity cost adjusted to account for the effects of expanding the side-2 participation
on the side-1 price (recall the discussion in Section 2). Notice that despite each firm acting
as a monopoly on the multi-homing side, there is still an indirect price externality between
the firms on this side. Any reduction of the side-2 price pA2 induces a shift of the side-1
demand toward A and therefore a reduction of the demand for firm B on the single-homing
side.
As pointed out in Armstrong (2006), the formula in (17) implies that the platforms
choose their prices on the multi-homing side so as to maximize the joint surplus of the
firm and of the single-homing side at constant volume of participation. In other words,
pk2 maximizes
(
pk2 − ck2
)
qk2 + γ1q
k
1q
k
2 holding q
k
1 constant. General comparisons between the
multi-homing and the single-homing prices is not easy because multi-homing changes the
level and the elasticity of the demands. For given participation on side 2 and elasticity on
side 1, the price each platform sets on side 1 is higher because the firm does not value stealing
consumers on side 1 as a way of weakening its competitor on side 2. In this respect, multi-
homing reduces the impact of network effects on prices by reducing the competitive edge
generated by higher interaction benefits. On the single-homing side, this effect, however,
must be balanced by the change in sales on side 2, as anticipated above. When multi-
homing increases the side-2 demands, the value of attracting a marginal consumer on the
single-homing side is higher because the firm may then match the consumer to a larger user
base on the other side of the market. Thus, there are conflicting effects. For instance, in a
model where all consumers on side 2 multi-home and have inelastic demands, Armstrong
(2006) shows that the equilibrium price on the single-homing side is the same as when both
sides single-home.
67This condition is computed assuming that platforms choose quantity on side 2. If, instead, they choose
prices, the interaction benefits between sides induce a 2-sided feedback loop on the competing firm’s demand
q−k2 that requires tracking the change of q
−k
2 in the computation of the inverse-semi-price elasticity µ
k
1 . This
happens even if the market is fully covered. See Armstrong (2006) and Crampes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien
(2009).
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The implications of multi-homing for consumer welfare are not straightforward either.
First, ceteris paribus, allowing some agents to multi-home raises their options and thus
their utility. However, prices may increase or decrease due to multi-homing, thus making
the analysis of the effects of the latter on consumer surplus ambiguous. Moreover, the
elasticity ηk2 of the monopoly demand differs in a non-trivial way from the elasticity of
the residual demand µk2 in the duopoly case, which also makes the comparison of prices
and hence of consumer welfare tedious. Still, intuition suggests that the single-homing side
should benefit if its participation is very valuable to the other side (γ2 large) and if multi-
homing raises the volume of sales significantly. Similarly, the multi-homing side should
benefit if the monopoly demand is elastic enough. Belleflamme and Peitz (2019a) confirm
these insights in an extension of Armstrong (2006)’s Hotelling model, varying the cost κ2
of multi-homing.
4.2.2 Multi-homing on both sides
The competitive bottleneck model assumes that agents multi-home only on one side. For
example, when platforms are the owners of smartphone operating systems, it makes sense to
expect most users to buy a single smartphone. This is because the cost of purchasing mul-
tiple handsets typically offsets the benefit of being able to use the apps that are developed
for one smartphone operating system but not the others. On the other hand, developers
typically develop apps for multiple operating systems.
In other markets, though, multi-homing may occur on both sides and this possibility
brings new effects.68 There are three types of reasons for multi-homing to occur.
1. Incremental stand-alone values: the two stand-alone products need not be perfect
substitutes so that buying the second good may provide additional utility irrespective
of whether it also provides access to more agents from the other side.
2. Incremental volume of interactions: when some agents single-home on the other side,
multi-homing allows an agent to raise the volume of interactions.
3. Incremental value of interactions: interacting with the same agents on multiple plat-
forms may be more valuable than interacting with the same agents only on one plat-
form. In the context of advertising, multiple impressions may be more valuable than
single impressions. More generally, interacting over multiple platforms may increase
the likelihood that a final match is formed and/or its quality, as pointed out in Cail-
laud and Jullien (2003).
To see the implications of multi-homing on both sides on equilibrium prices, assume
that, on each side, a consumer who multi-homes obtains a total stand-alone utility equal to
wi = v
A
i + v
B
i − κ, where, as before, κ denotes the cost of combining the two stand-alone
products. Further assume that each multi-homing consumer obtains a additional interaction
benefit equal to χi from interacting with an agent from the other side who multi-homes.
Continue to let qkj denote the total participation to firm k on side j and mj the mass of
68See the recent analysis in Bakos and Halaburda (2020) and Jeitschko and Tremblay (2020).
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side-j multi-homers. The total participation on side j is then equal to qAj + q
B
j −mj . The
utility of a multi-homing consumer on side i is thus equal to
wi + γi
(
qAj + q
B
j −mj
)
+ χimj − pAi − pBi .
Assuming full participation (i.e., qAj + q
B
j −mj = 1), the consumer thus chooses to multi-
home if
wi − v−ki + γi
(
qkj −mj
)
+ χimj > p
k
i for k = A,B. (18)
The term wi− v−ki captures the degree of substitutability between the two firms’ stand-
alone products, ranging from 0 in case of perfect substitutes to vki in case of independent
products. The second term captures the increase in the volume of interactions with the other
side (recall that qkj −mj is the measure of side-j agents who are present only on platform
k). The third term χimj captures the increase/decrease in interaction efficiency (i.e., the
change in benefits originating from interacting with the same agents on both platforms as
opposed to a single platform).
For our concerns, the interaction terms are the most interesting. Typically, the ad-
ditional benefit of interacting with the same agent on multiple platforms is less than the
benefit of interacting with the same agent on a single platform, that is, χi < γi. This implies
that, at fixed prices, increasing the volume of agents multi-homing on one side decreases the
volume of agents who multi-home on the other side. Hence, when products are substitutes
and the incremental gain χi of interacting with agents from the opposite side on multiple
platforms is small, we may expect one side to single-home if the number of agents who
multi-home on the other side is large. Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) illustrate this point.
They find that only one side multi-homes in a model with heterogeneous interaction ben-
efits. They suggest a link between multi-homing in two-sided markets and multi-purchases
in vertical differentiation models. Interaction benefits constitute a quality dimension and
multi-homing is similar to buying a bundle that raises quality compared to each single
product in the bundle. Interaction benefits thus introduce a vertical dimension in the com-
petition between the firms. As in models of standard vertical differentiation (Mussa and
Rosen, 1978 and Shaked and Sutton, 1983), only consumers with a high value for quality
(high interaction benefits) buy the high quality product (here multi-home).
Along this line, Doganoglu and Wright (2006) build a model of platforms where con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their interaction benefits and both sides multi-home.69 Suppose
there are two types of consumers on each side: half of the consumers have a high inter-
action benefit γ̄i and the other half has a low interaction benefit γi < γ̄i. Products are
independent and there is no efficiency from multi-homing (χi = 0) so the sole motive for
multi-homing is to to expand the network interactions. Then a consumer multi-homes
if vki + γi
(
qkj −mj
)
− pki > 0 for k = A,B. Assume that in equilibrium the market is
covered on each side and prices are at intermediate levels so that low types single-home
whereas high types multi-home. The demand from low types is then as in the baseline
model Dki (pi; qj) /2 (accounting for the mass 1/2) while the demand from high types is as
in the competitive bottleneck model and given by
D̄ki
(
pki ; q
k
j −mj
)
=
1
2
Pr
(
vki + γ̄i
(
qkj −mj
)
− pki > 0
)
,
69See also Kim and Serfes (2006).
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with the volume of multi-homers given by70
mj = D̄
A
j
(
pAj ; q
A
i −mi
)
+ D̄Bj
(
pBj ; q
B
i −mi
)
− 1
2
.
Compared to the competitive bottleneck model, there are two differences. First, each firm
faces both single-homers and multi-homers and marginal consumers are spread over the
two categories. Hence the situation is a hybrid between the single-homing case and the
competitive bottleneck. Second, the value offered to marginal multi-homing consumers on
one side decreases with the volume of multi-homing agents on the other side. This is the
consequence of a more general principle that governs competition with multi-homing. When
the marginal consumer is already buying from the other firm, a firm can only charge for
the additional interaction benefits it brings to the consumer given the level of interactions
at the other firm. This has been referred to as the “incremental pricing principle”in the
advertising literature.71
When applied to each firm, this principle implies that each firm is constrained in its
ability to extract rents from the consumers. For instance, if all consumers multi-home
on side j (that is, qAj = q
B
j = mj ) and all marginal consumers multi-home on side i,
then no firm can charge a mark-up for interaction benefits on side i. This incremental-
pricing principle has been used to explain the decline of aggregate advertising revenue
following the rise of the Internet and the declining ability by large advertising platforms to
charge higher prices (Athey, Calvano, and Gans, 2018). Rochet and Tirole (2003) point to
another aspect of competition with multi-homing that they refer to as “steering”. In their
setup, firms are credit cards setting transaction fees. Sellers must decide whether to accept
transactions on both platforms (multi-home) or only one.72 In case a seller accepts to trade
on both platforms, the buyer chooses which platform to use. A seller choosing to trade only
on the platform setting the lowest transaction fee reduces its total sales but increases its
average margin by forcing some buyers to trade on their least-preferred platform. Reducing
transaction fees in this context raises the volume of transactions by convincing some sellers
to stop accepting transactions on the other more expensive platform..
4.3 Concentration, merger and collusion
4.3.1 Concentration and entry of platforms
It is well known that there may be excessive or insufficient entry in industries absent network
effects.73 The same holds true for goods involving network externalities, with the added
feature that market fragmentation reduces interactions benefits on each platform (see Katz
and Shapiro, 1994, for a discussion). Thus increasing concentration need not hurt consumers
in markets with network externalities.
70As the market is covered, every agent on side j is either a single-homer or a multi-homer. If xAj and x
B
j
are the mass of high type single-homers then D̄kj
(
pkj ; q
k
i −mi
)
= xkj +mj and x
A
j + x
B
j +mj = 1/2.
71See Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2018), Ambrus and Reisinger (2006), Ambrus, Calvano, and Reisinger
(2016) and Anderson and Peitz (2020a).
72Liu, Teh, Wright, and Zhou (2020) extend the model to allow consumers to multi-home as well, showing
that it induces some re-balancing of transaction fees in favor of consumers.
73See for instance Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995) for conditions under which entry is excessive
from a total-welfare perspective.
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The literature based on incumbency advantage in one-period models confirms this insight
for two-sided markets, despite barriers to entry. For instance, Jullien (2011) and Vasconcelos
(2015) conclude that both excessive or insufficient entry may occur if network externalities
are not too large. This is because an incumbent may find it too costly to deter all divide-
and-conquer strategies by an entrant and decide to accommodate some (inefficient) market
fragmentation. Amelio, Giardino-Karlinger, and Valletti (2020) characterize a limit-pricing
equilibrium with inefficient entry deterrence for some intermediate range of entry costs.
In the context of competition on the market, Tan and Zhou (2019) analyze the effect
of concentration in the discrete-choice model with K differentiated platforms and single-
homing consumers on both sides discussed in Section 4.1.1. Reducing market fragmentation–
reducing K–raises average participation in each platform on both sides and thus raises total
interaction benefits. However, a lower elasticity of residual demands tends to increase price-
cost margins, due to the familiar market-power effect. The market-power effect dominates
if network effects are small. The paper shows that, depending on the specification of the
demand function, increasing K may reduce or increase prices on any side of the market.74,75
In particular, prices may increase on one side and decrease on the other side. This property
is a manifestation of the “seesaw” principle of Rochet and Tirole (2006), according to which
“a factor that is conducive to a higher price on one side, to the extent that it raises the
platform’s margin on that side, tends also to call for a lower price on the other side, as
attracting members on that other side becomes more profitable.”
Correia-da Silva, Jullien, Lefouili, and Pinho (2019) study the effect of concentration in
a Cournot model with K homogeneous platforms (see Section 5.2 for a discussion of the
Cournot model). The paper finds that reducing K reduces quality-adjusted prices, pki −
γiq
k
j , i 6= j, on both sides i = 1, 2 if pre-merger quality-adjusted prices are below marginal
costs on both sides, which occurs when interactions benefits are large. As lower quality-
adjusted prices translate into higher consumer surplus in their model, consumer surplus
increases on both sides with concentration if network effects are important. The reverse
holds if interaction benefits are small and pre-merger quality-adjusted prices are above cost
on both sides. The paper also identifies an intermediate range of interaction benefits such
that increasing concentration harms consumers on one side and benefits consumers on the
other side—a seesaw effect.
Anderson and Peitz (2020b) also analyze the seesaw effect in an aggregative-game for-
mulation76 of a media market. The paper focuses on a competitive bottleneck model and
argues that the seesaw effect is more likely to occur when advertising is a nuisance and
content is offered free of charge to consumers.77
74The possibility that increasing concentration may reduce prices also exists in one-sided setting with
product differentiation (Chen and Riordan, 2008). We focus on platform-specific effects.
75The paper also derives conditions for excessive entry to occur in a multi-sided market model.
76Aggregative games simplify the equilibrium analysis by using an aggregate of players’ actions to reduce
the dimensionality of strategic interactions (Selten, 1973). See Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) and Anderson,
Erkal, and Piccinin (2020). This simplification allows Anderson and Peitz (2020b) to consider asymmetric
platforms and partial market coverage
77In a competitive bottleneck setup with ad nuisance, the attention to ads is the price to access content.
A merger relaxes competition for consumers so that it raises the volume of advertising and hurts consumers
(Anderson and Coate, 2005). This result may be reversed if consumers multi-home, because multi-homing
softens competition for consumers (Anderson, Foros, and Kind, 2019).
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4.3.2 Horizontal mergers
Unsurprisingly, similar conclusions emerge for mergers. Because of two-sidedness, a merger
may not lead to higher prices and lower consumer surplus on both sides. This was first
pointed out by Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009). Considering two newspapers selling
content to readers and space to advertisers, they notice that, due to imperfect screening, the
reader subscription price may be excessive from the industry-profit perspective. Newspapers
cannot discriminate between readers so that advertising revenue per reader is equal to the
average value of a reader for advertisers. In order to sell to the readers most valuable
to advertisers, a newspaper needs also to sell to readers not valuable to advertisers, who
may contribute negatively to profit.78 Then suppose that when a newspaper raises its
subscription price, the marginal readers diverted toward the competing newspaper are those
contributing negatively to profit, whereas the most attractive marginal consumers stop
buying all together. In this case, raising one newspaper’s price has a negative externality
on the other. Thus a monopoly owner of two newspapers may reduce subscription prices.79
Tan and Zhou (2020) show, in a model with three platforms and γ2 = 0, that, if γ1 is
intermediate, then a merger is profitable and results in lower prices and higher consumer
surplus on side 2. Intuitively, if the pass-through of interaction benefits from side i to side
j increases, it may be worthy boosting participation on side i by reducing the prices on
that side. Higher participation on side i–which is a quality dimension for side-j consumers–
may then benefit side j. Baranes, Cortade, and Cosnita-Langlais (2019) consider a model
where four firms are located on the Salop circle so that competition is localized. When
two adjacent firms merge without synergy, the market power effect dominates and all prices
increase. They then show the possibility of a seesaw effect of cost synergies, with consumer
surplus increasing on one side but decreasing on the other side when cost saving increases.
Finally, the owner of two platforms can raise compatibility between platforms and conse-
quently boost the interaction benefits on the merged platforms (Leonello, 2010). Increasing
compatibility may in turn incentivize the merged entity to reduce some price. To see that,
suppose the owner of two platforms initially incompatible decides to make them compatit-
ble. The interaction benefits of a side-j consumer joining platform k that is merged with
platform l becomes γj
(
qki + ξq
l
i
)
instead of just γjq
k
i . As the merged entity coordinates
prices, it internalizes the effect of side i’s participation to platform k on the side-j’s partic-
ipation to platform l and may decrease the price pki for ξ > 0 below the level chosen when
ξ = 0.
4.3.3 Collusion
A seesaw effect is identified in Dewenter, Haucap, and Wenzel (2011)’s analysis of price
coordination within a competitive bottleneck model: coordination reduces participation on
the multi-homing side but may increase participation and consumer welfare on the single-
homing side. Dewenter, Haucap, and Wenzel (2011) also introduce the possibility of price
coordination on one side only (with competition on the other side), referred to as “semi-
collusion.” They show that semi-collusion in the multi-homing side generates higher total
78This occurs when the sum of the subscription price and the value of the consumer for advertisers is
smaller than the newspaper’s marginal cost.
79See also Foros, Kind, and Sørgard (2015) for a discussion of the impact of mergers in media markets.
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welfare than a full merger and may even generate higher total welfare than competition.80
Lefouili and Pinho (2020) present a full-fledged analysis of tacit collusion in grim-trigger
strategies (with Nash reversal) in Armstrong’s model. At the most profitable collusive
equilibrium, incentive compatibility implies additional distortions of the price structure
compared to competition, raising the price differential between the side with the larger
degree of differentiation and the other side. In this model, the prices maximizing total
profit are above competitive prices on both sides, but incentive compatibility may call for
reducing the price below the competitive level on the least differentiated side, so as to
reduce deviation profits. The paper then finds a seesaw effect of a different nature than in
the merger analysis. A more standard seesaw effect occurs under semi-collusion, although
the price may decrease on any side depending on the level of network effects. Under semi-
collusion, firms have two possibilities: they may agree to raise margins on the collusive side
with the consequence of reducing prices on the competitive side; or they may agree to boost
demand on the collusive side by reducing margins, inducing higher interaction benefits and
prices on the competitive side.81
4.4 Exclusivity and bundling
4.4.1 Exclusivity
Platforms use exclusive dealing as a way to prevent multi-homing.82 Requiring exclusivity
on a multi-homing side j allows platforms to raise the price charged on side i for a given
mass of side-j users on the platform. In a duopoly context, imposing exclusivity amounts
to imposing that agents single-home. When there is little differentiation between platforms,
exclusivity permits platforms to monopolize the side where exclusivity is imposed and gain
a competitive hedge on the other side of the market. Hence exclusive contracts may desta-
bilize equilibria where agents multi-home. Armstrong and Wright (2007) show that this is
the case in a model of competitive bottleneck and characterize the resulting tipping equi-
librium (discussed in Section 3) where all agents use the same platform that emerges when
exclusive contracts are allowed and platforms are homogeneous. The tipping equilibrium is
efficient but with lower consumer surplus than the competitive bottleneck without exclusive
contracts.
The emergence of tipping equilibria when platforms can require exclusivity raises the
question of strategic barriers to entry. The fact that exclusivity may be used by an incum-
bent platform to raise barriers to entry is confirmed by Doganoglu and Wright (2010). They
first extend the naked-exclusion principle (Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley Jr, 1991, Segal
and Whinston, 2000)83 to markets with network effects.84 They then focus on a two-sided
80See Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) in Section 9 for empirical evidence.
81The paper also analyzes semi-collusion in a competitive bottleneck with similar insights (full collusion
in their competitive bottleneck model has no effect on quantities and welfare because the market is fully
covered on both sides).
82There are of course other motives for exclusivity not specific to platforms, such as protecting specific
investments or preventing free riding.
83This principle states that, with increasing returns to scale, a monopoly can prevent efficient entry by
offering discriminatory exclusive contracts, subsidizing a subset of consumers large enough to make trading
with the entrant inefficient for other consumers.
84In this case, subsidizing a subset of consumers for exclusive participation raises the value differential
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market and assume that an incumbent platform A cannot discriminate within each side but
may offer an exclusive contract to all agents on one side before an entrant B steps in and
competes. Agents are assumed to be homogeneous on both sides with no stand-alone values
(vki = 0, i = 1, 2, k = A,B) and multi-homing. They assume that the entrant offers higher
interaction benefits than the incumbent (i.e., γBi > γ
A
i , i = 1, 2) and faces no chicken & egg
problem (consumers coordinate on Pareto efficient allocations). Under these assumptions,
absent exclusive contracts, the equilibrium is efficient and B wins the market.
When exclusive contracts are feasible, the incumbent can however prevent entry by
offering exclusivity on one side of the market. To see that, suppose that all agents on side
1 grants exclusivity to platform A before B can make any offer. Then platform B cannot
generate any value as it can only trade with one side. This allows A to charge a monopoly
price γA2 to the non-exclusive side 2. Platform A thus offers exclusivity if there is a price
pA1 > −γA2 that is accepted by the side-1 agents for their exclusive participation. Given that
the surplus on side 1 is γA1 − pA1 , this is the case if γA1 + γA2 –the total value of A–is larger
than the surplus accruing to side 1 under no exclusivity and competition between A and B.
But without exclusivity, competition implies that consumers surplus, and a fortiori side-1
surplus, cannot exceed the maximal surplus that platform A can offer, which is precisely
γA1 +γ
A
2 .
85 As a consequence, the platform can profitably sell exclusive contracts and exclude
its competitor. Notice that the argument requires no incumbency advantage but the ability
to obtain exclusivity prior to the competition stage with the entrant. Clearly, if the entrant
can also make such offers, there would be competition to sell exclusivity and the entrant
would win the market.
The above argument reflects the view that exclusive dealing may protect incumbents.
An alternative view is that exclusive contracts may help the entrant when the incumbent
benefits from an incumbency advantage (such as favorable beliefs). In this case, exclusive
offers may help a new platform overcome the chicken & egg problem by targeting key
strategic players (Markovich and Yehezkel, 2021). Indeed, one issue faced by an entrant
using a divide-and-conquer strategy when consumers can multi-home is that, if it subsidizes
the participation of side i, it needs to prevent the possibility that side j stays with the
incumbent and side i just multi-homes (collecting the subsidy but interacting with the other
side on the incumbent’s platform). This requires low prices on side j. Offering exclusivity
to side i would then amount to switching to the single-homing divide-and-conquer strategy,
which allows a platform to charge higher prices to side j but requires a larger subsidy to
side i. When introductory exclusive contracts can be targeted in a discriminatory way, the
entrant may then selectively target some agents on side i with a large subsidy for exclusive
participation. This is in particular the case if some agents generate large interaction benefits,
or if a subset of agents are part of an institution coordinating their choices (a user-group).
By convincing these key agents to join exclusively, the entrant raises its relative value on
the other side.
The view that exclusive deals can help smaller firms has some support empirically.
As mentioned above, Lee (2013) studies exclusive deals between producers of video game
consoles and video game developers. In his empirical results, without exclusivity, consumers
and developers (who are allowed to multi-home) flow to a single console but exclusive deals
with the entrant for other consumers. See also Karlinger and Motta (2012).
85This argument relies on efficient coordination by the consumers.
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provide a way for smaller consoles to differentiate themselves and maintain market share.
An interesting feature pointed out in Carroni, Madio, and Shekhar (2020) is that exclu-
sivity offered by a platform k to some key strategic agents on side i not only dfoes it boost
participation on the other side j, it may also help convincing other agents of the same side i
to stop multi-homing and join exclusively platform k. The reason is that increasing platform
k′s demand on side j to the expense of the other platform raises the value of platform k for
agents of side i and reduces the incremental value of the other platform. To see that, recall
from the analysis in the previous sections that the (gross) incremental value of platform −k
is the extra utility that a user of platform k obtains by joining platform −k (in addition to
joining platform k) and is given by
wi − vki + γi
(
q−kj −mj
)
+ χimj = wi − vki + (γi − χi)
(
q−kj −mj
)
+ χiq
−k
j ,
where q−kj is total participation to platform −k on side j and q
−k
j − mj is the exclusive
participation to platform −k. Assume that 0 ≤ χi < γi. Then given that both total and
exclusive participation to platform −k decrease when platform k becomes relatively more
attractive, the incremental value of platform −k decreases and more agents single-home.
Hence, gaining exclusivity of some agents brings additional exclusive participation at no
cost on the same side.86 However, gaining exclusivity of these strategic agents is costly
as they need to be compensated for giving up some interaction benefits. In the analysis of
Carroni, Madio, and Shekhar (2020) of a competitive bottleneck, exclusivity arises when
competition on the single-homing side is intense. As in Armstrong and Wright (2007), the
equilibrium may be more efficient due to larger interaction benefits when concentration
increases.
Hence, exclusivity raises equilibrium concentration when network effects are large and,
depending on the context, may raise or reduce barriers to entry.87
4.4.2 Bundling
Bundling is a widespread practice by platforms (which stands a bit outside the models dis-
cussed so far) that is motivated by specific features of platforms and leads to new economic
insights. Choi (2010), and its corrigendum Choi, Jullien, and Lefouili (2017), argue that
bundling may help a firm coordinating agents on its platform. The paper considers a situa-
tion where the platforms are pure complements of a monopoly base product. The monopoly
provider A of the base product owns one platform, but cannot capture the revenue from
an independent complementary platform–because it cannot directly charge the platform.
When platform A is not tied to the base product, partial multi-homing on both sides of
86Ishihara and Oki (2020) point out that, when both sides multi-home, increasing exclusive participation
on one side raises the incremental value of each platform and thus the mass of multi-homing consumers on
the other side. Put it differently, exclusivity on one side increases platform differentiation on the other side
and may relax competition.
87See also the literature on exclusivity in media, mostly focusing on premium content. For instance,
Chowdhury and Martin (2017) focus on exclusive licensing. D’Annunzio (2017) and Stennek (2014) study
the relation between exclusivity and quality of content. Also related is Kourandi, Krämer, and Valletti
(2015), focusing on Internet fragmentation and net-neutrality.
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the market dissipates profits. By tying the platform to the base product, platform A then
convinces both sides to single-home on A, excluding the competing platform and raising
total revenue.
Amelio and Jullien (2012) point out that non-negative price constraints create new in-
centives for bundling that are specific to platforms.88 Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.2.3, a
zero price in some contexts reveals that the platform would be willing to set negative prices
to attract consumers but cannot do so. Bundling may then be used to boost adoption when
the service is free. In a competitive context, relaxing the non-negative price constraint by
bundling participation with goodies has two effects. First, it raises the attractiveness of the
platform on the other side. Second, it relaxes the incentives to compete with other plat-
forms as consumers on the profitable side become more costly (due to the feedback effect
on subsidies). Bundling has thus both a direct effect on the attractiveness of the platform
and a strategic effect that reduces the intensity of competition. While in the monopoly
case bundling is welfare improving, the effects of bundling in a duopoly are ambiguous.
In particular, in the symmetric model of Armstrong (2006), allowing symmetric bundling
possibilities reduces consumer surplus. Choi and Jeon (2021) clarify that a key factor be-
yond new theories of bundling in two-sided markets is that a platform’s ability to cope
with aggressive competition is limited by the non-negative price constraint. Hence, if one
platform has exclusive access to some way of relaxing the non-negative price constraint and
subsidizing the participation of one side (with bundling for instance), it can win the compe-
tition even if it is less efficient than its competitor and there are no consumer coordination
failures.
Bundling is of great interest in the context of cable television. Cable systems are plat-
forms connecting channels with consumers, and most cable systems offer bundles of channels
organized in plans. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) estimate a structural model of consumer
demand, pricing, and bargaining between cable systems and channels. They find that con-
sumers would benefit from á la carte pricing if fees from cable systems to channels remained
constant. However, the switch to á la carte pricing increases pricing power for channels and
enables them to bargain for higher fees because these will be passed through to consumers
more directly. When accounting for this effect on input prices, á la carte pricing hurts
consumers relative to bundled pricing. 89
5 Alternative modeling of competition, coordination and be-
liefs
Equilibria in games of platform competition with network externalities typically depend
on the assumptions involving (i) the set of feasible price structures, and (ii) the demand
configuration given the firms’ prices. In this section, we discuss in more detail each of the
above aspects.
88Traditional motives for bundling include price-discrimination and exclusion of competitors (see Fuma-
galli, Motta, and Calcagno, 2018, for an overview).
89While Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) focus on bundling in the retail market, De Cornière and Taylor
(2019) argue that a seller of multiple ad-financed products may improve its bargaining position in the
negotiation with a distribution platform by bundling at the wholesale level.
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5.1 Richer price structures
The standard Bertrand oligopoly model discussed above combines several assumptions typ-
ically encountered in the literature on competing platforms. First, platforms set a single
price on each side that can take the form of a participation fee or a transaction fee, without
transferability.90 Second, demand on each side adjusts to changes in prices to always yield
an equilibrium demand configuration in the continuation game that starts after the firms
announce their prices.91
Many platforms can monitor both participation and usage. In this case, the choice of the
price instruments is endogenous and the platforms can either charge fixed participation fees
or individual transaction fees. As mentioned in Section 2, in the case of monopoly pricing,
Rochet and Tirole (2006) allow for general two-part tariffs by focusing on the average price
per transaction, assuming away the issue of multiplicity of continuation equilibria in the
agents’ choice of whether or not to join the platform. The generalization to oligopoly raises
challenging problems and it seems difficult to find a single representation capturing the
diversity and richness of oligopoly interactions with multi-sided network effects.
The difficulty in the oligopoly case is that the elasticity of the residual demand for any
firm on any side depends on the structure of the tariffs used by the competing firms on
all sides. Indeed, even if a firm can coordinate participation on both sides with its tariffs,
the value of the agents’ outside option (buying from the other firms) depends on the other
firms’ tariffs.92
Suppose agents single-home on both sides and firm B charges a total price PBi = p
B
i +
tBi q
B
j on each side i = 1, 2, where p
B
i is a fixed fee and t
B
i is a fee per interaction. A
deviation from the equilibrium tariffs by firm A that raises participation on side i and
leaves the side-j participation constant requires an adjustment of the side-j price PAj equal
to γj +
(
γj − tBj
)
= 2γj − tBj per consumer attracted on side i, where γj is the extra value
a side-j user of platform A derives from the increased participation to platform A on side
i whereas the term γj − tBj is the lost interaction value for a side-j user of platform B. The
first-order condition for platform A’s prices (assuming it faces no chicken & egg problem)
can be written as
PAi −
[
cAi + σ
AqAj − 2γjqAj + tBj qAj
]
= µAi (Pi; qj) . (19)
where again µAi is the inverse-semi-price elasticity of the residual demand of platform A on
side i, holding qAj , q
B
j and P
B
i constant. In this approach to pricing, the tariff offered by
the competing platform B determines the relevant opportunity cost of bringing a marginal
consumer on board. This is another illustration of the point made by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) that, in two-sided markets, the price structure matters as well as the price level.
The equilibrium allocations then depend on whether the firms set flat prices or two-part
tariffs with a positive slope. For instance, when platforms compete in tariffs, Armstrong
90We define transferability as in the matching literature as the possibility for a pair of agents interacting
on a platform to negotiate a transfer between them to redistribute the fees.
91See Correia-da Silva, Jullien, Lefouili, and Pinho (2019) for a discussion of this assumption and a few
issues related to it.
92The complexity here is similar to the one noticed in the competing-principals literature – see, e.g.,
Martimort and Stole (2009).
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(2006) shows the existence of a continuum of equilibria indexed by the level of the interaction
fees tki . To see that, suppose that demand is as in (11) and focus on the case of a symmetric
equilibrium where quantities are qki = 1/2, k = A,B, i = 1, 2. Consider a symmetric tariff
in which the participation fees are pAi = p
B
i = pi and the interaction fees are t
A
i = t
B
i = ti,
with ti not too large. In a symmetric equilibrium with full coverage, the total price paid by
each side-i consumer is Pi = pi + ti/2. Under suitable concavity conditions, any symmetric
tariff such that
pi − cAi − σA/2 + γj + ti/2− tj/2 =
Φi (0)
Φ′i (0)
can be sustained in a symmetric equilibrium, where Φi is the cdf of the side-i distribution
of the stand-alone value differential between the two platforms (Armstrong, 2006).
Reisinger (2014) shows however that the multiplicity disappears if there is enough het-
erogeneity in the interaction benefits γi as well as in the stand-alone values. In his model,
different types of consumers have different trade volume and thus pay a different total price
for the same transaction fee. Each part of a two-part tariff then induces a different demand
reaction, reflecting the mix of the different types of marginal consumers. Optimal subscrip-
tion fees and transaction fees are tailored to these different elasticities, leading to unique
equilibrium tariffs.
Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl (2016) argue that platforms have enough pricing
instruments to overcome any coordination problem. They define the concept of Insulated
Equilibrium, based on the idea that prices can be designed so that participation on each
side is independent of the participation decisions on the other side. More specifically, they
consider an insulating tariff system whereby the tariffs set by all firms make the choice of
whether or not to join a platform invariant in the agents’ beliefs about the participation
of the other side. In other words, given the equilibrium tariffs, each agent’s participation
decision is determined by a dominant strategy. Formally, the notion of dominance applies to
each agent in the case of homogeneous interaction benefits or to a representative consumer
on each side in the case of heterogenous interaction benefits. In either case, the insulating
tariff system is given by Pi (qj) =
(
PAi (qj) , P
B
i (qj)
)
with
∂Dki (Pi (qj) ; qj)
∂qlj
= 0 for k, l = A,B.
The concept of an insulating equilibrium however implicitly assumes coordination be-
tween the firms. Indeed whether the tariff of a firm is insulating or not depends on the
tariff set by other firms. In general, a firm may not find it profitable to offer an insulating
tariff if it expects the other firms to offer tariffs other than the insulating ones, which raises
the usual question of equilibrium selection. Lastly, while insulating tariffs are quite simple
in the case of homogeneous interaction benefits, these tariffs become highly complex in the
case of heterogeneous interaction benefits. This is because an insulating tariff system must
preserve for the marginal consumer the value differential between the platform and the con-
sumer’s outside opportunities. This requires controlling the value offered by the platform
to the representative consumer in a manner that compensates for any change in outside
options. 93
93Hence, the firm must have enough instruments to implement optimal prices and these instruments
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In the duopoly model with homogeneous interaction benefits discussed above, things are
simpler and an insulated equilibrium arises when each firm selects a two-part tariff of the
form pki + γiq
k
j . When both firms offer such tariffs, all externalities are eliminated through
taxation and the characterization of the insulated tariffs is given by the following first-order
conditions:
P ki −
[
cki + σ
kqkj − γjqkj
]
= µki (Pi; qj) . (20)
The difference with Condition (12) is that the term γjq
k
j is counted only once instead of
twice. Insulated tariffs eliminate the feedback loop between sides discussed above. When a
firm attracts one more consumer on side i, the competitor’s tariff responds by reducing the
price on side j so as to preserve the competitor’s value, which reduces the platform’s ability
to raise its own price on side j. Because the competitor’s tariff taxes interaction benefits,
demand is less elastic and prices are higher than under flat access fees. Hence, tariffs that
solve the consumers’ coordination problem may not benefit consumers. On the contrary,
coordination failures may protect consumers against excessive use of market power.94
Earlier versions of insulating tariffs appear in Caillaud and Jullien (2003). The paper
shows that competition in two-part tariffs between homogeneous platforms leads to an
efficient outcome with zero profits (see also Armstrong, 2006, for a similar point). With
complex tariffs, a platform can tax all the surplus it creates for its members and redistribute
it through flat registration fees. By doing so, the firm ensures its customers against the risk
that participation does not meet expectations. When all firms offers such tariffs, network
effects are internalized and coordination failures vanish.
The concept of insulating tariffs relies on the existence of multiple best-replies. In other
words, it assumes that, given other firms’ tariffs, each firm has several tariffs that would
achieve the same revenue. The concept then implicitly assumes that each firm breaks in-
difference by choosing the tariff that minimizes the risk of consumers’ mis-coordination.
However, whether this multiplicity of best replies remains in cases involving more realistic
assumptions than the base model is questionable. For instance, in Reisinger (2014) (dis-
cussed above), the platforms prefer to exploit the richness of tariffs to achieve second-degree
price discrimination and there is a unique optimal tariff that may not be insulating.95
must be sufficiently flexible (see the discussion in Veiga, Weyl, and White, 2017). White and Weyl (2016)
and Veiga, Weyl, and White (2017) state that contingencies can be achieved with dynamic pricing, with
firms adjusting their price to market conditions over time. As mentioned in Section 2, for the case of a
monopoly platform, Cabral (2019) finds one particular instance (i.e. homogeneous consumers with vi = 0)
where optimal dynamic tariffs mimic insulating tariffs, although the tariffs in his analysis reflect exploitation
motives rather than insurance motives. In the case of competition, dynamic strategic considerations must
also be accounted for, which casts some doubts about the dynamic justification of insulated equilibria.
94To illustrate this point, consider a monopoly platform facing “unfavorable beliefs”. Consumers benefit
if the platform must subsidize participation on one side to overcome the unfavorable beliefs. When, instead,
consumers coordinate efficiently, the platform can extract the full surplus from the consumers by charging
high prices on both sides.
95See also Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013) who show how to use tariffs to screen agents with adequate
choices of transaction fees.
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5.2 Quantity competition
An alternative to the model of price competition considered thus far is the Cournot model
in which platforms choose quantities instead of prices. Indeed, the assumption in Rochet
and Tirole (2006) that the monopoly can select the desired demand configuration among
all allocations consistent with the posted prices amounts to assuming that the monopoly
chooses the participation on each side, which then uniquely determines the prices. This
observation suggests that having platforms choosing quantity (i.e., the participation) on
each side instead of prices may bypass some of the complexity of the pricing games discussed
above. To our knowledge, Katz and Shapiro (1985) are the first to introduce network effects
in the Cournot model of quantity competition. The Cournot equilibrium concept has also
been used in a limited number of papers on two-sided markets. An early example is Schiff
(2003) who finds, in a setting with homogeneous interaction benefits, that a monopoly is
socially preferable to a duopoly because it permits each side to interact with a larger number
of agents on the opposite side. Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) show that heterogenous
interaction benefits may lead to asymmetric market shares, despite the platforms being
symmetric ex ante.96 That paper also finds that the equilibrium participation and welfare
are higher under the Cournot equilibrium than under price competition with passive beliefs
(see also the discussion below). Correia-da Silva, Jullien, Lefouili, and Pinho (2019) analyze
the impact of platform mergers in a Cournot setting with homogeneous interaction benefits
within each side.
The Cournot model should be interpreted as imposing a specific form of firm’s conduct.
Its key assumption is that each firm anticipates that its rivals will maintain their quanti-
ties at a given level when the platform under consideration changes its practices and that
equilibrium prices will clear the market at targeted quantities.97
Models of Cournot competition can be more tractable than models of price competition
in the presence of cost asymmetries or if there are more than two platforms. In particular, the
Cournot model generates predictions for externality-adjusted prices that make it possible
to determine the welfare effects of a merger. To see that, consider a market with K firms
and suppose that demand on each side depends only on the hedonic prices on that side,
pki − γiqkj , k = A,B. Invert the demand to obtain each platform’s hedonic price on side i
as a function of participation to all platforms: pki − γiqkj = Zki (qi). Then each platform’s
profits can be written as ∑
i
(
Zki (qi) + γiq
k
j − cki
)
qki − σkqk1qk2 .
96The logic is similar to the one behind the emergence of vertical quality differentiation as a way of
relaxing competition. The quantity chosen on one side is the quality perceived on the other side. As price
competition would erode profit for equal quality, platforms are better off differentiating their offers, with
one firm offering a high quantity catering to consumers with high interaction benefits and the other a low
quantity catering to consumers with low interaction benefits.
97As mentioned above, in media markets this may be due to pricing per user. In some two-sided markets,
capacity is a key strategic variable (e.g., ad-finance media platforms committing to ad-space and auctioning
ad inventories; other examples are nightclubs, shopping centers and exhibition halls). In such cases, Cournot
competition is a natural way of modeling platforms’ behavior, at least on one side.
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In the Cournot model of platform competition, each firm k chooses quantities
(
qk1 , q
k
2
)
and prices adjust so that demand equals supply on each side and for each firm, pki =
Zki (qi) + γiq
k
j . It is then easy to see that equilibrium quantities and prices must satisfy
pki −
[
cki + σ
kqkj − γjqkj
]
= µki (pi; qj) (21)
where µki (pi; qj) is as defined above. Comparing the above formula with the first-order con-
ditions for insulated equilibria discussed above, we see that, under homogeneous interaction
benefits and regularity conditions ensuring equilibrium existence and uniqueness, the out-
come of Cournot equilibrium and Insulated Equilibrium coincide. However, this coincidence
should not be expected to hold in more general situations.
The concepts of Insulated Equilibrium and of Cournot equilibrium are related insofar as
they both reduce the effect of two-sidedness on prices by mitigating the internalization of
demand feedback effects by the platforms. However, the two concepts differ when interaction
benefits are heterogeneous, because the insulating tariffs insure only a “representative”
consumer against the risk related to the other side’s participation, whereas the Cournot
equilibrium entails insurance for all users.98
It is worth pointing that many papers in the media literature assume that media plat-
forms set quantities on the advertiser side.99 The literature is surveyed by Anderson and
Jullien (2015) and Peitz and Reisinger (2015). For instance, Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard
(2007) build a model in which TV stations offer advertising space to advertisers and (free)
content to viewers. They show that there is too little advertising when the channels’ pro-
grams are close substitutes and that the more viewers dislike ads, the more likely it is that
social welfare is increasing in the number of channels. Crampes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien
(2009) and Peitz and Valletti (2008) consider similar models but investigate also the case
in which platforms charge viewers. This allows them to compare the free-to-air and pay-
tv business models (see also Calvano and Polo, 2020). Rysman (2004) utilizes a quantity
setting assumption in an empirical study of Yellow Pages directories in order to avoid the
multiple equilibria that arise under price setting. A common feature of these papers is
that consumers are assumed to single-home. Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2019) relax this
assumption and show that a number of puzzles related to entry, merger and profitability
identified in the previous literature on media can be resolved by allowing for multi-homing
consumers.
5.3 Passive Beliefs
Coordination plays an important role in platform competition. As coordination largely
depends on agents’ beliefs, the way beliefs are formed and modeled plays a crucial role in
the analysis of platform markets.
All contributions using static models de facto assume that consumers’ expectations
about participation decisions are fulfilled in equilibrium. The equilibrium concept must
98As pointed out informally by Glen Weyl, this property impedes the existence of a Cournot equilibrium
with multi-dimensional heterogeneity, which is one motivation for the introduction of the concept of insulated
equilibria.
99In a competitive bottleneck model, this is equivalent to setting an ad price per consumer.
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then include a conduct assumption for firms, as discussed above, and an assumption about
the way consumers coordinate when firms act out of equilibrium. The most prominent view
(Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006), Weyl (2010))
is that, when prices change, consumers adjust their beliefs and correctly anticipate the
adjustment in the participation level on the other side. This property is sometimes referred
to as rational expectations, or reactive beliefs, although neither expression seems ideal.
Some contributions take the alternative view that consumers hold fixed beliefs about the
other side’s participation, that do not vary when prices change.100 These beliefs are referred
to as “passive” and their interaction with network effects was first examined in Katz and
Shapiro (1985). With passive beliefs, because the side-j agents’ expectations of the side-i
demand do not vary when a platform changes its side-i prices, then opportunity costs no
longer incorporate network effects. Indeed profits can now be written as
Πk =
∑
i
(
pki − cki
)
Dki
(
pi; q
e
j
)
where qej is the side-j participation expected by the side-i users and is not affected by the
firm’s strategy. It follows that the first-order condition for the side-i prices under passive
beliefs reduces to the standard oligopoly pricing rule
pki − cki = µki (pi; qj) .
In this case, two-sidedness affects prices only through the effect of interaction benefits on
the elasticity of the residual demands, not through the firms’ incentives.
In the context of the competitive bottleneck model, Hagiu and Ha laburda (2014) show
that monopoly profits are lower under passive beliefs than under reactive beliefs. This is
because, with passive beliefs, platforms de facto cannot credibly commit to the prices they
set on the other side. Things, however, are different in a duopoly context. Duopoly profits
in their competitive bottleneck model are higher under passive beliefs than under reactive
beliefs because residual demands are less elastic in the absence of feedback effects (see also
Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019b, for a model with single-homing). While interesting, a concern
with the assumption of passive beliefs is that, because platforms take users’ expectations
about participation as given, they do not account for the value that a user creates for the
other side(s) of the market when setting prices or quantities. Thus, this approach ignores a
key driver of the differences between one-sided and multi-sided markets (see the discussion in
Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006): the (imperfect) internalization of network externalities.101
6 Matching design
6.1 Second-degree price discrimination and matching design
The literature surveyed in the previous sections is not concerned with the specific process by
which agents on board are matched to agents from the other side of the market. In particu-
100See Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) and Griva and Vettas (2011). Hurkens and López (2014) study the
role of expectations in the context of mobile telephony and show that passive beliefs provide better modeling
of actual behaviors.
101Belleflamme and Peitz (2019b) obtain partial internalization by considering a mix of passive and reactive
beliefs reflecting different information of consumers on prices.
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lar, the latter process is treated as exogenous to the platform. Some models are compatible
with one-to-one matching in a buyer-seller context in which buyers are interested in one
specific product version, provided by at most one seller. In these models, the probability by
which buyers find their desired product on the platform is naturally increasing in the sellers’
participation on the other side of the market. However, in these models, the platform does
not engage in any activity to favor the matching between buyers and sellers other than
influencing the participation of each side through the choice of its prices.
Over the last few years the literature on platform markets has started considering models
in which platforms engage in more sophisticated design, matching participating agents in a
customized manner. This change in modeling reflects the observation that many platforms
engage in discriminatory practices whereby they match different agents from the same side
to different sets of agents from the opposite side of the market. For example, ad-exchanges
match advertisers to only a subset of the content providers that join the exchange. Simi-
larly, the packages offered by most cable TV providers (the platforms) are designed with a
similar intent of price discriminating among the viewers by granting them access to different
subsets of the channels that join the cable providers. In a similar vein, Business-to-Business
platforms typically match vendors to a subset of the procurers in their network. Similar
discriminatory practices are used by video-game consoles when mediating the interactions
between gamers and video-game developers, and by employment agencies when mediating
the interactions between employers and job seekers.102. For models of price discrimination
in two-sided markets, see Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013), Reisinger (2014), Gomes and
Pavan (2016, 2019), and Jeon, Kim, and Menicucci (2021).
The possibility of offering differential access to the other side of the market opens the
door to matching design. In this subsection, we review some of the results in this literature,
focusing on existing work where matching allocations are supported by payments.103 In
addition to accommodating for price discrimination, the literature on matching design also
allows for richer preference structures and for the possibility that agents differ not only in
their preferences but also in their attractiveness, that is, in the utility they bring to those
agents they are matched with.
Consider the baseline model of Section 2, where a single platform mediates the inter-
actions between two sides of a market, but now assume that the interaction benefit that a
side-i agent of type θi derives from interacting with a side-j agent of type θj depends on
the latter agent’s type.104
Think of the platform as offering to each side of the market a sophisticated tariff spec-
ifying the price asked to each agent for each possible set of matches with the agents from
102Most of the literature on two-sided markets assumes that platforms price discriminate across sides but
not within side. Price discrimination within the same side has been considered in the networks literature. See,
for example, Belleflamme and Peitz (2020), Bloch and Quérou (2013), Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar
(2012), Chen, Zenou, and Zhou (2018) and Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016).
103This is in contrast to the rich literature examining the stability of matching allocations in environments
without payments. See Roth and Sotomayor (1992) and Roth (2008) for a review of the earlier literature,
and Kojima (2017) and Pathak (2017) for more recent developments. For a connection between the two
literatures, see also the book “Market Design” by Haeringer (2018) and the chapter book ”Two-sided Markets
and Matching Design” by Gomes and Pavan (2021).
104For models with competing matchmakers see Damiano and Li (2008) and Halaburda, Piskorski, and
Yıldırım (2018).
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the other side of the market. The equilibrium outcomes induced by any pair of such tariffs
can be conveniently described by a pair of matching rules (si(·))i=1,2 and a pair of payment
rules (pi(·))i=1,2, one for each side. The matching rule si specifies, for each type θi ∈ Θi, the
set of types si(θi) ⊂ Θj from the opposite side of the market that each side-i agent of type
θi is matched to. The payment rule pi specifies for each side-i type θi the total payment
Pi(θi) that type θi makes to the platform, where the payment can be positive for some types
and negative for others. As in other mechanism-design problems, such functions should be
interpreted as describing the equilibrium allocations generated by the agents’ choices on
each side of the market.
A feasible pair of matching rules (si(·))i=1,2 must satisfy the reciprocity condition ac-
cording to which type θj from side j is matched to type θi from side i if and only if type θi
is in type θj ’s matching set, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i:
θj ∈ si(θi)⇒ θi ∈ sj(θj). (22)
The utility that each side-i agent of type θi derives from paying Pi(θi) to the platform and
being matched to a set of types si(θi) from the opposite side is equal to ui(si(θi)|θi)−Pi(θi),
with the real-valued function ui describing the agent’s gross payoff.
105
As types are the agents’ private information, the matching and the payment rules must
be individually rational and incentive compatible, meaning that each type θi must prefer the
allocation (si (θi) , Pi (θi)) to his outside option (assumed to yield a payoff equal to zero) and
to any other available allocation, in particular to the equilibrium allocation (si (θ
′
i) , pi (θ
′
i))
of any other type θ′i.
To simplify things, we assume here that the costs to the platform of getting agents on
board are equal to zero, so that ci = 0, i = 1, 2.
6.1.1 One-to-one matching
Consider first markets in which matching is one-to-one, meaning that each agent can be
matched up to at most one agent from the opposite side. One-to-one matching typically
arises in markets where the two sides are buyers and sellers and in which buyers have
unit demands and sellers have unit supply. Also assume that the type of each agent is
unidimensional and drawn from Θi = [θi, θ̄i] ⊂ R according to an atom-less distribution Fi,
independently across agents.
The gross utility that each side-i agent of type θi derives from interacting with a side-j
agent of type θj is equal to
φi(θi, θj), (23)
where the function φi is strictly increasing in both arguments and supermodular.
106 An
example often considered in applications is φi(θi, θj) = θiθj , with Θi ⊂ R+, i = 1, 2.
To make things simple (but interesting), assume that the cost σ that the platform
incurs for each match it creates is such that it is inefficient to match pairs of agents with
105Importantly, the analysis accommodates for the case where the matching rule is stochastic, in which
case si(θi) is a lottery over the collection of feasible subsets of Θj . We describe the rule as deterministic
here to facilitate the exposition.
106In addition, the function is typically assumed to be differentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous which
guarantees that the equilibrium payoffs are well behaved.
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the lowest types, but it is efficient to match those with the highest types:
∑
i=1,2 φi(θ1, θ2) <
σ <
∑
i=1,2 φi(θ̄1, θ̄2).
A deterministic matching rule of special interest is the (truncated) positive assortative
one. Formally, for any U ∈ [0, 1], let F−1i (U) ≡ inf{θi ∈ Θi : Fi(θi) ≥ U} be the generalized
inverse cdf of the type distribution on side i. Say that the pair of matching rules {si(·)}i=1,2
is truncated positive assortative if, for each i = 1, 2, there exists a threshold θ̂i ∈ Θi such
that
si(θi) =
{
(Fj)
−1 (Fi(θi)) if θi ≥ θ̂i
∅ if θi < θ̂i.
Hence, any agent from side i with a type below θ̂i is excluded (that is, he is matched to
nobody), whereas any side-i agent with a type above θ̂i is matched in a positively assortative
manner. That is, higher types from each side are matched to agents from the other side
with higher types. The optimality of matching agents assortatively is a direct consequence
of the gross payoffs φi being supermodular. Given the feasibility constraint imposed by
one-to-one matching, positive assortativeness requires that an agent whose type θi occupies
the nth quantile on one side be matched with an agent from the opposite side whose type
occupies the same quantile.107
Next, let
φ̂i(θi, θj) ≡ φi(θi, θj)−
(
1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
)
∂φi
∂θi
(θi, θj)
denote the “virtual” utility that type θi derives from being matched to type θj . This is
the true utility φi(θi, θj), adjusted by a term that controls for the cost to the platform of
matching the pair θi and θj , due to the informational rents that the platform must leave to
those agents from side i with a type above θi.
When the virtual utility functions φ̂i, i = 1, 2, are also nondecreasing and supermodular,
on both sides, one can show that both the welfare-maximizing and the profit-maximizing
matching rules are truncated positive assortative (variants of this result appear in Damiano
and Li, 2007, Johnson, 2013, and Galichon, 2018 – see also Gomes and Pavan, 2021 for an
alternative and unifying proof). That is, when the virtual utility functions φ̂i satisfy the
same properties as the true utility functions φi, the matching partner of any participating
agent under profit maximization is the same as under welfare maximization. The set of
participating agents under profit maximization though need not coincide with the efficient
set: A profit-maximizing platform may exclude an inefficiently large set of agents from
both sides of the market: θ̂∗i ≥ θei , i = 1, 2, where θ̂∗i is the threshold type under profit
maximization and θ̂ei is the threshold type under welfare maximization.
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The above result, however, hinges on the virtual utility functions φ̂i being supermodular.
When the true utility functions are supermodular but their virtual analogs are not, profit-
maximization, in addition to excluding too many agents, may lead to inefficient matching
of the participating agents.
Finally, one can show that, both in the case of profit maximization and in the case of
107Feasibility also requires that θ̂j = F
−1
j (Fi(θ̂i)).
108These threshold solve φ̂1(θ̂
∗
1 , θ̂
∗
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welfare maximization, the total payment asked to each side-i agent of type θi is equal to
Pi(θi) = φi(θi, si(θi))−
∫ θi
θ̂i
∂φi
∂θi
(θ̃i, si(θ̃i))dθ̃i,
all θi ∈ θi, i = 1, 2.109
6.1.2 Many-to-many matching
Now suppose that matching is many-to-many, meaning that each agent from each side may
be matched to many agents from the other side of the market, with the only constraint being
that the matching be reciprocal (that is, the resulting matching rules satisfy Condition (22)).
As in the previous subsection, let Θi ≡ [θi, θi] ⊆ R. Assume that agents with a positive
type like interacting with agents from the opposite side, whereas the opposite is true for
agents with a negative type. To avoid trivial cases, assume that θ̄i > 0 for some i ∈ {a, b}.
In addition to parametrizing an agent’s preferences, suppose that each agent’s type also
parametrizes the utility the agent brings to the other side. To capture such a possibility
in the simplest possible way, suppose that there exists a function λi : Θi → R+ describing
the “salience” of each side-i agent of type θi. An agent of higher salience contributes more
to the utility of those agents from the other side who like interacting with the opposite
side and generates higher disutility to those who dislike interacting with the other side.
For example, in the case of advertising, an ad of higher salience is one delivering a higher
utility to those viewers or readers who like advertisement and a larger disutility to those
who dislike it.
For any set of type s ⊂ Θj , let
|s|j ≡
∫
θj∈s
λj(θj)dFj(θj) (24)
denote the “total salience” of the set s. Assume that the gross utility ui(s|θi) that any side-i
agent of type θi obtains from being matched to all agents from the opposite side whose type
is in s ⊂ Θj depends only on the agent’s type and on the set’s total salience and takes the
form
ui(s|θi) = θi · gi
(
|s|j
)
. (25)
The function gi(·) is positive, strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and satisfies
gi(0) = 0. Note that the above specification admits as a special case the additive preference
structure considered in most of the discussion in the previous sections, which is nested as
θi = γi , λj(θj) = 1 all θj , and gi(x) = x, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. In other words, the structure
considered in the previous sections corresponds to a market in which salience is constant
across types (in which case agents care only about the measure of agents they interact
with and not the type of such agents) and where preferences are linear in the size of the
matching set. The more flexible specification in (25) accommodates for the possibility that
different agents contribute differently to the utility they bring to the other side, and that
the incremental value of adding a marginal agent to an agent’s matching set depends on
109The result follows from usual envelope-type of arguments standard in mechanism design.
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the salience of the latter agent’s matching set. The case where the functions gi(·), i = 1, 2,
are concave corresponds to the case where agents experience decreasing returns to scale to
match quality, whereas the case where these functions are convex corresponds to the case
of increasing returns to scale.
However, even when the functions gi are linear and salience is constant across types, an
important point of departure from the analysis in the previous sections is that the platform
is not restricted to matching each agent on board to all agents on board from the other side.
Instead, the platform may engage in second-degree price discrimination by charging different
payments for different matching sets (when preferences take the special structure as in the
previous sections, this means that total payments need not be linear in the interactions
with the other side).
Finally, note that the multiplicative specification in (25) permits one to retain the usual
vertical-differentiation structure from the price-discrimination literature (e.g., Mussa and
Rosen, 1978) and conveniently interpret an agent’s type as the (positive or negative) value
the agent assigns to interacting with agents from the opposite side.
To make things simple, assume that the virtual values θi− [1−Fi(θi)]/fi(θi) are nonde-
creasing in θi, as typically assumed in the monopolistic screening literature. Finally, assume
that ci = 0 = σ so that there are no costs to get agents on board and/or to match any pair
of agents.
Say that a matching rule is a threshold rule if there exits a pair of non-increasing
functions Ti : θi → Θj , along with threshold types θ̂i ∈ Θi, such that, for any θi ∈ Θi,
i = 1, 2, the equilibrium matching set takes the form
si(θi) =
{
[Ti(θi), θj ] if θi ≥ θ̂i
∅ otherwise,
with Ti(θi) = min{θj : Tj(θj) ≤ θi} for all θi ∈ [θ̂i, θi].
Thus, under a threshold rule, any type below θ̂i is excluded, while any type θi > θ̂i is
matched to any agent from the other side whose type is above the threshold Ti(θi). Finally,
the condition Ti(θi) = min{θj : Tj(θj) ≤ θi} means that the pair of rules si(·), i = 1, 2,
satisfies the reciprocity condition (22).
Gomes and Pavan (2016) show that, both in the case of profit maximization and in the
case of welfare maximization, a threshold rule is optimal provided one of the following two
sets of conditions holds:110
(a) the functions gi(·) are weakly concave and the functions λi(·) are weakly increasing,
i = 1, 2;
(b) the functions gi(·) are weakly convex and the functions λi(·) are weakly decreasing,
i = 1, 2.
In markets satisfying one of the above two sets of conditions, the tariffs that maximize
profits (alternatively, welfare) thus induce a form of negative assortativeness at the margin:
those agents with a lower value for interacting with the opposite side are matched only to
those agents from the opposite side whose value for matching is large enough. Furthermore,
the matching sets of any pair of agents from the same side are ranked, in the sense that one
110The role of the convexity/concavity of the gi functions is to guarantee the optimality of threshold rules.
It has nothing to do with the optimality/suboptimality of stochastic rules.
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is a superset of the other. The above properties reflect the optimal way platforms subsidize
interactions in markets in which they can engage in price discrimination (across and within
sides) and agents’ preferences are their own private information. Importantly, note that the
above conditions are satisfied by the linear specification considered in the previous sections.
Gomes and Pavan (2016) also show that the above conditions are “almost necessary” in the
sense that, when violated, one can identify cases in which either the profit-maximizing or
the welfare-maximizing tariffs fail to induce matching sets with a threshold structure.111
The intuition for the above result is the following. Consider a welfare-maximizing platform
(the problem for a profit-maximizing platform is similar, once values are replaced with
their “virtual” analogs). Suppose that the market satisfies the conditions in scenario (a).
Clearly, efficiency requires that any agent from side i whose type θi is positive be matched
to any agent from the opposite side whose type is non-negative. However, efficiency may
also require some cross-subsidization. That is, the platform may want to assign to a side-i
agent with type θi > 0 a matching set of total salience
|si(θi)|j >
∫
[0,θ̄j ]
λj(θj)dFj(θj).
This requires matching the agent also to some of the side-j agents who dislikes interacting
with the side-i agents (namely, those with θj < 0). When gi(·) are weakly concave and λi(·)
are weakly increasing, i = 1, 2, and the agents’ types are the agents’ private information (all
these assumptions are important), the least costly way to deliver such matching intensity is
to match type θi to all agents from the opposite side whose type is large enough (i.e., above
a threshold Ti(θi) satisfying
∫
[Ti(θi),θ̄j ]
λj(θj)dFj(θj) = |si(θi)|j). This is because the side-j
agents with the highest type are the most attractive ones (by virtue of the monotonicity of
the salience functions λj) and because using the same side-j agents intensively to deliver
high mach quality to the side-i agents who ask for high match quality is less costly than
using different agents from side j (by virtue of the gj functions being concave).
A similar logic applies to markets satisfying the conditions in scenario (b). That gi(·)
are weakly convex, and λi(·) weakly decreasing, on both sides, along with the fact that
types are private information, implies that the most profitable way of using any agent from
side i with a negative type θi < 0 is to match the agent to those agents from side j with
the highest positive type. This is because such side-j agents are those that benefit the most
from interacting with the side-i agent and because such agents are the least salient ones
and hence exert the smallest negative externalities on type θi.
112
We conclude by discussing possible distortions in the provision of matching services due
to market power. For this purpose, let νj (θi) ≡ g′j
(∣∣[θi, θ̄i]∣∣i) · λi(θi) be type θi’s marginal
contribution to the total salience of a matching set that contains all side-i types above θi.
That is, for any side-j type θj , θjνj (θi) is the marginal value of expanding the matching
111The analysis in Gomes and Pavan (2016) is however more general and accommodates for the possibility
that the agents’ salience λi is a stochastic function of the agents’ match values θi and that the agents have
private information about both θi and λi.
112That the side-j agents with the highest type are those that benefit the most from interacting with the
side-i agent follows from the fact that such agents necessarily have matching sets with the highest salience,
as required by incentive compatibility. Because of the convexity of the functions gj(·), such agents thus have
the highest marginal utility for interacting with the side-i agent.
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set of type θj starting from [θi, θ̄i]. Assume that the functions
ψWi (θi) ≡
θi
νj (θi)
and ψPi (θi) ≡
θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi)
νj (θi)
are strictly increasing, i = 1, 2. Gomes and Pavan (2016) refer to this property as “match
regularity”. To interpret the condition, take the case of profit-maximization. The numerator
in ψPi (θi) is type θi’s “virtual type”. This term captures the marginal effect on the platform’s
profits of expanding the salience of type θi’s matching set (accounting for the extra surplus
that the platform must leave to all side-i agents with type above θi, as required by incentive
compatibility). The denominator of ψPi (θi), instead, captures the marginal effect on the
platform’s profit of adding type θi to the matching set of any side-j agent θj whose matching
set is [θi, θ̄i] (i.e., whose threshold is given by Tj(θj) = θi). The condition then requires that
the contribution of each side-i agent to the platform as a “consumer” increases faster with
the agent’s type θi than his contribution as an “input.” This condition is thus the analog of
Myerson (1981)’s regularity condition in a two-sided many-to-many matching environment.
As in standard screening problems, the role of the match regularity condition is to rule out
bunching. Under such a condition, in a matching environment, bunching occurs only at
the bottom of the distribution where it takes the form of exclusion, or at the very top of
the distribution where agents are matched to all agents on board from the other side of the
market.
Gomes and Pavan (2016) then show that when, in addition to the conditions guarantee-
ing the optimality of a threshold rule, the agents’ utilities satisfy the above match regularity
condition, then, relative to the welfare-maximizing rule, the profit-maximizing rule (a) al-
ways excludes a larger group of agents and (b) matches each agent who is on board to a
subset of his efficient matching set.
The result follows directly from the fact that a profit-maximizing platform internalizes
the effects of cross-subsidization on marginal revenues (which are proportional to virtual
values θi − [1− Fi(θi)] /fi(θi)), rather than their effects on marginal welfare (which are
proportional to the true values θi). Because the former values are always smaller than the
latter (reflecting the extra costs due to informational rents), the matching sets of all agents
are a subset of the efficient sets.
Note that, contrary to other mechanism design problems, the matching sets of all types
may be distorted, including those types θ̄i at the “top” of the distribution. The reason
is that the cost of cross-subsidizing such types is strictly larger under profit maximization
than under welfare maximization, due to the infra-marginal losses imposed by reciprocity
on the opposite side.113
Strong market power in such markets may thus result in the complete exclusion of many
agents from either side of the market, and/or to inefficient matching, whereby those agents
on board are either matched to the wrong partners (in the case of one-to-one matching)
or to a subset of their efficient matching set (in the case of many-to-many matching).
Such distortions call for regulation and government interventions, an area that is receiving
growing attention in recent years.
113A similar result appears in Jeon, Kim, and Menicucci (2021).
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6.2 Targeting and third-degree price discrimination
The result about the optimality of threshold rules in Gomes and Pavan (2016) assumes
that any pair of agents from side i may disagree on the relative attractiveness of any two
agents from side j only when the first agent from side i likes interacting with the side-j
agents (formally, has a positive type θi) whereas the second agent dislikes it (formally, has a
negative type θi). This is a direct consequence of the assumed multiplicative structure. The
above property is a good representation of markets in which preferences are differentiated
only along a vertical dimension. In a recent paper, Gomes and Pavan (2019) show that the
optimality of threshold rules extends to various models where agents’ preferences are both
vertically and horizontally differentiated, under appropriate regularity conditions.114
To see this, suppose each agent’s type is now bi-dimensional θi = (xi, vi). The first
component, xi, is the agent’s “location,” whereas the second component, vi, is the agent’s
“value for matching,” that is, the overall importance the agent assigns to interacting with
agents from the opposite side of the market. The component xi thus parametrizes hetero-
geneity along a horizontal dimension, whereas the component vi parametrizes heterogeneity
along a vertical dimension.
For example, in the case of cable TV, the vertical dimension may capture the overall
importance that a viewer assigns to cable TV, or the overall importance that a channel
assigns to reaching viewers, reflecting the channel’s expected advertising revenue as well as
possible costs stemming from broadcasting rights. In turn, a viewer’s location captures the
viewer’s tastes for different types of programming, whereas a channel’s location proxies the
type of content broadcasted by the channel.
Gomes and Pavan (2019) assume that the vertical dimensions are the agents’ private
information. As for the locations, they consider cases where they are publicly observable as
well as cases where they are the agents’ private information. In the cable TV application, for
example, each viewer’s ideal type of broadcasting is likely to be his own private information,
whereas each channel’s broadcasting profile is publicly observable. The analysis in Gomes
and Pavan (2019) then shows that, under appropriate conditions, the optimal matching
rule continues to have a threshold structure, but with a threshold Ti(vi;xi, xj) that depends
on the involved agents’ locations (a form of third-degree price discrimination). The paper
then uses the result to study the effects on matching allocations and welfare of various
regulations prohibiting platforms from engaging in third-degree price discrimination (see
also Belleflamme and Peitz, 2020, for an alternative model of price discrimination in platform
markets).115
Finally, the paper shows how the analysis of the effects of such regulations can also shed
light on the effects of a transition from a centralized structure whereby matching is mediated
by platforms to a decentralized structure whereby one side (typically the seller side) sets
114The analysis in the works cited above abstracts from within-side network externalities. In a recent
paper, Valenzuela-Stookey (2020) shows that threshold rules are also optimal in certain markets combining
across-side network effects with within-side network effects (e.g., congestion or, more generally, within-side
agents’ competition). See also Teh (2019) for an analysis of matching design with within-side network effects.
115The paper develops tools that one can use to derive the optimal matching plans in the presence of such
regulatory restrictions. The difficulty is that these restrictions do not allow one to use standard results from
mechanism design to represent the payments as a function of the matching allocations. The reason is that
such regulations impose specific restrictions directly on the structure to the implementing tariffs.
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prices and the other side then chooses the composition of the matching sets. The equivalence
between such a decentralized structure and a centralized one subject to the aforementioned
non-discriminatory restrictions follows from the fact that, in a decentralized market, sellers
cannot bundle their products with other sellers’ products. Because bundling is what permits
platforms to condition the composition of the matching sets on locations, when the latter
are private information, the matching allocations induced by a profit-maximizing platform
when third-degree price discrimination (alternatively, bundling) is banned are similar to
those in a decentralized market.
6.3 Dynamic arrivals and evolving private information
Another question that is receiving attention in the matching-design literature is how plat-
forms respond to the dynamic arrival of information and/or of new agents by adjusting the
matching allocations they propose to agents from different sides of the market.
In a couple of recent papers, Fershtman and Pavan (2017, 2021) consider dynamic match-
ing markets in which agents arrive stochastically over time and experience shocks to their
match values for specific agents from the other side of the market. Such shocks can be
interpreted as reflecting the arrival of new information or variations in the environment
that alter the attractiveness of the potential interactions. As a result of such changes,
agents on both sides of the market are frequently re-matched. Both the agents’ arrivals
and the shocks the agents experience to their matching valuations are the agents’ private
information. Agents face capacity constraints that limit the number of interactions they
can entertain in each period. In addition, the platform may also face constraints on the
total number of interactions it can accommodate within each period. Such limits may re-
flect time, resource, or facility constraints, but also capture certain non-separabilities and
non-linearities in the agents’ preferences.
The combination of the agents’ private information with the aforementioned capacity
constraints suggests that platforms could benefit from using auctions to determine the
relevant matches (e.g., Martens, 2016, and Pinker, Seidmann, and Vakrat, 2003, argue that
search rankings and price auctions will soon become the main tools to facilitate online
matching).116 However, standard auction formats used for the sale of physical goods or
services (e.g., first-price, second-price, English, clock, and double auctions) do not appear
appropriate for such matching markets in which agents play the double role of buyers and
inputs and where the match values are expected to evolve frequently over time and, as a
result, agents need to be re-matched.
Fershtman and Pavan (2021) show that, in many such markets, the profit-maximizing
matches can be induced by using appropriate “matching auctions,” specifically designed for
such markets. Upon arrival, agents are asked to select a “membership status” which is then
used to determine the weight assigned to the agents’ bids. In each subsequent period, each
agent is then asked to submit a bid for each possible agent on board from the other side
of the market, with the identity of such agents disclosed by the platform. Each bilateral
116Online ad exchanges such as Google’s DoubleClick and Microsoft’s Exchange already use auctions to
match advertisers with content providers. Advertisers bid repeatedly over time to place their ads on the
website of multiple content providers and, over time, content providers ask different ad-specific prices to
display the ads (see, e.g., Mansour, Muthukrishnan, and Nisan, 2012. See also the book “Market Design:
Auctions and Matching” by Haeringer, 2018).
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match is then assigned a “score” that depends on the involved agents’ reciprocal bids, their
membership status, and the platform’s cost of implementing the match.117 The matches
maximizing the sum of the bilateral scores are implemented in each period, and each agent
is charged a total payment that reflects the “externality” the agent imposes on others (by
altering the composition of other agents’ matching sets). Importantly, such externalities
are adjusted to account for the platforms’ cost of leaving information rents to the agents.
When the arrival of new information is endogenous (as is the case when agents learn
the attractiveness of their partners by interacting with them), the score assigned to each
match resembles a Gittins “index,” and accounts for the option value of generating new
information to be used in subsequent periods. Despite the complexity of the environment
and the discrepancy between the agents’ and the platform’s value for experimentation, the
proposed matching auctions admit simple profit-maximizing equilibria in which bidding is
straightforward and myopic in each period.
Fershtman and Pavan (2021) also contrast matching dynamics under profit maximization
to their counterparts under welfare maximization. The paper shows that, when all agents
like interacting with all other agents from the opposite side of the market and only the
aggregate capacity constraints possibly bind, profit maximization involves fewer and shorter
interactions than welfare maximization. This conclusion, however, need not extend to
environments where some agents dislike certain interactions and/or where agents’ individual
capacity constraints limit the number of matches that each agent can be involved in at each
period.
The research on mediated matching surveyed above is still in its infancy. Important
work remains to be done to incorporate within-side network effects (namely, the possibility
that an agent’s preferences for interacting with those agents from the other side they are
matched with depend on who else from the same side interacts with the latter agents).
Furthermore, the literature discussed above assumes that the platform can fully control the
matching allocations (that is, can prevent agents from changing partners, for example by
charging a large enough penalty in case agents do so). Most of the theoretical literature on
matching of the last twenty years has abstracted from the role played by matchmakers in
platform markets and from the possibility to incentivize matching with payments. It has
studied, instead, the implications of appropriate stability notions and other desiderata (e.g.,
envy-freeness, and strategy proofness). Further bridging the Industrial Organization and
the mechanism-design literatures briefly discussed above with the aforementioned literature
on non-cooperative matching can shed more light on the properties of matching allocations
induced by matchmakers with significant market power.
7 Identification of network effects
The previous sections built up theoretical models of indirect network effects to study pricing
equilibria and the implications for profit and welfare. In this and the following sections,
we focus on empirical analysis of these market phenomena. In this section, we discuss the
identification of network effects. In Section 8, we discuss the implementation of these ideas
117These scores play a role similar to that played by the “compatibility scores” used by ad exchanges to
select matches between advertises and content providers (see, e.g., Moghaddam and Nof, 2017).
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and estimation in practice. And in Section 9, we discuss empirical papers that study pricing
in the context of platforms and indirect network effects.
For identification, we start with the question of how to estimate the strength of a
direct network effect. The preceding sections focused on indirect network effects almost
exclusively. However, from an empirical perspective, it will be useful to begin with direct
network effects. Recall that direct network effects are when the value of a product depends
on other consumers purchasing or using the same product whereas indirect network effects
are when the value depends on the provision of some complementary good and that provision
depends on other consumers purchasing or using the product. Because direct network effects
study adoption of only one product, direct network effects will in some ways be an easier
context in which to establish ideas about identification. Also, some empirical papers that
study indirect network effects settings actually model them as direct network effects, often
because of lack of data. For instance, consumers may value an operating system based on
how many applications it has but a researcher that lacks data on the application market may
model consumers as making choices based on the installed base of the operating system. The
researcher relies on the close association between installed base and application availability.
Another reason to study direct network effects is that direct network effects are more
easily comparable to other fields of economics. A central goal of this section is discuss
identification of direct network effects from the perspective of the social economics literature,
as in Durlauf and Ioannides (2010), Benhabib, Bisin, and Jackson (2011), Angrist (2014) and
Graham (2018). This line of research has made substantial progress on the identification and
estimation of neighborhood effects and social spillovers, which are modeled in similar ways to
direct network effects. Our goal is to utilize the results from the social economics literature
to gain insight into the estimation of network effects. Doing so provides perspective on
estimating network effects and, in cases where the social economics literature has used
approaches that the empirical network effects literature has not, provides new avenues for
research. We are particularly interested in the reflection problem of Manski (1993). We
discuss the identification of direct and indirect network effects from this perspective.118
In this section, we first present a basic model of direct network effects and we use it to
highlight identification problems associated with social effects and network effects. We add
consumer heterogeneity to the model and show how that contributes (or does not contribute)
to identification, and we consider the concept of contextual effects. We then turn to a series
of solutions to the identification problem drawing on ideas from the literature on network
effects and social effects. Finally, we introduce a model of indirect network effects which
enables us to tie these ideas back to the rest of the chapter.
The starting point for the empirical social economics literature is a linear-in-means
model that is best represented by continuous choices. The theoretical treatment in the
previous sections discussed primarily discrete choices by consumers, such as whether to
adopt a technology or not. We return to this question below, but for now, we adjust the
presentation of the theoretical model to generate a continuous choice.
118An early version of these ideas appears in Rysman (2019), which covered only Manski (1993) and Manski
(1995). This chapter covers the large literature on the reflection problem that has followed, as well as a
wider set of empirical papers.
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7.1 Direct network effects
In this section, we present a simple model of network effects and discuss issues with iden-
tifying the network effect in empirical settings. We start with a model with no consumer
heterogeneity. We add consumer heterogeneity to the model and then add a contextual
effect, further discussed below.
7.1.1 Base model
We start with the case of direct network effects. Consider a partition of agents into markets
m = 1, . . . ,M . Each market has one network and agents choose how much to use the
network in their market. Markets play the role of neighborhoods and determine which agents
interact, so network effects operate only within a market. Each market can be thought of as
a distinct network. Each market m has a continuum of agents as in the previous sections.
Unlike the previous sections, each agent makes a continuous choice a ⊂ R that incurs a
constant marginal price of Pm. The optimal choice for each agent is:
a = β0 − β1Pm + β2qm + ζm + ε (26)
The variable qm = a is the average choice of agents in the same market. In the parlance
of the reflection problem, β2 represents the endogenous effect, or what we refer to as the
direct network effect. We may observe many markets, each with a different Pm and thus
a different qm. In this section, we use ε to represent an idiosyncratic match between the
consumer and the platform and assume that E[ε] = 0 in each market m.
A primary concern in both network effects papers and social economics papers is ad-
dressing omitted variables or correlation in unobserved terms across agents in the same
market. These may arise for a variety of reasons, such as unobserved shocks to a market
or sorting by agents with similar unobserved terms into the same markets. These omitted
variables are captured by ζm, and Manski (1993) terms ζm as correlated effects. These terms
are typically treated as a nuisance to be controlled for or to be eliminated by experimental
design. We argue in Section 7.3 that while this makes sense for direct network effects, com-
mon approaches to indirect network effects turn the focus of interest onto the correlated
effects rather than the endogenous effect.
An equally difficult challenge is addressing simultaneity in choices. Because ε affects
the agent’s choice, and the agent’s choice affects neighbors’ choices, ε is correlated with qm
through simultaneity. However, in this simple model, a more significant problem arises than
omitted variables or simultaneity. In particular, we recognize that a = qm can be derived
by taking the mean of Equation 26:
qm = β0 − β1Pm + β2qm + ζm. (27)
We can rewrite this as:
qm =
β0 − β1Pm + ζm
1− β2
.
Plugging back into Equation 26 leads to the reduced-form of our model:
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a =
β0 − β1Pm + ζm
1− β2
+ ε
We have more parameters than regressors and thus, the parameters are unidentified. As is
well-known, estimating the regression in Equation 26 is guaranteed to find β2 = 1.
119 That
negative result holds even if we eliminated correlated effects by assuming ζm = 0 for all m.
What is the economic problem? Intuitively, suppose that we observe the price decrease
on a platform. The reduced price leads agents to use the platform more as governed by β1,
a standard demand effect. The increased use makes the platform more valuable to agents
and thus leads to increased usage as governed by β2, the network effect. But all we observe
in data is that price went down and quantity went up, and we cannot distinguish how much
of that increase was due to shifts along the demand curve (β1) versus the demand curve
shifting out (β2).
One might think that this relationship could be broken by calculating the mean of
neighbors’ choice only among other neighbors, so that it varies across each agent. However,
note that the equation already includes a and qm, which are sufficient (along with the
number of agents) to construct the leave-one-out mean. In this sense, the leave-one-out
mean does not introduce any new information. Angrist (2014) is particularly critical of
using the leave-one-out mean to address this identification issue.
7.1.2 Consumer heterogeneity
If we observe individual-level explanatory variables, the situation is somewhat improved.
Suppose that agents have a type ν that describes some demographic variables such as income
or perhaps an individual-specific platform tax or subsidy. Our new version of Equation 26
is:
a = β0 − β1Pm + β2qm + β3ν + ζm + ε. (28)
Then, qm is:
qm =
β0 − β1Pm + β3νm + ζm
1− β2
, (29)
where νm is the mean value of ν in market m. Thus, the reduced-form is:
a =
β0 − β1Pm + β2β3νm + ζm
1− β2
+ β3ν + ε.
Because β3 appears by itself in front of ν, it could be identified, which gives the key to
separating out the elements in the fraction. This is at least somewhat more promising than
the result without ν.
Intuitively, consider the case of a discrete set of consumers in each market rather than
a continuum. Equation 28 faces a simultaneity problem because ε affects qm. Equation 29
provides a path to addressing this problem. Interpreting the equation as a first-stage pre-
diction of the endogenous variable in a two-stage least squares estimator, we have that νm
predicts the endogenous variable but is otherwise excluded from the agent’s decision. That
119Angrist (2014) argues that because we can estimate Equation 26 and find a parameter for β2, the
parameter is identified (in some sense), but the estimand is not informative about the underlying model.
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is, exogenous characteristics of other agents in the market provide instruments for their
choices that can be used for identification.120
This regression still faces the problem that Pm and νm must be distinguished from the
correlated effects ζm. If ζm are addressed with market fixed effects, we have a collinearity
problem leading to a lack of identification. If we were willing to restrict the flexibility of
these effects, identification follows. For instance, the presentation of Manski (1993) assumes
that ζm is a linear function of observable market characteristics. Intuitively, unrestricted
unobserved market-level shocks make interpreting the effect of qm impossible, and so one
approach is to restrict those shocks in some way.
7.1.3 Contextual effects
Relative to the social economics literature, it is important to keep in mind that we have so
far ruled out one important effect. In the presentation of Manski (1993), νm enters directly
into Equation 28 as a variable of interest, i.e.:
a = β0 − β1Pm + β2qm + β3ν + β4νm + ζm + ε.
The parameter β4 measures the contextual effect and represents the response of an agent
directly to the characteristics of others in the market separately from the effect of their
choices a. The contextual effect is often of major interest in social economics studies. For
instance, researchers might be interested in the effect on the performance of students in a
classroom from having a higher proportion of students from an underrepresented minor-
ity population, or from having very wealthy classmates. Research on racial segregation in
friendship networks or in housing sorting sometimes focuses almost entirely on the contex-
tual effect and largely ignores the endogenous effect. Graham (2018) discusses this line of
research.
In contrast, we are not aware of network effects papers that allow for a contextual effect
or attempt to address it. It certainly could be an issue. For instance, we might think that
technology/platform adoption by a household depends not only on whether neighborhood
households adopt (Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002, has a structure like this) but also on whether
neighbors have high income or white-collar jobs. Neighbor demographics might affect the
likelihood of hearing about a new technology or the value of the technology if it allowed the
household to sell items to neighbors.
It is clear from the modeling above that adding the contextual effect will create signifi-
cant problems. Going through the steps above leads to:
a =
β0 − β1Pm + (β2β3 + β4)νm + ζm
1− β2
+ β3ν + ε. (30)
Again, this equation allows us to learn β3 but that is not sufficient to unpack the parameters
in the fraction because β4 also sits in front of νm. Thus, we cannot distinguish between the
endogenous effect and the contextual effect. This identification problem is the heart of the
120Note that doing so in the problem without ν implies that qm is perfectly collinear with Pm and so does
not lead to identification.
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reflection problem, which Manski (1993) describes as the difficulty in determining causality
when the behavior of agents is reflected in their neighbors.121
Although we cannot generally separate between the contextual and endogenous effects,
we can check if the composite term is equal to zero.122 If we find that it is not, we can
conclude that there is some social effect, either endogenous or contextual. That is the
approach of a number of social economics papers. For instance, Angrist and Lang (2004)
measure the effect of the number of minority students in a classroom on other students
without distinguishing whether the effect is driven by the presence of those students or by
the performance of those students.
Because network effects papers do not seem to have considered the contextual effect, we
do not allow for a contextual effect for the rest of this chapter, but it is worth considering
whether the contextual effect might be important in some circumstances. The focus on
contextual effects in the social economics literature suggests it might be relevant in the
network effects literature.
7.2 Some solutions for direct network effects
The social economics literature has made progress on finding settings that lead to identifi-
cation, and we review several approaches here. We also consider whether these approaches
have been considered in the network effects literature and how they might be extended.
In particular, we consider random assignment, heterogeneous networks, non-linear models,
dynamic, and the use of variance of outcomes as a dependent variable.
7.2.1 Random assignment
Perhaps the most substantial focus has been on random assignment to markets. Reviews
of these approaches are in Sacerdote (2014) and Graham (2018). A well-known example
is Sacerdote (2001), which relies on random matching of college roommates to study the
effects of roommate characteristics on GPA. Another example is Angrist and Lang (2004),
which studies the effect of a program that assigns students from urban schools to suburban
schools. The implementation of the program generates randomness in the number of urban
students assigned to each class.
The basic idea of random assignment is that it should eliminate self-selection into the
market. If selection is the only source of variation in ζm, random assignment can eliminate
ζm. Note that if we are considering a contextual effect, eliminating ζm does not allow us to
separately identify β2 and β4 in Equation 30. Sacerdote (2001) estimates the overall effect of
student characteristics on roommate outcomes. Thus, Sacerdote estimates a reduced-form
coefficient that could be positive either because of the endogenous effect or the contextual
effect (β2 or β4), both of which represent social effects.
121Manski (1993) writes (pg. 532): “This paper examines the ‘reflection’ problem that arises when a
researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour
in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group. The term reflection is
appropriate because the problem is similar to that of interpreting the almost simultaneous movements of a
person and his reflection in a mirror. Does the mirror image cause the person’s movements or reflect them?
An observer who does not understand something of optics and human behaviour would not be able to tell.”
122Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2011) discuss how the contextual effect could be some alternative
function of group characteristics other than the mean, which can lead to identification.
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Unfortunately, random assignment does not obviously set ζm = 0. Recall that ζm can
represent not only sorting and self-selection but also any common market shocks. For in-
stance, college roommates may be jointly affected by their residence counselor or room
location. In a network effects context, random assignment to a network may eliminate
selection concerns but an unobserved marketing campaign may still affect how much mem-
bers use a network. As a result, Sacerdote focuses only on the social spillover effect of
characteristics that are determined before the students start at college. For example, even
in the case of random roommate matching, regressing GPA on the fraternity membership
status of a roommate may be subject to omitted variable bias because GPA and fraternity
membership for roommates may be affected by common shocks. However, regressing GPA
on a roommate’s parent income or distance to their household can be regarded as exogenous
due to random roommate matching.
Similarly, Angrist and Lang (2004) focus on the effect of the number of students assigned
to a class (a predetermined number) rather than the effect of student performance (an
outcome) on one and another. We are not aware of papers in the network effects literature
that have been implemented in the same way as Sacerdote (2001) or Angrist and Lang
(2004). Given that contextual effects are not of primary interest in network effects models,
the focus on contextual effects due to pre-determined heterogeneity is likely not particularly
attractive. That is, randomly assigning agents to markets does not allow us to be sure an
endogenous effect exists because of common market shocks, and in this sense, is of limited
value for identifying a network effect.
However, random assignment can be utilized in a different way in a network effects
context. Unlike typical social economics problems, network effects often operate through the
size of the network rather than just the average behavior of the people in the network. As a
result, even when randomly matching agents to markets of the same size (like the roommates
or classroom examples) may be of limited value, randomly matching agents to networks of
different sizes could be fruitful. Weiergraeber (2019) is an example of this approach. The
paper estimates the network effect between adopters of a given mobile carrier. A cell
phone is valuable in part because of how many phones it can call and at what price. The
paper studies a period when carriers eliminated fees for calling users who subscribed to a
different service. Eliminating fees led consumers to exogenously experience a wider and
more accessible network, with the extent of this depending on the consumer’s carrier and
market shares of other carriers. Taking market structure as exogenous, eliminating out-of
network fees causes consumers to experience random assignment to a new network size.
Weiergraeber exploits this exogenous variation to find a significant network effect.
7.2.2 Heterogeneous networks
The linear-in-means model implies that each agent responds to every other agent in the
market in a symmetric manner. An alternative is to allow agents to respond to only a
subset of agents in the same market. This approach leads us to consider which agents are
linked to which.
Our presentation follows Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009). Let the number of
agents be an integer and let a with length equal to the number of agents be the vector of
actions a, and similarly for ν, γ and u. Let Λ be a square matrix with dimension equal to
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the number of agents. Let element λij be element {i, j} of Λ and let λij = 1 if i is affected
by j and λij = 0 otherwise.
123 There is no need to distinguish between markets in this
approach as the existence of separate markets could be embedded in Λ. Also, Λ need not
be symmetric, so some agents may respond to agents that do not respond to them.
In matrix notation, the equivalent to Equation 26 is:
a = β0 − β1P + β2Λa+ β3ν + γ + ε.
Here, the endogenous effect q from Equation 26 is replaced by Λa.
Solving for a finds:
a = (1− β2Λ)−1 (β0 − β1P + β3ν + γ + ε) .
Multiplying each side by Λ and taking an expectation over a:
E [Λa | P ,ν] = (1− β2Λ)−1 Λ (β0 − β1P + β3ν + γ) .
We can interpret this equation as a reduced-form for the endogenous effect and, as in
Equation 29, it provides a potential instrument for Λa: Λν. In this model, an agent’s choice
is instrumented for by exogenous characteristics of connected agents as these characteristics
affect the choices of neighbors but are otherwise excluded from the agents’ decision problem.
Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2006) follow an approach like this. As described
in Section 3.2, they study the adoption decision of internet-service providers (ISPs) in the
face of competing incompatible 56K modems. ISPs may agglomerate on the same standard
due to indirect network effects with consumer adoption or ISPs may choose to differentiate
from each other in order to avoid competition even if that means serving a smaller market.
Because ISPs have overlapping service areas, the matrix indicating which ISPs compete
with which (and how much) has a structure like Λ envisioned in Bramoullé et al. (2009). In
addition to a two-stage least squares specification as suggested here, the main specification is
a structural model of adoption in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where firms take expectations
over the choices of rivals, as suggested by Seim (2006). This structural model exploits
exogenous characteristics of connected agents as an instrument.
Another example is Tucker (2008), who studies the adoption of a video-messaging tech-
nology within an international investment bank. She allows different employees to have
different sets of connections and allows connections to be asymmetric; for instance, the
choice of a manager may affect the choice of an employee differently than an employee’s
choice affects that of a manager. The technology could have alternative uses such as for
viewing the World Cup soccer tournament. Thus, whether an employee is interested in soc-
cer (perhaps explained by the country of the employee) is an exogenous shifter that plays
the role of an instrument for the effect of the employee’s choice on others in its network.
Ryan and Tucker (2012) provide dynamic analysis of this setting in a structural model. In
the developing country context of Rwanda, Björkegren (2019) estimates a model of adop-
tion of mobile phones allowing for a consumer’s network and calling patterns to influence
adoption.
123Alternatively, rows of Λ could be scaled so that the agent responded to the mean of actions by connected
agents rather than the sum.
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An even more straightforward approach arises if some agents are affected by agents that
are not affected by any other agents. That is, for some i and j 6= i, λij = 1 and λjk = 0 for
all k. We can take these agents that are not affected by other agents as exogenous actors.
There is no need to instrument for the choices of exogenous actors. We can regress the
choices of agents on the choices of exogenous actors directly.
In this vein, Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) study the adoption of clearinghouse
services by banks. The clearinghouse provides a very efficient method of moving funds
across banks so Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) expect a network effect as more local
banks (the ones a bank is most likely to trade with) adopt. Gowrisankaran and Stavins
(2004) take several approaches including assuming that large banks are exogenous to small
banks, so for instance, Citibank’s choice can affect the Bank of Cape Cod but not vice versa.
Interestingly, the approach of Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) can be used to
distinguish between the endogenous and contextual effect. Letting the contextual effect
have the same network structure as the endogenous effect, we can write the choice function
as:
a = β0 − β1P + β2Λa+ β3ν + β4Λν + γ + ε.
Then, the function for the endogenous term is:
E [Λa | P ,ν] = (1− β2Λ)−1 Λ (β0 − β1P + β3ν + β4Λν + γ) .
Thus, Λ2ν provides a potential instrument for Λa.124 Instruments for the actions of con-
nected agents are exogenous features of the agents that are connected to them. Blume,
Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015) extend this point in several ways, such as allowing
different network structures to determine the endogenous and contextual effect. Bramoullé,
Djebbari, and Fortin (2020) review recent developments in the literature on using network
structure to identify peer effects.
With all of these approaches based on network structure, it is possible to find spurious
results if error terms have the same correlation structure. That would be the case if the
correlation of unobserved terms across agents were based on the network structure. Angrist
(2014) constructs an example like this when discussing Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin
(2009). It could be reasonable to consider such a pattern in some situations. For instance, we
might normally assume that error terms have a market-level component as in Equation 26,
but if we are studying firms with a network of interaction across different markets, we should
ask why firms exhibit their connection pattern, which might lead us to consider unobserved
terms with a parallel structure.
7.2.3 Nonlinear models
Many of these problems in identification follow from the linear-in-means set-up. However,
many if not most network effects are better thought of as binary or discrete choices, such as
the choice to adopt or not. Binary outcome models are often nonlinear and that can lead
124A requirement is that Λ and Λ2 are not perfectly collinear. If agents are broken up into markets and
interact with everyone in their market, then Λ is a block-diagonal matrix of ones, which is perfectly collinear
with Λ2. Thus, this approach requires some asymmetry in who is connected with who.
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to new identification results. Important contributions on this are Brock and Durlauf (2001,
2007).
Consider the following model. Let a ∈ {−1, 1} be the choice of a given agent. For
instance, we can interpret a = 1 as adoption and a = −1 as non-adoption. As before, let
qm be the average choice in a market, so naturally, qm ∈ [−1, 1]. Let a∗ be the latent utility
parameter defined as:
a∗ = β0 − β1Pm + β2qm + ε.
Brock and Durlauf (2001) consider parametric assumptions on ε such that this model ex-
hibits multiple equilibria. For instance, there may be one equilibrium with very high adop-
tion and another with very low adoption.125 Brock and Durlauf (2001) argue that this
nonlinearity generates identification:
Why is there this difference between the binary choice and the linear-in-means
frameworks? The answer is that the binary choice framework imposes a nonlin-
ear relationship between group characteristics and group behaviours whereas the
linear-in-means model (by definition, of course) does not. ... So, for example, if
one moves across a sequence of richer and richer communities, the percentage of
high school graduates cannot always increase proportionately with income. (p.
254)
Brock and Durlauf (2007) extend these ideas to consider minimal assumptions on the
functional forms for ε and qm. However, the existence of the identification problem in linear-
in-means models means that this approach cannot be extended to a fully nonparametric
estimator. All of the papers mentioned in this section up to now (such as Gowrisankaran
and Stavins, 2004; Augereau et al., 2006; Tucker, 2008; Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002; Weier-
graeber, 2019) and many more use discrete models of technology adoption. However, they
tend to focus on sources of identification other than nonlinearity. Whether the network
effects literature also provides applications for the ideas about nonlinearity as a source of
identification for network effects remains an interesting question.
7.2.4 Dynamics
In general, installed base is a key determinant of future consumer decision-making in models
of product diffusion under network effects. Section 3.4 discussed the importance of installed
base in the theory of dynamic adoption of technologies characterized by network effects.
Although this approach does not seem to have been widely explored in the social economics
literature, a number of empirical papers on network effects adopt estimation strategies in
which current decisions depend on accumulated past decisions of nearby agents. Past choices
can sometimes be treated as exogenous to current choices, which makes this particularly
attractive. Even in a model in which agents’ utility depends on current adoption rather than
past adoption, focusing on installed base might be justified by a model in which agents have
imperfect information over each other’s current choices and use installed base as a predictor
of current choices.
125Brock and Durlauf (2001) interpret ε as private information to the agent so the agents take expectations
over other agents’ choices and play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We suppress that notation here, as well
as the market effect ζm.
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A number of papers have adopted strategies like this. For instance, Ohashi (2003) and
Park (2004) study adoption of VCRs. In this case, indirect network effects between console
standards (i.e. VHS vs. Beta) and pre-recorded movies are likely at play but for data
reasons, they treat the problem as one of direct network effects between purchasers of the
same standard. They use installed base at the end of the previous period as the measure
for the size of the network. It is the key variable for measuring the network effect. Ohashi
(2003) experiments with different lags of the installed base such as the one year lead (which
might capture expectations) and the two-year lag.126 Naturally, relying on installed base
or lagged sales as an exogenous variable requires a strong assumption on the independence
of the error term over time. This may be supported with first-differencing strategies well-
known in time series economics.127 Kim, Newberry, Wagman, and Wolff (2021) is a recent
example studying network effects through installed base, in this case in the context of
online fantasy sports leagues. They use local team success as an exogenous instrument for
the intsalled base.
7.2.5 Variance
Graham (2008) focuses on conditional variance rather than conditional means. Network
effects are a social multiplier that magnify the response of a population of agents to choices
of any one agent. Intuitively, if there is no network effect or social spillover, the variance of
outcomes a will be the same regardless of how many agents are in the market. With network
effects, the choices a respond to the average shock in the market and if the variance of the
average shock increases, so should the variance of a. We can exploit this by noticing that
as the number of agents rises, we average over more shocks so the variance of market-level
shock decreases. If we observe that the variance of outcomes a differs across markets with
different numbers of agents holding all else equal, it must be because of the existence of a
social multiplier such as a network effect.
To see this, we return to the model in Section 7.1. This time, assume there is a finite,
discrete set of consumers so the average of individual shocks, which we denote εm, does not
average out. That is, εm 6= 0. Thus, Equation 27 is:
qm = β0 − β1Pm + β2qm + ζm + εm
Solving for qm and plugging into the previous equation:
a =
β0 − β1Pm + ζm
1− β2
+
β2
1− β2
εm + ε
We see that εm affects a only if the network effect parameter β2 is non-zero. The variable
εm is not observed so we cannot estimate this equation to learn about β2. However, Graham
(2008) recognizes that we can work with the conditional variance rather than the conditional
126Park (2004) uses time-format dummies for the main specification which captures all elements of the
network effect, such as installed base, available complements (like the number of compatible pre-recorded
videos), and expectations about the future. He uses installed base to decompose the elements of the network
effect captured by the dummy variable.
127Weiergraeber (2019), mentioned above in the context of random assignment, considers an alternative
identification scheme utilizing lagged values of other consumers in the market.
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mean. The variance of εm should fall as the number of agents in a market grows. If we
assume that the variance of the first term and the variance of ε stay the same as the number
of agents grows, then we can regress the variance of a on the number of agents in the market
and interpret a negative coefficient as evidence of the existence of a network effect.
Graham (2008) outlines the assumptions that are necessary for this approach to work
and allows for market characteristics to differ in a number of dimensions. He applies his
method to an education setting where he can use institutional knowledge to argue that
classes with different numbers of students are comparable. For instance, he needs to argue
that the variance of teacher quality does not differ with classroom size.
We are not aware of an application of this method to a network effects setting. The
requirements of the conditional variance method for the orthogonality of potentially con-
founding factors are significant for a typical industrial organization application, but it seems
feasible. For instance, Tucker (2008) and Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) study markets
(or offices in the case of Tucker) with different numbers of agents making simultaneous
adoption decisions, which would seem to fit into the general approach of Graham (2008).
7.2.6 Other approaches
Naturally, not every paper fits into one of the categories we describe so far. Particularly
in industry-specific settings, specialized arguments may be feasible. For instance, an early
empirical paper on network effects is Gandal (1994), which shows that spreadsheet software
that was compatible with the most popular brand at the time (Lotus 1-2-3) was more
highly valued, presumably because it allowed users to more easily trade files. In addition to
the approach described above, Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) also test whether more
concentrated markets are more likely to adopt ACH banking as firms in these markets are
better able to internalize network effects.
7.3 Indirect network effects
Many of the techniques we discuss for estimating direct network effects can be applied to
indirect network effects but indirect network effects open up new possibilities. Suppose
there are two sets of agents, i = 1, 2 in each market m. Let qim = ai in market m, the
average choice of agents on side i in the market, and let Pim be the price of the platform
to the set of agents i. We assume actions are given by
ai = βi0 − βi1Pim + γiqjm + ξim + ε.
Thus, we have dropped β2 (the direct network effect) and replaced it with the value of
activity on the other side of the market. The function captures agents that are indifferent
to how many agents on their side of the market use the product but care about how many
agents on the other side do so. That is, we study across-side network effects rather than
within-side network effects, consistent with the approach in sections 1-6. It is unusual to
study models with both direct and indirect network effects, although it could happen. For
instance, consumers might value Windows operating system both because there is a variety
of software available (an indirect network effect) and because it is easier to share files with
neighborhood agents (a direct network effect).
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From the perspective of the reflection problem, the correlated effect from the direct
network effect case ζm is replaced by γiqjm + ξim. That is, γiqjm represents a correlated
effect, a factor that affects all agents in a market. Whereas in the network effect setting,
correlated effects were something to be controlled for in order to estimate the endogenous
effect, in the case of indirect network effects, the correlated effect becomes the primary
interest. However, in addition to the network effect γiqjm, there may be other market level
shocks or selection effects captured by ξim. In this case, the realization of qim does not
create the same sort of problem as before as it does not show up on both sides of the
equation:
qim = βi0 − βi1Pim + γiqjm + ξim (31)
There is still a simultaneity problem between qim and qjm because the equation holds
for both sides of the market. Realizations of ξim (or in the case of individual-level data, ε)
on side i affect qim which affects qjm, leading to correlation between the error term and a
regressor.
However, this case provides natural instruments, which are variables that affect one
side but not the other. In Equation 31, Pim affects qim but does not otherwise affect qjm.
Similarly, Pjm affects qjm but does not otherwise enter into Equation 31 and thus can play
the role of an instrumental variable in estimating that equation. In practice, we often think
of prices as endogenous so then we require some other variable that affects one side of
the market but not the other, similar to the way Pim is written here. We turn to specific
examples below, but the key point is that this appears quite feasible.
In the direct network effects case, we could not distinguish between shifts along a demand
curve and shifts of a demand curve resulting from a change in price. In the indirect network
effects case, we have separate prices for each side of the market. Price changes on side 2
shift out the demand curve on side 1 and do not otherwise lead to shifts along side 1’s
demand curve, leading to identification.
For intuition, consider Figure 7.3. In this figure, we distinguish between the demand
curve and the willingness-to-pay curve. The figure shows the willingness-to-pay at price
P ′i . Willingness-to-pay is provided by D(Pi, q
′
j) where q
′
j = qj(P
′
i ). That is, we graph
willingness-to-pay by varying price Pi but holding quantity on the other side fixed at the
level induced by P ′i . The demand curve is labeled as D(Pi, qj(Pi)). Writing the argument
as qj(Pi) rather than qj emphasizes the dependence of qj on Pi through qi. This is demand
as observed by the firm; it maps out how qi changes as the firm adjusts Pi.
Demand is less than willingness-to-pay above P ′i . A consumer on side i may be willing
to pay more than P ′i when price is at P
′
i but if price actually rose to that level, the reduction
in qi reduces qj and so the consumer is no longer willing to pay that amount. The slope
of willingness-to-pay is β1, whereas the slope of demand also involves γi, which causes the
slope to be less steep. For instance, the graph shows that when price drops from P ′i to P
′′
i ,
the willingness-to-pay shifts upward. As econometricians, we can never actually observe
a change in price Pi with quantity on the other side qj held constant. But instrumental
variables approaches allow us to shift qj while holding Pi constant and thus separately
identify these different parameters. Relative to the identification problem in Equation 28,
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the following assumptions on that equation provide identification:
β2 = 0 ζm = γiqjm + ξim E[ξim|Pim, Pjm] = 0.
The instrumental variables idea is not restricted to indirect network effects. If we can
find instruments that affect some agents and not others, we can use instrumental variables
in the case of direct network effects. Moffitt (2001) presents a social-spillover model of two
agents that highlights this point, and we could see the use of pre-existing heterogeneity in
Equation 29 along these lines. However, in practice, this approach is much more prevalent
in the case of indirect network effects and the actual instruments used tend to be quite
different. We take that up now.
8 Estimating indirect network effects
This section discusses approaches to estimating the strength of indirect network effects from
the perspective of implementation. We focus particularly on the use of exclusion restrictions
in simultaneous equations representations of platform markets following the approach laid
out in Section 7.3. We briefly discuss the use of dynamics as well, similar to Section 7.2.
8.1 Dynamics
Lee (2013) studies consumers buying video game consoles and video games as well as game
developers releasing consoles. His model captures that, as more video games become avail-
able for a given console, consumers value that console more. Consumers are forward-looking
both in their choices over games and consoles. He estimates his model in first-differences
which allows him to use lagged variables as instruments. This is, in part, reliant on as-
sumptions of how unobserved terms are not correlated. Lee (2013) argues that because of
the long lag between when a game developer commits to producing a video game and when
the game is released, these assumptions are likely to hold. Zhou (2017) also studies video
games in a fully dynamic game between consumers and firms and relies on similar timing
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assumptions in a Bayesian econometric framework. Dube, Hitsch, and Chintagunta (2010)
emphasize tipping in a related dynamic model of video games.
8.2 Exclusions in two-sided markets
A number of papers have used exclusion restrictions by assuming that some variables affect
outcomes on one side of the market but do not otherwise affect outcomes on the other
side. Early papers in this vein are Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000) and Rysman (2004).128
Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000) study consumer demand for compact disk players and
compact disks. One might worry about simultaneity in the determination of these outcomes
and the paper uses the evolving cost of building a plant to produce disks as a shifter for the
availability of titles. Dranove and Gandal (2003) analyze sales of DVD players during its
competition with the DIVX standard. They allow sales of DVD players to depend on the
number of titles available. Rather than use installed base of DVD players as an instrument,
they use installed base of related technologies such as CDs and camcorders, which should
better satisfy exogeneity requirements. An related early paper is Nair, Chintagunta, and
Dube (2004), which studies the dynamics of the market for personal digital assistants and
software.
In many industries, we see a competitive bottleneck, with single-homing on one side
of the market and multi-homing on the other. For instance, consumers may read a single
newspaper but advertisers appear in multiple newspapers, or consumers may use a single
payment card but merchants accept many cards. A typical empirical model that captures
this treats the single-homing side, such as consumers, as making a discrete choice. Let side
i = 1 be the consumer side and let consumers that select platform k = 1, . . .K in market
m obtain utility:
uk1m = β10 − β11P k1m + xk1mβ12 + γk1mqk2m + ξk1m + εk1m
where εk1m is distributed according to the extreme value distribution, a popular choice in
empirical discrete choice models (see Train, 2009). Here, xk1m are some exogenous platform-
market characteristics and ξk1m is a quality index unobserved by the researcher.. We assume
each consumer picks platform k such that uk1m ≥ uz1m, ∀z. Assuming there is also an outside
option k = 0 with utility normalized to u01m = ε
0
1m, we have the common logit form for
market share sk1m:
sk1m =
exp
(
β10 − β11P k1m + xk1mβ12 + γk1mqk2m + ξk1m
)
1 +
∑K
z=1 exp (β10 − β11P z1m + xz1mβ12 + γz1mqz2m + ξz1m)
.
Taking the log of the ratio sk1m/s
0
1m (see Berry, 1994) we obtain that:
ln
(
sk1m
)
− ln
(
s01m
)
= β10 − β11P k1m + xk1mβ12 + γk1mqk2m + ξk1m. (32)
Let i = 2 be the seller side. We assume the demand for the (multi-homing) seller side
can be expressed as a linear (or log-linear) demand function:
qk2m = β20 − β21P k2m + xk2mβ22 + γk2mqk1m + ξk2m. (33)
128Both of these papers are far pre-dated by Rosse (1970), which studies the interaction of readers and
advertisers at newspapers although the focus is on the cost function rather than this feedback loop.
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If the set of consumers is of size M , then qk1m = Ms
k
1m, which links together Equations 32
and 33. For estimation purposes, we assume {ξk1m, ξk2m} are mean independent of exogenous
variables.
In the seller demand function (33), we have left off prices of rival products in determining
seller demand for platform k. This could be justified if consumers single-home and sellers
have constant returns to scale. In that case, selling on one platform does not make selling
on another platform more or less attractive and sellers make decisions independently across
platforms, which justifies excluding rival prices from demand on the seller side. See Rysman
(2004) for a formal derivation of a Cobb-Douglas demand function in a platform setting (in
which case, many of these explanatory variables would be expressed in logs). Of course, we
could add rival prices to Equation 33 if we would like (and then perhaps side 1 quantities
as well).
This set-up clarifies the simultaneous equations nature of the estimation problem and
makes clear our identification requirements. The variables qk1m and q
k
2m are endogenous. If
we are taking prices as exogenous, then prices serve as instrumental variables because they
enter in only one equation. In many cases, we will treat prices as endogenous. In those
cases, we need variables in xkim excluded from x
k
jm to identify parameters in equation j.
If we estimate additional equations, such as platform first-order conditions, there may be
additional excluded variables available from those equations.
There are many examples of this approach. Rysman (2004) studies Yellow Pages direc-
tories and models consumer demand for Yellow Pages advertising and advertiser demand
for readership as a simultaneous equations problem that leads to excluded variables. For
instance, the number of people covered by a directory affects advertiser demand but does
not enter into the consumer choice, and some consumer demographics are assumed to affect
whether consumers use a directory but not affect the value that advertisers place on those
consumers conditional on usage. This general approach has proven popular for media stud-
ies, such as Fan (2013) in newspapers and Song (2021) in magazines. Similarly, Clements
and Ohashi (2005) study video games and use software age as an instrument for software
demand.
A more recent application of these ideas appears in Caoui (2020), who studies the
adoption of digital projection technology by movie theaters and the production of movies
in the digital format. The paper focuses on France and uses the digital production of
movies in the United States as an exogenous shifter of digital movie availability in France,
as many US movies are released in France. A related idea is in Gowrisankaran, Park, and
Rysman (2014) which studies the adoption of DVD players in response to DVD titles and
uses box office outcomes as a shifter of the attractiveness of titles. Like Lee (2013) and
Caoui (2020), Gowrisankaran, Park, and Rysman (2014) use a dynamic model of consumer
demand. Sokullu (2016) studies the interaction of advertising and readership in newspapers
relying on characteristics from each side of the market as excluded variables to identify the
indirect network effect. In particular, she allows the network effect to be non-monotonic
and utilizes nonparametric instrumental variables in this context.
These ideas are being applied in a wide variety of industries. For instance, Li, Tong,
Xing, and Zhou (2017) and Li (2019) study the diffusion of electric vehicles and charging
stations. Li, Tong, Xing, and Zhou (2017) assume that gas prices affect only consumer de-
mand and identify the effect of consumers on charging stations. Li (2019) uses, among other
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instruments, federal and state subsidies as instruments. As subsidies exist on both sides
of the market (subsidies to vehicles and subsidies to charging stations), these can identify
the network effect in both directions. Rysman (2007) studies correlation between consumer
usage of payment card networks and merchant acceptance, although does not attempt to
establish causality. Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006) study ACH banking adoption as
a two-sided market, analyzing both consumer adoption and bank adoption. They use adop-
tion behavior in other markets as a proxy for costs, which provides identification. They
quantify the importance of network effects and the extent of multiple equilibria.
Farronato, Fong, and Fradkin (2020) study digital platforms that match pet owners to
pet sitters. From the perspective of a pet owner, a merger between two platforms creates
a larger set of potential pet sitters to interact with on the remaining platform than either
platform provided before the merger. As platform market shares differ across markets, this
provides an opportunity to evaluate the presence of network effects. In a sense, this is a
version of random assignment discussed in Section 7.2.1 adapted to a two-sided setting. Pet
owners are randomly assigned different increases in the size of the network of pet sitters with
which they may interact, with assignment depending on what city the pet owner lives in.
Farronato, Fong, and Fradkin (2020) find that in markets where the acquiring platform was
dominant, there is little change after the merger. Network effects are apparent in markets
where the two platforms were similar in size, although pet sitters of the acquired platform
often did not participate after the merger. This evidence of switching costs provides a
potential downside to network effects realized through merger.
Similarly, Reshef (2020) exploits a partnership between Yelp and Grubhub. Because
market shares differ for these firms across cities, their partnership generates plausibly ex-
ogenous variation across cities in the size of the network expansion. Obviously, this version
of random assignment is different from the social economics literature in which random
assignment typically takes the form of literal randomness imposed at an administrative
level, such as random assignment of college roommates. In the platform economics setting,
establishing randomness (or more realistically, exogeneity) requires specialized arguments,
but conditional on that, the thought experiment is very similar.
9 Empirical work on pricing in platform studies
With our discussion of the identification and estimation of network effects completed, we
can now turn to approaches to study pricing in these markets and their results, which
more closely connects with the earlier sections in the chapter. We distinguish between
two approaches, which loosely correspond to treating price as endogenous or exogenous.
In the first approach, the researcher observes many platforms setting prices and studies
how observed prices respond to factors such as market structure and determines whether
platform behavior is consistent with theory. In this approach, we find papers that are both
structural and reduced-form in their econometric techniques. Next, we discuss papers in
which the researcher observes one plaftorm or set of platforms with relatively few sets of
prices, such as a single pricing schedule used in many geographic markets. The researcher
typically models how agents interact on this platform, and studies pricing by analyzing how
agents would behave under some counterfactual pricing regime. Modeling agent interactions
in ways that make the counterfactual compelling can often lead to very involved models
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and this approach tends to be structural. Naturally, the two approaches answer different
questions and are complementary for understanding platform markets.
9.1 Price as endogenous
Early papers in the first approach focus on media. Rysman (2004), discussed earlier in the
context of identification of network effects, also fits here. The paper observes many markets,
each populated by several Yellow Pages directories, which are the platforms, and models
quantity (and by extension, price) as the choice variable. It uses a model similar to the
one represented in Equations 32 and 33, along with a pricing first-order condition. Rysman
(2004) simulates outcomes as the number of competing directories change. More directories
reduce market power but also dissipate network effects. The paper finds that the former
effect dominates, and so market efficiency is enhanced as the number of directory increases,
at least within the range of the data.
Kaiser and Wright (2006) study German magazines, again studying the interaction of
readers and advertisers. They estimate a structural model of both consumer and advertiser
demand, in this case, assuming that both sides single-home. They use several instrumental
variables, in particular, prices of publishers in related markets, which can be interpreted as
related to cost-shifters in the spirit of Hausman (1996). They find that profits are collected
largely from the advertiser side rather than the consumer side. Higher demand on the
advertiser side actually reduces consumer prices as magazines seek to attract these adver-
tisers with large readership, similar to the seesaw effect described in Section 4.3.2. Another
paper on media is Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007), which provides a structural model of
Italian newspapers. They extend the approach of Kaiser and Wright (2006) to include a
publisher first-order condition, as in Rysman (2004), which allows them to study market
power. Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009), mentioned in Section 4.3.2, study mergers be-
tween newspapers and show theoretically and empirically that the logic of two-sided markets
implies that prices do not necessarily increase. Song (2021) analyzes pricing, market power,
and merger in German magazines accounting for two-sidedness. Fan (2013) emphasizes how
a merger leads newspapers to change not only the prices but also quality characteristics such
as news content and how these features interact. Jeziorski (2014) embeds a related model
of radio stations in a dynamic model of mergers. He finds that a merger results in market
power that allows radio stations to lower the quantity and increase the price of advertise-
ments. However, because consumers dislike advertising, this outcome enhances consumer
welfare.
Reduced-form approaches often provide compelling tests of whether theoretical models
make accurate predictions. Empirical papers confirm the existence of the seesaw effect of
Section 4.3.2 in a variety of industries. That is, a shock that tends to raise price on one side
often reduces prices on the other side. In media, in addition to Kaiser and Wright (2006)
mentioned above, Seamans and Zhu (2014) study how newspaper prices and outcomes
respond to the entry of Craigslist, which cannibalizes classified advertisement revenue, an
important source of newspaper revenue up until that point. The response is complex. For
instance, consumer prices increase and advertiser prices decrease. Their interpretation is
that the reduction in demand for classified advertisements reduces the value of consumers
leading to an increase in consumer price, and the resulting reduction in readers lowers value,
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and thus price, to advertisers.
In telecom, Boik (2016) studies cable systems, which are platforms between content
providers, such as local television stations, and consumers. Boik confirms the two-sided
intuition that local television stations in markets with high advertisement rates set lower
fees to cable systems as the advertising rates incentivize the stations to seek more consumers.
Similarly, Genakos and Valletti (2011) find that pricing reductions imposed by regulators
in how mobile carriers price in-coming calls lead to increases in price to consumers as the
consumers become less valuable. Genakos and Valletti (2011) show how this effect differs
across different types of consumers.
In payments, Kay, Manuszak, and Vojtech (2018) study the debit card market in the
US. Under the Financial Reform Act of 2010, the Federal Reserve Bank capped the inter-
change fee on debit cards for banks above a size threshold, which effectively reduced the
amount that these banks charge to merchants. Kay, Manuszak, and Vojtech (2018) compare
banks around the threshold to document that the regulation led to more fees to consumers.
Manuszak and Wozniak (2017) take a similar approach to analyze the nature of fees added
to checking accounts and similar products. Carbo-Valverde, Chakravorti, and Rodriguez-
Fernandez (2015) study the Spanish payment card market during a period of declining in-
terchange fees, which reduced effective payments from merchants to consumers. Although
this likely led to higher consumer fees, the paper shows that it also led to increaesed mer-
chant acceptance. Overall, Carbo-Valverde, Chakravorti, and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2015)
find that consumer adoption increased.
It would seem unintuitive that competition between firms would lead to worse prices
for some agents but that is natural in a two-sided context. As described above (see Section
4.3), competition between platforms can lead to better terms for one side but worse terms
for the other. The study of local television fees of Boik (2016) finds that in markets with
more substantial competition between television delivered by cable companies and telephone
companies, local television stations charge lower rather than higher fees. An explanation
consistent with a number of theoretical models is that local television stations multi-home
and the benefits of competition between platforms (cable and telephone) go to the single-
homers, the consumers.129
Similarly, Jin and Rysman (2015) analyze sports card conventions, which bring together
buyers and sellers of sports memorabilia. Taking the convention organizer as the platform,
they observe prices charged to each side at thousands of conventions. They find that
pricing responds to competition between platforms much more on the single-homing side.
We discussed prices that face a lower bound at zero in Section 2.5.3, and about 50% of
conventions offer free admission to consumers. Jin and Rysman (2015) find that when price
on the single-homing side hits zero, pricing on the other side shows a stronger response to
competition, as predicted by Armstrong and Wright (2007).
129Boik (2016) finds that fees to local television stations increase when there is more significant competition
from satellite, but he points out that it is likely driven by the advertisement market. Cable competes
with local television for local advertisements whereas satellite does not, giving the local television stations
incentives to direct consumers to satellite service.
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9.2 Price as exogenous
Studies in the previous section use covariation in prices with other variables. The second
approach studies a platform with fixed prices (or fixed commission rates) and studies how
agents interact on the platform. Typically using structural estimation, these papers study
counterfactual outcomes under alternative pricing structures. Several papers study markets
with many competing intermediaries, such as brokers. An example is Gavazza (2016) who
studies intermediaries in the market for trading used aircraft and looks at outcomes with-
out intermediaries. Barwick and Pathak (2015) study the effects of the commission rate
for agents in the Boston real estate market, which is typically fixed across brokers. They
find that allowing brokers to compete on commission rates leads to a reallocation of market
share to more efficient brokers and substantially more efficient outcomes. Similarly, Hendel,
Nevo, and Ortalo-Magné (2009) show in a reduced-form comparison between outcomes on
an internet platform for selling homes and the traditional broker market that high commis-
sions drive sellers to the on-line platform, which creates important selection effects in which
sellers participate on each platform. Robles-Garcia (2020) models the relationship between
mortgage lenders and borrowers with a focus on mortgage brokers that connect them. The
paper finds that caps on commissions to brokers increase welfare in part by aligning incen-
tives with consumers rather than lenders. A common theme across these papers appears
to be that if the market-wide commission structure is not efficient, competition between
brokers does not necessarily correct for that.
Some recent papers apply this method to online markets. Marra (2020) studies an
online platform for trading wine. Echoing the selection effects of Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-
Magné (2009), she shows how fees on one side of the platform affect not only the number of
participants but also the quality of those participants, which has implications for agents on
the other side. Castillo (2020) provides a detailed model of participants in the ride-sharing
platform Uber. In ride-sharing, the value to riders from participating in the platform
depends on the number of drivers participating, and vice versa. Castillo considers the effect
of eliminating surge pricing, the increase in fees from riders to drivers during high demand
periods. He finds that riders in particular benefit from surge pricing, contrary to some of
the popular discussion, as they benefit from increased service levels. Rosaia (2021) studies
a model of drivers choosing not only whether to drive but also choosing between Uber
and Lyft. He studies pricing power of the two companies and finds that merger leads to
efficiencies due to the management of traffic congestion. These papers highlight the complex
interactions between agents in a platform and the sometimes surprising outcomes that arise
from policy interventions that would be more straightforward in a one-sided market.
9.3 Matching
Above, Section 6 highlights the importance of matching and platform design. As pointed
out there, the line between indirect network effects and matching can be blurred. For
instance, empiricists may model the value of a platform as a simple function of the number
of sellers even if the platform plays a substantial role in matching consumers to individual
sellers or groups of sellers. Some papers however engage with this matching process and
the consumer’s individual choice of which seller to utilize. For example, Fox and Bajari
(2013) study FCC spectrum auctions as a matching problem between bidders and spectrum
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with the government as the “platform” connecting them. The econometrics of matching
models is discussed in Fox (2018), who estimates a model of parts buyers and sellers in
the automobile market. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) and Crawford, Lee, Whinston,
and Yurukoglu (2018) study the market for cable television and model the choices of cable
systems over what channels to include and consumers’ prices, as well as consumers’ choices
over which channels to view. Similarly, Ho (2009), Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015)
and Ho and Lee (2017) are part of a literature that studies how health insurance companies
form bundles of providers (i.e., hospitals) to offer consumers. They also model consumer
choice of a provider upon a health event. These papers emphasize the role of bargaining
between the intermediary and the sellers and the complex ways in which market power and
product differentiation at both the seller and intermediary level affect consumer pricing and
choices.
Salz (2020) studies intermediaries in commercial waste collection in New York City and
observes contracts reached by buyers and sellers including price. He finds that, because
buyers with high search costs gravitate to the intermediaries, the bilateral bargaining seg-
ment of the market is particularly competitive. Thus, matching by intermediaries and
matching to intermediaries together causes low prices in the bilateral market. Biglaiser, Li,
Murry, and Zhou (2020) also highlight selection effects when dealers compete with bilateral
bargaining in the context of used cars. They use pricing patterns to infer the importance
of addressing asymmetric information in explaining the prevalence of dealers. Buchholz
(2021) and Fréchette, Lizzeri, and Salz (2019) study dynamic matching models of taxi cabs
in New York City and view the regulator as a platform that can implement policies that can
reduce search costs and affect both the entry choice and locations of taxicabs. Both papers
find that appropriate policies can substantially increase welfare. Buchholz, Doval, Kastl,
Matejka, and Salz (2020) study a Czech ride-hailing platform that allows drivers to bid on
riders so riders choose between rides with different prices and waiting times. This study
emphasizes price-setting between the buyer and seller which plays a role in the models in
Section 6. There is a large literature in finance on the value of centralized markets relative
to individual traders. A recent example is Allen and Wittwer (2021) who study the treasury
bond market in Canada and observe individual trades and prices.
10 Conclusion
This chapter focuses on pricing in two-sided markets, the most well-studied phenomenon in
the growing literature on platform economics. Platforms set prices on each side of the mar-
ket accounting for the complex interactions between the various platform’s users. Pricing
strategies respond to the existence of network effects but also contribute to the realization
of such network effects.
We start by reviewing the theoretical literature on monopoly platforms, comparing
profit-maximizing to welfare-maximizing solutions, and analyzing different ways in which
network effects shape prices and market outcomes.
Next, we turn to competition between platforms, which has been the subject of recent
research. We emphasize the (somewhat fuzzy) difference between “competition for the
market” and “competition on the market,” and review the different approaches to modeling
platform competition. We point to the importance of accounting for the various ways that
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agents may interact with the platforms, such as by single-homing or multi-homing. In
addition, we discuss the nascent literature on the closely-related topic of matching design,
opening the “black box” of network effects and allowing for individualized matching and
within-side price discrimination.
Finally, we discuss empirical approaches to the study of these markets. We discuss
identification issues in the estimation of network effects. We argue that connecting this
literature to the well-developed literature on the estimation of social spillovers provides
valuable insights and opens the door to promising new directions for future research. We
review a number of empirical papers that rely on a variety of strategies to identify network
effects. We review the study of pricing in these markets and show support for several of the
theoretical results.
Despite the fact that many issues related to platforms are dynamic in nature, the lit-
erature on platforms is largely static; very few works study ignition and dynamic platform
competition. More progress is needed to understand the evolution of platform markets.
Moreover, most of the literature on competing platforms focuses on symmetric market con-
figurations. More work on the relation between platform size and dominance is needed for
policy analysis.
Similarly, more work on the effects of multi-homing when agents have different values
for interacting with the other sides is necessary for a better understanding of pricing in such
markets.
Discriminatory practices have also become prevalent in many platforms and the litera-
ture still lacks a flexible but tractable model accounting for such practices. The literature
is also evolving towards a deeper understanding of the interactions between pricing and
other aspects of platform design such as feedback and recommendation systems, bundling,
integration, ranking systems, marketing, information design, and entry rules.
Lastly, specialized industry studies in areas such as media, finance, transportation, hous-
ing, and health insurance, which have been covered only tangentially in this chapter, rep-
resent important directions for current and future research.
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Bramoullé, Y., H. Djebbari, and B. Fortin (2020). Peer effects in networks: A survey. Annual Review
of Economics 12, 603–629.
Brock, W. A. and S. N. Durlauf (2001). Discrete choice with social interactions. Review of Economics
Studies 68, 235–260.
Brock, W. A. and S. N. Durlauf (2007). Identification of binary choice models with social interactions.
Journal of Econometrics 140, 52–75.
Buchholz, N. (2021). Spatial equilibrium, search frictions and dynamic efficiency in thetaxi industry.
In Press, Review of Economic Studies.
Buchholz, N., L. Doval, J. Kastl, F. Matejka, and T. Salz (2020). The value of time: Evidence from
auctioned cab rides. Unpublished Manuscript, MIT.
Cabral, L. (2011). Dynamic price competition with network effects. The Review of Economic
Studies 78 (1), 83–111.
Cabral, L. (2019). Towards a theory of platform dynamics. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 28 (1), 60–72.
Cabral, L. M., D. J. Salant, and G. A. Woroch (1999). Monopoly pricing with network externalities.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 17 (2), 199–214.
Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2001). Competing cybermediaries. European Economic Review 45,
797–808.
89
Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2003). Chicken & egg: Competition among intermediation service
providers. RAND Journal of Economics 34, 309–328.
Calvano, E. and M. Polo (2020). Strategic differentiation by business models: Free-to-air and pay-
TV. The Economic Journal 130 (625), 50–64.
Candogan, O., K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar (2012). Optimal pricing in networks with externalities.
Operations Research 60 (4), 883–905.
Caoui, E. H. (2020). Estimating the costs of standardization: Evidence from the movie industry.
Unpublished manuscript, University of Toronto.
Carbo-Valverde, S., S. Chakravorti, and F. Rodriguez-Fernandez (2015). The role of interchange
fees in two-sided markets: An empirical investigation on payment cards. Forthcoming, Review of
Economics and Statistics.
Carroni, E., L. Madio, and S. Shekhar (2020). Superstars in two-sided markets: Exclusives or not?
Unpublished manuscript, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
Casadesus-Masanell, R. and H. Ha laburda (2014). When does a platform create value by limiting
choice? Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 23 (2), 259–293.
Castillo, J. C. (2020). Who benefits from surge pricing. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Pennsylvania.
Chandra, A. and A. Collard-Wexler (2009). Mergers in two-sided markets: An application to the
Canadian newspaper industry. Journal of Economics and Management Science 18, 1045–1070.
Chen, J., U. Doraszelski, and J. E. Harrington, Jr (2009). Avoiding market dominance: Product
compatibility in markets with network effects. The RAND Journal of Economics 40 (3), 455–485.
Chen, Y. and M. H. Riordan (2008). Price-increasing competition. The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 39 (4), 1042–1058.
Chen, Y.-J., Y. Zenou, and J. Zhou (2018). Competitive pricing strategies in social networks. The
RAND Journal of Economics 49 (3), 672–705.
Choi, J. P. (2010). Tying in two-sided markets with multi-homing. The Journal of Industrial
Economics 58 (3), 607–626.
Choi, J. P. and D.-S. Jeon (2020). Two-sided platforms and biases in technology adoption.
Choi, J. P. and D.-S. Jeon (2021). A leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets with nonnegative
price constraints. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1), 283–337.
Choi, J. P., B. Jullien, and Y. Lefouili (2017). Tying in two-sided markets with multi-homing:
Corrigendum and comment. The Journal of Industrial Economics 65 (4), 872–886.
Chou, C.-f. and O. Shy (1990). Network effects without network externalities. International Journal
of Industrial Organization 8, 259–270.
Chowdhury, S. M. and S. Martin (2017). Exclusivity and exclusion on platform markets. Journal of
Economics 120 (2), 95–118.
Church, J. and N. Gandal (1992). Network effects, software provision, and standardization. Journal
of Industrial Economics 40, 85–103.
90
Clements, M. and H. Ohashi (2005). Indirect network effects and the product cycle: Video games
in the U.S., 1994-2002. Journal of Industrial Economics 53, 515–542.
Correia-da Silva, J., B. Jullien, Y. Lefouili, and J. Pinho (2019). Horizontal mergers between
multisided platforms: Insights from Cournot competition. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 28 (1), 109–124.
Cournot, A.-A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses par
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Fréchette, G. R., A. Lizzeri, and T. Salz (2019). Frictions in a competitive, regulated market:
Evidence from taxis. American Economic Review 109, 2954–2992.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (2000). Pricing a network good to deter entry. The Journal of Industrial
Economics 48 (4), 373–390.
92
Fumagalli, C., M. Motta, and C. Calcagno (2018). Exclusionary Practices: The Economics of
Monopolisation and Abuse of Dominance. Cambridge University Press.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and X. Y. Wauthy (2014). Vertical product differentiation and two-sided markets.
Economics Letters 123 (1), 58–61.
Galichon, A. (2018). Optimal Transport Methods in Economics. Princeton University Press.
Gandal, N. (1994). Hedonic price indexes for spreadsheets and an empirical test for network exter-
nalities. RAND Journal of Economics 25, 160–170.
Gandal, N., M. Kende, and R. Rob (2000). The dynamics of technological adoption in hard-
ware/software systems: The case of compact disc players. RAND Journal of Economics 31,
43–61.
Gans, J. S. (2019). The specialness of zero. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gavazza, A. (2016). An empirical equilibrium model of a decentralized asset market. Economet-
rica 84, 1755–1798.
Genakos, C. and T. Valletti (2011). Testing the “waterbed” effect in mobile telecommunications.
Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 1114–1142.
Goldfarb, A. and C. Tucker (2019). Digital economics. Journal of Economic Literature 57, 3–43.
Gomes, R. and A. Pavan (2016). Many-to-many matching and price discrimination. Theoretical
Economics 11 (3), 1005–1052.
Gomes, R. and A. Pavan (2019). Price customization and targeting in matching markets. Unpub-
lished manuscript, Northwestern University and Toulouse School of Economics.
Gomes, R. and A. Pavan (2021). Two-sided markets and matching design. In F. Echenique, N. Im-
morlica, and V. Varziani (Eds.), Online Matching Theory and Market Design. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Goolsbee, A. and P. J. Klenow (2002). Evidence on learning and network externalities in the diffusion
of home computers. Journal of Law and Economics 45, 317–343.
Gowrisankaran, G., A. Nevo, and R. Town (2015). Mergers when prices are negotiated: Evidence
from the hospital industry. American Economic Review 105, 172 – 203.
Gowrisankaran, G., M. Park, and M. Rysman (2014). Measuring network effects in a dynamic
environment. Unpublished Manuscript, Boston University.
Gowrisankaran, G. and J. Stavins (2004). Network externalities and technology adoption: Lessons
from electronic payments. RAND Journal of Economics 35, 260–276.
Graham, B. S. (2008). Identifying social interactions through conditional variance restrictions.
Econometrica 76, 643–660.
Graham, B. S. (2018). Identifying and estimating neighborhood effects. Journal of Economic
Literature 56, 450–500.
Griva, K. and N. Vettas (2011). Price competition in a differentiated products duopoly under
network effects. Information Economics and Policy 23 (1), 85–97.
93
Haeringer, G. (2018). Market Design: Auctions and Matching. MIT Press.
Hagiu, A. (2006). Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms. The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 37 (3), 720–737.
Hagiu, A. and H. Ha laburda (2014). Information and two-sided platform profits. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 34, 25–35.
Hagiu, A. and D. Spulber (2013). First-party content and coordination in two-sided markets. Man-
agement Science 59 (4), 933–949.
Hagiu, A. and J. Wright (2015a). Marketplace or reseller? Management Science 61(1), 184–203.
Hagiu, A. and J. Wright (2015b). Multi-sided platforms. International Journal of Industrial Orga-
nization 43, 162–174.
Halaburda, H., B. Jullien, and Y. Yehezkel (2020). Dynamic competition with network externalities:
how history matters. The RAND Journal of Economics 51 (1), 3–31.
Halaburda, H., M. J. Piskorski, and P. Yıldırım (2018). Competing by restricting choice: The case
of matching platforms. Management Science 64 (8), 3574–3594.
Halaburda, H. and Y. Yehezkel (2013). Platform competition under asymmetric information. Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5 (3), 22–68.
Ha laburda, H. and Y. Yehezkel (2016). The role of coordination bias in platform competition.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 25 (2), 274–312.
Hausman, J. A. (1996). Valuation of new goods under perfect and imperfect competition. In T. F.
Bresnahan and R. J. Gordon (Eds.), The Economics of New Goods, Chapter 5, pp. 209–248.
University of Chicago Press.
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